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A primary task of the police administrator is to make
the most efficient and effective use of his manpower. In
addition because police provide a public service, an important
issue in the deployment of police personnel is that each
segment of the community be allocated an equitable share.
Models are presented that focus on the spatial component of
these deployment goals.
Interactive computer models are formulated to aid a
police planner design patrol sectors which represent a good
balance among often conflicting objectives (e.g. response
times, workloads). The models guide the decision maker
iteratively through a series of alternative sector designs
while providing him ,with information about a spectrum of
performance measures. An integral part of the system is a
set of algorithms that can modify an initial sector design to
greatly improve imbalances in either workload, preventive
patrol coverage or response time. Computational experience
is presented.
A second set of models is presented which focuses on the
more effective deployment of randomly patrolling police units
as measured by the probability of intercepting a crime in
progress. The discussion begins with a presentation of a
basic search theoretic model of police patrol which is used
to calculate the probability of intercepting a crime. As part
of the analysis of the model's input parameters, we discuss
the critical need for a police patrol related data base and
outline some of its salient features (e.g. duration and
observability of various crime types). Then, using the
model we explore the differences between overlapping and
non-overlapping patrol sectors.
The development of methodologies for deploying patrol
units proceeds in several stages. First, we analyze the
impact on the classical search theory allocation problem of
various characteristics of crimes (e.g. random arrival,
short duration, mUltiple independent targets). A continuous
time differential equation model of search and detection
provides the vehicle for carrying out "much of this analysis.
Optimal solutions for a number of classical search problems
are presented including simple closed form expressions for
determining if a region should be excluded frem' -the
search. The main result of this analysis, however, is the
generation of a number of important insights which simplify
the development of algorithms for deploying police.
An algorithm for deploying a tactical patrol force
(i.e. limited or no responsibility for calls for service) is
presented. The measure of effectiveness that is used is the
weighted (a user specified index that weights the various
crime types) probability of intercepting a crime. An
essential component of the algorithm is its ability to
perform sensitivity analysis on the various input parameters.
Lastly we outline the development of an algorithm for
effectively allocating the patrol time of standard patrol
units. Once again the measure used is the weighted probability
of intercepting a crime. The discussion closes with a
description of what questions need to be answered before a
total model of police patrol can be developed.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard C. Larson
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and
Electrical Engineering
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CI-IAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.0 Background
1.0.1 Role Definition
"There's a holdup in the Bronx,
Brooklyn's breaking out in fights.
There's a traffic jam in Harlem
That's backed up to Jackson Heights.
There's a scout troup short a child;
Khruschev's due at Idlewild.
Car 54 where are you?"
The above excerpt from the lead song of a popular 1960's
television series offers a sprinkling of the manifold
activities of its heroes, two New York City patrolmen.
Despite changes in the Kremlin and in New York's international
airport during the past decade, the policeman of the seven-
ties is still confronted daily with a kalerdoscope of
responsibilities. Given the multiplicity of roles the police
officer, and more specifically the patrolman, must assume,
it is not hard to recognize the complex problem a decision
maker faces in attempting to maximize the efficiency ~d
equity with which the patrol force operates.
On the most basic level decisions need to be made as to
which tasks fall within the proper purview of a policeman's
role. Which tasks can be handled by civilians within the
department and which responsibilities could be delegated
entirely to other public agencies? Should police be the
prime providers of emergency medical transport'? ShOl11d a
patrol officer be summoned if a cat is caught in a tree, an
-18-
individual locked out of his home, or even a child lost?
Should traffic control be the responsibility of police?
These same role identification questions can be asked
both on a macroscopic level, police in general, and on a
microscopic level, the patrol officer. Should time be taken
from preventive patrol activities in order to respond to a
two day late complaint of stolen property for the sole
purpose of filing a perfunctory report on the incident~ Should
a city tie down more than half of its force two or three times
a day to guard school crossings? There are no simple answers
to these questions 0 And as the recent commission on standards
and Goals [ 8J suggested, the answers will and should be
community dependentG The response should reflect an amalgama-
tion of community expectations, needs and priorities, while
cognizant of the limitations on police resources. An attempt
at expanding the duties of a patrol officer will of necessity
encroach on already existent responsibilities. All too often,
the task most easily encroached upon is preventive patrol, a
task which many police feel prevents crimes by posing a threat
of apprehension. Since the amount of preventive patrol time
is usually determined by how much time is 'left' over from
other activities [ 4J. this activity is very easily nibbled
away by expanding the patrolman's role. More importantly,
in the current situation, with our cities suffering from
financial crises along with the rising crime rates, the
questions posed here concerning role delineation have been
-19-
transformed into pragmatic budgetary issues. Can the cities af-
ford to have police provide all the s~rvices they presently do?
1.0.2 Performance Measures
Defining clearly the policeman's role in the community is,
however, only one of a series of steps that should precede the
process of allocating available resources e An obvious second
issue to resolve is the specification of measures to be used in
assessing the effectiveness of the police in performing their
assigned functions. Ideally these should measure output. How
have specific crime levels changed as a result of fielding
more patrol units? Are the various segments of the co~~unity
satisfies with the delivery of police services? Unfortunately
it is often extremely difficult to measure directly police
effectiveness. Instead a surrogate is often adopted; in some
inst~1ces it will be a process measure which describes how the
system performs (e.g. response time) rather than what its im-
pact is. The measure of response time is purported to reflect
citizen satisfaction and patrol coverage or arrests to reflect
the efficiency with which police deal with crime. In other
instances the surrogate may be an input measure describing,
for example, the number of patrol units on duty at anyone time.
An alternative approach to measuring police performance is to
measure the efficiency of the systeme Can the same level of
services be provided at a lower cost (e.g. introduce civilian
dispatchers) or can more services be provided without increas-
ing the cost?
-20-
Because police provide a pUblic service, measuring of
performance can not be limited just to issues of overall
effectiveness and efficeincy. Each section of 'a community
has a right to receive its equitable share of police services.
In a recent court case [1 ], one segment of the Washington,
D.C. community sued the city and required it to prove that
police services had been distributed equitably. Equity,
however, is not always easily defined or measured. What
constitutes an equitable distribution of patrol coverage':
the same number of patrol hours per street mile, per part I
crime, per what?
Problems of performance measurement are not however
limited to systemic issues. The performance of an individual
police officer is, in many ways, even more difficult to assess
[ 2,7]. Does a particular officer use too much force when
making an arrest? Is he efficient in his preventive patrol
activities?
Even with the development of perceptive measures of
performance, the multiplicity of goals and measures com-
plicates the decision-making task. Individual goals and
performance measures do not stand isolated§ Decisions must
be made as to what to emphasize and tradeoffs must be analyzed
either because of limited resources or because of conflicting
goals or both. Equity criteria may suggest one form of
deployment (e.g. dispersal) while efficiency criteria warrant
another (e.g. crime concentrated).
-21-
1.0.3 Relationship Between Input and Output
Having determined an appropriate multifaceted role for
the police and patrol officer, and developed measures to
evaluate the degree to which the goals are achieved, the
decision maker can now begin the task of allocating his
limited resources to achieve specified goals. He must, of
course, have the capability of determining how many patrol-
men are needed to achieve a specified response time and how
that response time impacts on crime levels (in terms of
crime prevention and crime solution after the fact). He
also needs to determine the level of preventive patrol
coverage needed to produce a 5, 10 or 20% reduction in the
street crime level. Determining the link between various
input and output measures would at least allow the decision
maker to begin analyzing alternatives as to their relative
effectiveness.
The difficulties involved in uncovering the relation-
ship between input and output in the area of crime are in
part reflections of the fact that the problems the police
attack are not only police problems but, on a larger scope,
societal problems~ Just as the health of an individual does
not necessarily depend on the type of hospital closest to him,
the level of crime in an area is not a direct function of
only the efficiency of local police patrol. The causes of
crime are complex, the police being but one component of a
criminal justic system designed to control and react to
-22-
incidences of crime. For some crimes the police can pose
almost no deterrent effect. Even for such crime categories
as street crime where patrol has potential impact, the effec-
tiveness of patrol is inseparable from the courts and correc-
tions. Doubling the interception probability and solution
rate of crimes can not take criminals off the street or pose
a deterrent threat if criminals are not prosecuted and
imprisoned. On the other hand, a relatively small increase
in interception orsolution could have a long term impact if
all convicted criminals were sentenced to life imprisonment
or successfully rehabilitated while in prison. (Obviously,
we are not suggesting the former nor realistically expecting
the latter).
1.0.4 Interactions
We have outlined above three separate steps: (l)defini-
tion of role; (2)specification of performance measures;
())determination of relationship between input and output;
that a rational decision maker should take in allocating
resources. However, we also recognize the interaction
between these steps. The specification of performance
measures requires a realistic appraisal of how police can
affect a specific situation. For example, in measuring
the impact of various patrol strategies, the performance
measures used should relate to only a delineated fraction of
all part I crimes, those observable by a passing patrol car.
-2]-
Another decision to expand the role of police to include, for
example, responding to emergency medical situations, should
be sensitive to the implications of this decision. What
amount of expenditure in police resources will be required?
How will taking on these added responsibilities detract from
police performance in their other duties?
If the above discussion has conveyed a feeling for the
tremendous array and spectrum of multifaceted problems facing
the police decision maker, then it has achieved its goal. The
reader should therefore not expect the following pages to
contain a single all encompassing model of police patrol which
can be used to deploy patrol units to optimize whatever goal
is specified. The perceptive reader can not realistically
expect a methodology for deploying patrol units to eliminate
or even reduce signiricantly serious observable crimes. What
will follow is a series of models that examine different
aspects (performance measures) of patrol and Which facilitate
the exploration for more equitable and efficient deployment
strategies.
1.0.5 The Cost of Police
Two and one half billion dollars a year was the estimate
of the cost of police given by the President's Crime Commission
in 1967 [10J. A lion's share of this total went to pay some
420,000 people working for approximately 40,000 separate
agencies. With spiraling inflation since theQ, the cost is no
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doubt significantly highero Since 1959 the cost of police in
12 of the nation's largest cities has more than tripled [9].
Presently the cost of police in those cities is running at
approximately $65 per capita. Of the total departmental bud-
get police patrol consumes by far the largest share. In many
cities patrol costs represent 40 to 50 percent (sometimes even
more) [4J of the budget. With the average starting salary
for a policeman (in those 12 cities) now at over$lO,lOO, the
annual direct cost (excluding pension) of fielding round-the-
clock one two-man patrol car is over $100,000.
In the light of the budget crunch faced by many cities
in recent years, the rising cost of police is forcing city
administrators into some very difficult decisions. In New
York City more than one thousand patrolmen were recently
laid off as part of a massive economy drive [3J. With the
above discussion and figures as background, it is all too
obvious that there is a critical need to deploy police in the
most effiecient way possible. It is this particular issue
(efficient allocatiDnof patrol) that many of the models that
will be presented here were designed to address.
-25-
1.1 Objectives
Despite the complexity of the police role, two rather
simple assertions can be made: (l)The police provide a pub-
lic service; (2)A primary goal of police patrol is to suppress
crime. The first assertion suggests that equity is an impor-
tant criterion for deploying police. Thus the first set of
models that we will present focuses on developing equitable
precinct level deployment strategies through the modification
of sector boundaries. The second class of models, based on
search theory; focuses on observable street crimes and is
used to deploy police so as to maximize the weighted (by crime
,type) probability of intercepting a crime. One underlying
theme common to the development of both models is that they
have the flexibility to incorporate local considerations and
priorities when applied to a particular situation.
The sector redesign models are part of an overall inter-
active system geared towards generating an equitable sector
configuration. However, rather than using some one absolute
measure of equity, the system allows the user to decide what,
for his environment, is most equitable. He can measure equity
in terms of only one performance measure (e.g. workload,
preventive patrol coverage, or travel time) or he can explore
tradeoffs between these particular measures to achieve an
intermediate range of imbalances in each of the parameters.
A key component of the above system is the hypercube
queuing model developed by Larson [ 5. 6 ]. It is a
-26-
probabilistic model which is used to estimate the operating
characteristics of a particular sector configuration,
generating such statistics as each unit's workload. precinct
wide average travel time, sector travel times, and frequency
of intersector dispatches. An interactive system iteratively
guides the user by offering' several alternative modifications
to the present configuration, which by hypercube estimates,
will reduce present inequities in certain performance
measures.
The development of the search theoretic models of police
(interceptive) patrol starts with the introduction of several
modifications of the earliest models of search and detection
developed by Koopman. Using the descriptive search model as
a basis, we carry out in two stages an extensive analysis to
develop methodologies for efficiently allocating police
patrol effort. The first stage determines characteristics of
optimal search strategies for the general class of targets
that arrive and depart randomly. Using the results of this
stage, the range of alternatives that need be analyzed in
order to find an efficient allocation is narrowed significant~
lyo The major consequence of these insights is that the
allocation, for example, of a tactical patrol force or the
free time of an individual patrol unit can be reformulated
so that straightforward heuristic techniques can be applied to
develop a good allocation of patrol effort.
Although the search theory models;_consider only one
-27-
measure, the weighted probability of interception. local
conditions can still be incorporated. The weights can be used
to capture the sUbjective importance pla~ed on each crime
type, which may vary from locale to locale.
-28-
1.2 Outline of th~ Chapters
Chapter II contains a review of the relevant literature
and is divided into four sections. The first section reviews
other models presently used by police in constructing sectors
as well as presenting a brief description of the development
of the hypercube model. Next the general search theory
literature is reviewed as to its applicability to problems in
which targets arrive and depart randomly. Then the literature
applying search theory to police patrol is analyzed in detail.
Lastly since an obvious implicit assumption of all of the
search theory models is that patrol can impact on crime,
relevant data from a number of experiments will be presented
and discussed.
The third chapter describes an interactive system for
sector redesign. Because the decision to make the system
interactive greatly influ~nced many aspects of the ~~em's
development, the motivation for choosing that orientation is
discussed e Following that, the superstructure of the system
is described, outlining how the system functions in guiding
the decision maker to an equitable configuration. The
workhorse of the system, however, is a set of ind~vidual
programs which can focus on a particular performance measure
(e.g. workload, preventive patrol coverage or travel time).
By alteDimg \iteratively the sector configuration, they attempt
to improve on an imbalance in that measure. These programs
are analyzed in detail both in terms of the algorithms used,
as well as in~terms of the underlyingproperties each program
-29-
attempts to exploit. A number of applications are also
included.
In the course of presenting this system one tangential
issue that is discussed is the non-equivalence of balanced
workload.s and balanced preventi.ve patrol coverage. F'inally
we introduce a method for attacking another related sector
design problem. This involves taking an existing n sector
configuration and assigning the n sectors to less than n
patrol units in a way that minimizes the workload imbalance.
All of the succeeding chapters (four through eight)
discuss the search theoretic models of police patrol.
Chapter IV begins with a discussion of the basic model, in-
cluding a comparison of overlapping and non-overlapping
patrol sectors. Following the initial presentation we
proceed to analyze in qualitative terms how randomness in
the arrival and departures of the targets (i. e. crinles)
impacts on optimal patrol strategies. This analysis is
carried out in terms of classical search theory by focusing
on the phenomenon of diminishing return. We show how random-
ness slows the process of diminishing return and when combined
with the short duration of crimes tends to generate optimal
strategies which limit patrol to only a small section of an
entire region.
Chapter V continues the discussion of the impact of
randomness in the arrival and departure of targets on optimal
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search strategies but with a quantitative focus rather than a
.
qualitative one. Using a differential equation model of
search, we analyze for a number of situations cyclical
sea~ch strategies involving two regions. As part of our
analysis·we present simple analytic expressions that specify
when to search only one of the two regions.
The first example that is analyzed involves a patrol
dividing its search efforts equally between two identical
regions (i.e. same crime rate and detection rate). The
question that we resolve is "How frequently should the searcher
change regions?"o The finding was that the average expected
number of crimes in progress increases as the length of stay
in a region increases; the magnitude of this is also
measured. The sec~nd example more realistically models
police patrol as it assumes that time is lost (because of
travel) from the search process when switching between regions.
Again a method is presented for finding how long each region
should be searched before traveling to the other region. We
show that because crimes are of short duration even small
travel times between regions make switching back and forth
between regions an inefficient policy. The ramifications of
this is that in allocating search effort among regions in a
realistic patrol environment, solutions which require a
patrol unit to travel between two even relatively high crime
regions should be avoided. This conclusion played a key role
in the development of the algorithms presented in Chapters
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VI and VII.
The last problem analyzed with the differential equation
model involves two regions of equal size but with differing
crime rates. Two sets of conditions are determined under
which it is preferable to search only one region. One con-
dition describes when to search only one region if no
minimum duration of a search of each each region has been
speciried. The second condition also specifies when to limit
search to the high crime region but this time as a function
of the minimum duration imposed on a visit to each region.
Chapters VI and VII build on the results of the two
previous chapters to develop algorithms for (l)deploying a
tactical patrol force and (2)finding the best region in
which a standard patrol unit should concentrate its patrol.
The two algorithms, besides addressing specific problems,
are also meant to be representative of the potential applica-
tion of search theory to a broad spectrum of crime related
patrol allocation issues.
The tactical patrol force algorithm of Chapter VI allo-
cates a specified number of patrol units among a set of high
crime regions. In the process of finding the optimal strategy
only solutions which allocate an integer number (or zero) of
patrol units to each region are considered because, as was
noted earlier, the time lost in travel between regions will,
in general, more than outweigh any benefits that might be
derived from switching regions.
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The application of the algorithm to a number of examples
is presented and is partially intended to point out some of
the data that is critical to developing effective patrol
strategies. For one thing, it is not sufficient to know
just the total observable crime rate of a region but it is
also necessary to knew the breakdown by crime type. However,
an equally important, but less recognized, data need is the
observalbe duration of each crime type (either an average or
preferably a probability distribution) and an estimate for
the probabDity that a passing patrol car will detect the
crime when it is potentially observalbe.
The tactical patrol force algorithm is flexible in that
it is not limited by the specific form of the probability
distribution function chosen to describe the duration of a
crime. In addition the objective function which is optimized
allows for different weights to be assigned to each crime
type to reflect the importance associated with intercepting
that type of crime. Lastly an integral part of the algorithm
is its capability of performing sensitivity analysis on each
of it input parameters.
Chapter VII is intended to be exploratory and offers one
approach to finding the optimal patrol region for a standard
patrol car (i.e. a patrol unit'that has responsibility for
answering calls for service). The objective jUnction to be
maximized is the same as in~the previous algorithm,the
weighted probability of intercepting a crime. In addition
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some of the issues relating to combining two patrol sectors
into a single larger sector enabling overlapping patrol are
also discussed.
The last chapter presents a summary of the most signifi-
cant results of our search theoretic modeling. Chapter VIII
also introduces some specific conclusions implied by our
analysis about the potential for developing more effective
patrol strategies. However the major focus of the chapter is
to outline a numbrwof important issues that need to be
resolved in order to implement models such as ours. It has
already been noted that there is a need for developing a data
base more relevant to patrol. One other specific issue dis-
cussed is the need to design carefully experiments whose
major purpose is to determine how saturation patrols disperse
crime in terms of both the magnitude of the effect and how it
varies over time. Experiments of this type, because of focus,
are really distinct from those that attempt to measure the
reduction in crime in the saturated region while monitoring
some of the side effects (dispersion phenomena) which reduce
the actual impact of the saturation patrol effort.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0 Introduction
Before proceeding with the actual review of the relevant
literature, it is important to understand first its intended
purpose. The literature review does not purport to describe
the state of the art in police patrol deployment. For a dis-
cussion of this scope, the reader is referred to Urban Police
Patrol Analysis [25J by Larson and to a critical review of
policy related research written by Gass and Dawson [16J. The
focus here will be instead on models and methodologies which
relate either to sector design or to the allocation of patrol
effort to intercept crimes. However, even for this more
limited set of models, this presentation will have as its only
goal to place in perspective the research presented in later
chapters with that of earlier work in the area. This issue
will be of special importance when we discuss search theory
since an initial question we had to resolve was "Is the
existing general search theory literature directly applicable
to police patrol issues?". Unfortunately, except for some of
the more basic results, the answer was negative. It is a point
we will explore initially here and will expand upon later in
Chapters IV and V. With the above disclaimer and'statement of
purpose in mind we proceed with the review.
The literature to be discussed falls into four categories:
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1. Sector Design--Proscriptive and Descriptive fuodels
2. Search Theory--General
3. Search Theory--Applied to Police Patrol
4. Patrol's Impact on Crime
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2.1 Sector Design--Proscriptive and Descriptive Models
The redesign of a precinct's outdated sector configura-
tion is a problem police administrators must tangle with
periodically: The methods used range from an experienced
patrol officer attempting to eyeball an acceptable configura-
tion to the more sophisticated techniques involving computer-
ized data analysis of calls for service and crime data. This
data analysis is then used as input into a second set of
programs to generate a sector design which optimizes one par-
ticular performance measure. Our interest is naturally in
methods of the latter type. Gass [is], Heller et al [19J and
Dean [ 9J, to cite a few examples, have used techniques devel-
oped for political redistricting (set covering and transpor-
tation/heuristic) to produce workload balanced sector configu-
rations. Incorporated in their approach, typically are con-
straints that force the sectors to be contiguous and compact
rather than elongated. In Detroit [10J a different approach
was taken to produce balanced workloads which in ways is
analogous to some of the models described in Chapter III. For
the existing configuration the individual workloads were
estimated by summing up the work generated by each census
block within a sector. Then the configuration was iteratively
modified by switching groups of census blocks between over and
underutilized units.
Common to these static models of workloads is the assump-
tion that the workload of a patrol unit and the workload
-39-
generated by its ~ssociated sector are equivalent. Larson
[28J, however, has shown this not to be true and in a recent
study in New Haven [8 J. the internally generated workload
underestimated a patrol unit's workload by as much as 60%.
Bammi [3 ] and a study in San Jose [1 ] both focus on
response time as the performance measure of major concern in
designing beats. Although each presents a different method
for minimizing precinct wide response time, neither method
is based on a solid theoretical foundation. In Bammi's
analytic model a number of independence assumptions are made
about the operation of each of the patrol units. It, however,
has been shown [27J that in a queuing system (a group of
patrol units deployed to answer calls for service can be
viewed as a queuing system), the state (answering a call for
service or on patrol) of a particular server is not indepen-
dent of the rest of the system. The San Jose study, on the
other hand, claimed that by minimizing the frequency of inter-
sector dispatches the precinct wide response time is minimized.
Although a justification for this assumption is given, no
proof is offered nor is it clear that the method they used
guarantees that even the frequency of intersector dispatches
is minimized.
Besides the questions of internal validity that we have
raised there is a fundamental difference in orientation of the
above models and the system we describe in Chapter III. Each
of the above models focuses essentially on only one parameter,
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with the user having at most limited control, through the use
of constraints, over what the program will generate as its
suggested configuration. Police patrol, though, is a multi-
faceted activity with multiple and often conflicting objec-
tives. As such, an approach to sector design should be
oriented more towards tradeoffs between performance measures
than optimizing a single performance measure without regard to
the impact on any of the others. The approach described in
Chapter III contrasts sharply with this as the goal of the
system is to guide the user towards what he judges to be an
equitable configuration, while explicitly taking into account
tradeoffs between balanced workloads, preventive patrol
coverage, response time, etc.
An obvious prerequisite for the developmen~ of a system
similar to that of Chapter III is the existence of a methodo-
logy (descriptive model) for calculating the various perfo~­
ance measures. Two methods presently available for evaluating
a particular sector configuration are Larson's hypercube
queuing model, which we use 1 [27 J, and a simulation, the
prototype of which was also developed by Larson C25J. Although,
conceptually the interactive approach described later could
have been structured about a more flexible simulation, the
speed of calculation was too critical a parameter since the
system iterates through a series of alternative designs.
Thus, the more rapid hypercube model was chosen, instead, as
the foundation for the system's development.
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The essential difference between using just the hypercube
or simulation model and the structured system of Chapter III
is that the former are purely descriptive models. They can,
therefore, provide no guidance on how to improve on the
present configuration other than by pointing out inequities.
Instead the user must develop on his own a series of potential
alternatives which he then evaluates individually with one of
the models. With a structure superimposed on these models, it
is possible for the computer to generate alternatives which
modify the sector configuration in the direction the user has
specified.
To summarize, the methodology to be presented here has
the flexibility of focusing on anyone of a series of perform-
ance measures, while encouraging the user to consider tradeoffs
between measures. In addition the decision making process is
left in the hands of the user. This is an advantage which
should not be underestimated as it significantly enhances the
system's implementability, a point which we elaborate on later.
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2.2 Search Theory: General
As was stated in the introduction to this chapter, the
literature reviewed will include only those papers directly
related to the problem of maximizing the probability of inter-
cepting randomly arriving and departing targets. Specifically
we will review the foundations of search theory developed by
Koopman ~~'4 ] as well as the companion work of Charnes and
Cooper [?]. Following that we will focus on the search
literature that looks at periodic cyclical search strategies
since the random arrival and departure of multiple independent
targets often necessitates optimal strategies of this type.
For a more comprehensive discussion of the literature the
reader is referred instead to Morse [32J and Moore [30J.
No discussion of search theory can be really complete
without some introductory remarks about Koopman's pioneering
work in the field. In a series of three articles [22, 23, 24J
Koopman looked at several aspects of the search and detection
problem and outlined, first, the basic negative exponential
model with its fundamental characteristic of diminishing return.
"As the available search effort increases the probability
of interception increases less than linearly."
{It is this simple~onentialmodal, coupled with a heuristic
procedure to find a more efficient allocation of police patrol,
that forms the backbone of the algorithms developed in
Chapters VI and VII.) Building on this model, he then pro-
ceeded to develop a methodology for find~ng the optimal
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allocation of search effort over a region. In his example
the target is assumed stationary and is located somewhere in
a region A with a known probability density function con-
tinuous in the region. Charnes and Cooper [ 7J later
developed an algorithm for the discrete analog to Koopman's
problem.
One obvious difficulty in applying either Koopman's or
Charnes and Cooper's methodology to police patrol is that
theirmetto,dologies do not include travel time between points
or regions and could, therefore, generate unimplementable
solutions. Secondly their approaches do not lend themselves
to the incorporation of classes of targets (crimes) each
with a different mean duration. However, of greater sig-
nificance is that the randomness in a crime's arrival and
departure and the independent arrival of crimes limit the
potential usefulness of their methods. Using the concept of
.
diminishing return we explore in Chapter IV exactly why this
is so. For the moment, though, it should be noted that ran-
domness and multiple independent crimes require that the
optimal solution specify not only how much effort to allocate
to each poin~ or region (which is all the above methods can
determine) but also how should that effort be sequenced. This
leads us to our next area of discussion, the literature in-
volving sequential search strategies.
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2.2.1 Sequencing Search Effort
Blachman and Proschan [5 ] analyzed the optimal sequen-
cing of search effort among a series of regions into which
targets arrive randomly atvarying rates. However, in con-
trast to our problem, once the target has arrived it never
departs. The objective function to be maximized is a gain
function which is a non-increasing function of the delay
between a target's arrival and the beginning of the detecting
look. Only cyclic searches are considered. Although a
method for determining almost optimal strategies is presented,
Barnett [4J points out that the theorem for determining
which regions should not be searched is meaningless when tar-
gets are allowed also to depart. Thus this approach provides
no insight in the police context into the characterization of
when not to search a region. It is this specific question
which the differential equation model of Chapter V success-
fully addresses, by generating very simple analytic expressions
to determine when to exclude a region.
Gilbert [17J and later Kisi [21J analyzed a two-box
search problem in which the objective is to minimize the
expected length of time until detection. The first result
Gilbert obtains is that if the target is equally likely to
be in either box, the optimal policy is a limit strategy which
involves switching instantaneously from one box to the other.
We obtain, in Chapter V, an analogous result for randomly
arriving and departing multiple targets using the differential
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equation model. Gilbert then proceeds to find an optimal
strategy when non-zero switching times are included. However,
because there is only a single target (and thus continuous
unbounded diminishing return) no matter how much time is lost
in switching regions, diminishing return eventually makes
switching regions profitable. In Chapter IV we show that as
a result of the arrival and departure of multiple targets
diminiShing return in the police context has a lower limit,
and as a result it may pay to stay in only one region. Using
the differential equation model this fact is confirmed and we
are able to quantify the limited range of switching times for
which cycling between regions is advantageous.
Two papers which more directly relate to the work presen-
ted here are by Moore [31J and Barnett [4]. Moore analyzed
the impact on optimal search strategies of random visibility
of a target both in terms of duration and initiation. An
interesting aspect of his presentation is that it compares
optimal strategies wh~ take account of these factors with a
blind application of Koopman's model disregarding all of
these characteristics of the target visibility. In general for
small amounts of search effort (crimes are relatively short)
the two strategies often provided significantly different
results. Although Moore suggests the possible analog between
police patrol and some of his examples, the police patrol
situation is really not compa~able. One obvious reason is
that his examples involve one target arriving somewhere in
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one of n regions. However, in the police context, each region
is generati11g crimes independently of the other, which as we
discuss in Chapter IV, tends to increase the likelihood that
search should be limited to a single region. In addition we
have noted that optimal strategies for targets arriving and
departing in different regions require the specification not
only of how ! ,much effort to allocate to each region but also
of the sequence of that effort. Moore's paper does not dis-
cuss sequencing because the problem he analyzes involves only
a single target.
There is, however, a more subtle, and in many ways, more
significant limitatiOtl in applying Moore q s results to police
patrol. He considers the problem in which the target's
visibility begins at a random instant (equivalent to a crime
beginning) by introducing a probability distribution function
for the target's appearance. However, this distribution
function is not calculated relative to the start of the entire
search process but relative rather to the search of each par-
ticular region. Thus his distribution function defines the
probability of the target appearing in region i five minutes
after the ~earcher has begun searching region i or appearing
in region j-three minutes after the searcher has begun
searching region j, independent of how much time has elapsed
before entering region i or region j. Thus conditioned on the
target appearing in region if Moore's example assumes that the
tcr~t's time of arrival depends of the time at which search
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is begun in region i. However, the time at which a crime
would occur in region i is more likely to be dependent on the
searcher leaving region i and beginning search in region j
than the time at which the searcher enters region i. We have
djscussed this point in somewhat greater detail because in
stating the problem to be solved, Moore does not seem to make
the above assumption; however, in the equations used to find
the optimal strategy he, in fact, does.
Barnett [4 ] considers the situation in which targets are
arriving in a Poisson manner with the rate varying by region.
In addition a probability distribution is assigned to the
duration of the target. One restrictive (in terms of general
applicability) assumption of the problem he models is that a
search of any region discovers, with probability one, all tar-
gets still present in that region. Barnett first proves that
the optimal strategies are cyclical, a fact we use in applying
the differential equation model. Then for the two region exam-
ple he finds analytically the optimal sequence of searcIl. 'Vith
this analysis he then generates a sufficient condition for ex-
cluding regions from the search in the N region allocation prob-
lem. Although the model incorporates some of the characteris-
tics of a search for crimes, it can not,at present, be directly
applied to finding optimal deployment strategies in a realistic
police environment.
The above discussion is by no means meant as an exhaustive
survey of the literature that relates to the search problem we
consider. We have chosen, for our discussion, papers that are
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representative of previous analyses of some of the different
individual characteristics of the search process involved in
police patrol. However, none of these models captures all of
the characteristics
1. multiple independent targets
2. random arrival of targets
3. departure of targets
4. different target types (mean duration)
5. time lost in travel between non-contiguous regions
In our review we have attempted to show how in each model or
methodology the elimination of one of the above characteristics
makes it difficult to generalize its results to police patrol.
In Chapter IV we begin by first developing a qualitative
understanding of how each of the above characteristics affects
the optimal solution. Then Chapter V introduces a differen-
tial equation model which can incorpo~ate all of them. Howeve~
even in our development of the differential equation model, the
model is not offered as part of an algorithm for deploying
police·patrol because of the present computational difficulty
in analyzing more than two regions 9 Instead it is used to pro-
viQ8 a number of generalizable insights specific to the police
environment (crimes of short duration, rapid rate of comple-
tion relative to rate of detection). These insights form the
basis of a number of simplifications essential to the develop-
ment of the patrol allocation algorithms of Chapters VI and
VII. Thus, in effect, we have come full circle. We started
with Koopman's most basic search model of random patrol, which
calculates the probability of intercepting a target. Then we
proceeded to show that a number of existing optimal allocation
methodologies can not be applied to the police patrol.
This motivated the development of the differential equation
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model, which then allowed us to develop patrol allocation al-
gorithms using essentially the basic Koopman ( not his
allocation model) model for calculating the probability of
interception when patrol is random.
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2.1 Search Theory: Applied to Police Patrol
A number of earlier works have suggested and discussed
the applicability of search theory to police patrol. A
natural q'tEstion is "How does the present work build on the
earlier research and in what areas does it differ?".Before
proceeding with the discussion there is an issue of defini-
tion that should be clarified. All search theoretic models
of patrol, to date, are models of interception patrol and not
of preventive patrol. They do not purport to predict the
probability of preventing a crime only the probabilit¥of
intercepting it. Whether or not optimal patrol interception
strategies are also optimal preventive patrol strategies is
subject to debate. One would hope that increases in the inter-
ception probability could serve as a crime deterrent; yet the
perceived threat of interception may be a more significant
factor. strategies which optimize one measure need not opti-
.
mize the other. Therefore, one of the major limitations of
any of the existing search models of patrol is that they do
not also capture the preventive aspect of patrol (assuming that
crimes can be prevented) nor do they include the interception
probabilities due to rapid response' to a report of a crime in
progress. In a study by the New York City-Rand Institute [ISJ
it was found that of the criminals arrested at the scene of the
crime by a patrol unit, approximately 50% were the result of
a response to a call and 50% were the result of patrol ini-
tiated action. Thus, ideally a patrol model should incorporate
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at least both possibilities for intercepting a crime when
attempting to determine the most effective patrol strategy.
The first set of works to be reviewed are those by
Elliott [11, 12, 13J. Applying the Koopman exponential model
for random patrol, Elliott calculates the probability of
intercepting crimes of various duration as a function of the
total time it takes to cover as many street miles as there
are in the region patrolled. More importantly using data from
Syracuse, he attempted to validate the model using as he
admits relatively meager data. The result was that the esti-
mate was within an order of magnitude of the observed
frequency of interception. If in fact thee~imate is within
an order of magnitude of the actual frequency of interception
it is probably coincidental. For one thing only reported type
I crimes were considered which typically significantly under-
estimate the actual number of type I crimes, thereby decreasing
the actual fraction of crimes intercepted. Secondly, his
search theoretic estimates assume patrol was uniformly distrib-
uted across the city. However patrol is likely to be concen-
trated in higher crime areas which would also throw the
estimates off significantly.
One last point about the model validation requires comment
as there is a basic flaw in his application of Koopman's model
to police patrol It To calculate the·.. average speed of patrol
Elliott determined the average number of miles patrolled
during a tour and divided by eight yielding an average patrol
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speed of 4.4 miles per hour. An implicit assumption is
therefore that there is no distinction between a patrol unit
busy 60% of its time responding to calls for service but
averaging 11 m.p.h. when on patrol and anotheT patrol unit
whtch does not respond to calls for service and averages 4.4
m.p.h. while on patrol. In Chapter IV we show the two are not
equivalent. For the range of values Elliott considered the
two alternatives do not yield very different estimates.
However, if this distinction were not made when saturation
patrols were considered, the result would be a serious over-
estimate of the probability of interception.
One last point to be discussed involves the e~imation of
the observable duration and conditionalprobabiity of detection
of a crime. In Chapter VI we discuss the problem of obtaining
estimates by interviewing patrol officers. Elliott has an
interesting alternative suggestion. Once the Koopman model
has been validated for police patrol, it would be possible
to estimate the product of the duration and observability by
allocatingp~rol uniformly in a region and finding the frac-
tion of crimes of each type that are intercepted o In
summary Elliott touched on many of the basic issues of
applying the Koopman model to calculating the probability of
interception; however no analysis is presented of, perhaps,
the mQre important problem: how to improve on present deploy-
ment strategies involving random[y patrolling cars.
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Olson [34J. on the other hand, focuses more,'on the
optimal allocation problem and develops a method for deploying
a tactical (does not respond to calls for service) patrol
force. His algorithm uses the Charnes and Cooper method to
allocate a patrol force of n cars to a region which is sub-
divided into smaller groups of blocks. Since the resultant
allocation to each region is not constrained to be integer,
all fractional allocations are rounded off to produce only
integer allocations of search effort to each group of blocks.
Recognizing also that the specific solution may vary with
the size of the subdivisions, the algorithm is repeated a
number of times for different sized groupingsof blocks and
the results compared to obtain a more global optimal solution.
Chapter VI presents an analogous model which also gener-
ates integer allocations of manpower to each region. However
the approach is not based on the Charnes and Cooper algorithm.
The reason for not following this approach is, as Olson noted,
because the resulting optimal allocation is not constrained
to benteger. Consequently rather than round off to a
solution that mayor may not be optimal p it seemed more
appropriate to start out by constraining the allocation to be
integer by following a steepest ascent algorithm which
seI'ially allocated the patrol fome unit by unit. Also with
the latter approach multiple crime types (different durations)
are no complication at all and sensitivity analysis is an
immediate consequence of the optimality condition as described
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at the end of Chapter VI.
Olson and Wright [33J used a Markovian decision model to
make an optilnal allocation of effort (for a standard patrol
car) in a manner that yields a random patrol schedule a The
motivation for developing this model is that Koopman type
allocation models may generate specified coverage levels that
are infeasible. In developing their model, because of a lack
of data on detection probabilities, they assume that the
strategy which maximizes space time-coincidence maximizes also
the probability of detection. This is not true, but the
model's development is not really affected by this assumption.
The model presents an alternative approach to the problem we
discuss in Chapter VII. A discussion of the different orien-
tation of the two methodologies will be presented later in
this section.
Rosenshine D.5 ] models an urban street grid as, a flow
network with the flows corresponding to the patrol coverage.
He then develops a.n algori thm for determining the mininlum
total effort necessary to generate a set of flows that
satisfy a given constraint on the minimum patrol effort
allocated to each arc. The algorithm is designed to assure
that patrol is ~s random as possible'. However as Gass and,
Dawson [15] point out, the degree of randomness required
to thwart prediction of patrol routing is not likely to
require the rather cumbersome and complicated approach out-
lined by Rosenshine. However, an equally important limitation
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[36J on the algori thm is that it dces notadtress the allocation
problem, since the minimum constraint on the patrol coverage
of each street (·i.e. arc) is assumed to be given.
Blumstein and Larson [6 ] present a basic model for
calculating the probability of interception which is a linear
approximation of the model presented in Chapter IV. They use
the model to obtain upper bounds on how ~requently an individ-
ual patrolman is likely to come across a crime in progress.
Using data for one large U.S. city and assuming, for example,
that burglaries have a duration of twenty minutes, they esti~
mate that an individual patrol officer can expect a maximum
of four burglary-in-progress detection opportunities per yearn
Their discussion closes with a brief description of how the
detection rate can be increased by changing the values of the
model's input parameters. In section 4.1.3 we will elaborate
on their discussion of changing the input parameters.
Larson in his book Urban Police Patrol Analysis [25J
presents a detailed discussion of many of the issues surround-
ing the deployment of preventive patrol. Were we to plagiarize
his six closing questions, entitled "Extensions and Further
Work t' , we could still use the same heading. "To what extent
is the crime distribution modified by patrol strategies?" is
still an open and crucial question as is the question "What
is the conditional probability of detecting a crime in a
particular physical environment?" 6) This last question will
be the subject of extensive discussion in Chapters VI and VIII.
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In discussing patrol models he introduces the Koopman
allocation model as a possible conceptual framework for deter-
mining the optimal allocation of patrol effort. Upon conclud-
ing his presentation of the method, which generated for each
point a patrol frequency, he raises the question of I'To what
extent is an optimal patrol coverage function realizable?".
One obviously unrealizable function arises if a connecting
street between two streets with non-zero patrol coverage is
allocated no patrol. There is,howeve~ a potentially more
substantive barrier which undercuts the feasibility of this
approach. In applying the Koopman model to a three minute
crime the crime's duration plays a dual role. It not only
represents the search effort but also constrains the sequen-
cing of the search. As we elaborate in Chapter IV, an optimal
patrol coverage function which assigns twice the patrol
coverage to point A as to point B requires that the ratio be
maintained not just over the eight hour tour but also over
every possible three minute span and similarly for every pair
of points.
Reviewing the approaches of Olson and Wright [33J. Larson
[25J and Rosenshine [35J, there is a fundamentally different
orientation to the problem of allocating a patrol unit's
preventive patrol time compared to the orientation of the algo-
rithms in Chapter VII. Their focus is on mapping out optimal
routes through the city streets with the concurrent problems
of re~izability. The focus in Chapter VII is instead on the
question of specifying the more gross allocation issues of
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which regions to patrol at all and which not. Along with
this simplification comes the flexibility of incorporating
into the model multiple crime types as well as assigning
weights to the various crimes.
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2.4 Patrol's Impact on Crime
The above section title could just as well havebeen
written with a question mark "Patrol's Impact on Crime?". It
is a question whose answer will have to await further research.
The discussion here, therefore, ,will be brief. merely pointing
out a number of cases which seem to shed some light on the
issue.
The question of patrol's impact on crime has of late been
split into two distinct questions. What is the impact on
crime of highly visible easily avoidable patrol cars randomly
(sometimes it seems aimlessly) patrolling the streets? What
is the impact of other forms of patrol strategies (e.g. plain-
clothe~directedpatrol, saturation patrol, stakeouts, decoys,
etc.)?
Two of the more well known contradictory studies that
relate to the first question are the 20th Precinct study in [35J
New York City and the now well known Kansas City experiment [20J.
The former was not designed as an experiment ro1d represents
a post hoc analysis of some of the affects of an increase in
manpower. This naturally raises some question of the
validity of the claimed cause-effect relationship. Some of
the effects claimed were a 36% decrease in total felonies
visible from the street and a 49% decrease in visible (from
the street) grand larcenYe The Kansas City experiment, in
which attempts were made to maintain controls, on the other
hand, showed no discernible impact from doubling and tripling
the number of units in a sector (Which more than triples the
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potential number of preventive pat!'ol hours). Should the
Kansas City study prove the more generalizable (the results
could conceivably be city dependent), it does not, however,
negate the necessity for development of methodologies for
determining optimal patrol strategies. As the au~t;}i(,rS of
the report repeatedly point out, the experiment showed only
that routine pI-eventive patrol in marked police cars llas
little value in preventing crime or making citizens feel safe.
As an alternative the experiment suggests that perhaps deploy-
ment strategies should be based instead on specific crime
prevention and service goals.
Larson [29J, however, in a detailed review of the Kansas
City experiment raises a number of serious questions about
whether or not the claimed experimental conditions were
maintained. His conclusion is that it is not at all clear
how generalizable the findings in Kansas City really are.
Section 8.3~1 contains a description of some of the highlights
of his analysis of the experiment.
In contrast to the a'bove, two representative examples
which claim to display the effectiveness of crime directed
strategies involve a street crime unit (Seu) in New York City
[)..4 ] and a burglary prevention program in Seaside, California
[ 2 ] G In the first example the street cl"irne unit averaged 8.2
man days per arrest against an average for all uniformed
officers of 167 man days. In the Seaside experiment a
special two man unit was assigned to reduce burglaries. The
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result was that over a two month period they made more
arrests than the entire 54 man force did during the previous
year. In addition there was a 25% reduction in burglaries
and a 50% reduction in average loss,
Although both of there examples support the claimed
effectiveness of crime directed police strategies, neither
was carried out in a controlled experimental setting. And
despite the often almost unanimous support among police for
strategies of these types, their effectiveness remains to
be proven.
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FOOTNOTES 2
There are actually two versions of the hypercube model,
an exact and an approximate one. We use the approximate
version.
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CHAPTER 3
AN INTERACTIVE APPROACH TO POLICE SECTCR DESIGN
3.0 Introduction
A primary task of the police administrator is to make
the most efficient and effective use of his manpower. To
do so he must allocate his force in a way that reflects the
temporal and geographical variations in crime level and other
demands for service. This chapter concerns itself with a
geographical allocation problem, specifically the design
of police beats or sectors.
The computer models described in this chapter are for-
mulated to aid a district (precinct) commander in designing
police patrol sectors which represent, to him, a good
balance of several somewhat conflicting goa.Is. The models
do not focus on optimizing anyone performance measure (e.g.
average response time) and are built cnthe belief that the
judgement of the experienced police manager must be a major
motivating force behind any sector design. Consequently,
their purpose is to guide the decision-maker through a
series of alternative sector designs and at each stage pro-
vide him with the information he considers necessary to
choose between alternatiYe designs.
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~l An Interactive Design
-
The decision to develop computer models which require
user interaction strongly influences all aspects of their
design. A discussion of some of the reasons behind this
decision is certainly warranted and may also provide some
additional insight into the potential uses of the model.
The first question that is raised in designing sectors is
"On what basis do we tiudge good sector design?" 0 One of the
best suggestio~1.s was offered by Vollmer [15J: "construct
beats so that every patrolman carries his share of the bur-
dens and each section of the community receives its share of
police protection".l These equity criteria are important and
the major thrust of the models is to aid the manager in pro-
ducing an equitable configuration. However, they are cer-
tainly not the only important criteria. Superbeat u~J, a
computerized sector design procedure designed at Illinois
Institute of Technologyp attempts to minimize district-wide
average response time. Larson [9], in a more complete list
of objectives than offered here, includes, for example, mini-
mizing the number of cross sector dispatches.
If one sector configuration could be devised that would
satisfy all the various criteria, user interaction might not
be that critical. Unfortunately, these various criteria are
often conflicting. For example, one may cite the two equity
criteria--equal patrolman workloads and equal community pro-
tection ( as measured by average response time, for example).
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the successful implementation of innovations in both the
public and private sectors. Little [11J offers as one reason
for implementation failure of operations research models that
'managers don't understand the models and people tend to
reject what they don't understand'. Colton [ 4J states that
a source of problems in police computer use is the gap that
often exists between technical and sworn personnel. An
interactive system requiring the involvement of the police
manager bridges the gap and provides the manager with a full-
er understanding of the potential uses and limitations of
their particular computer models.
This introduction is intended only as an initiation into
the goals, problems and conflicts that exist in the design of
sectors; it is in no way meant to be an exhaustive analysis
of these aspects of sector design. For more detailed discus-
sions of these issues. the readeris referred to Chapman [ 2J
and Larson [9J. The following sections of this chapter
describe and analyze one particular user-interactive model
for sector design. The model's assumptions and data require-
ments are outlined and a description of the overall system
is provided. Finally, there follows a discussion of five
subsystems whose major purpose is to guide the police manager
in producing a sector design which satisfies various equity
criteria.
-72-
In regions where the density of crime is low if we are to
maintain equal workloads, the size of the sector would have
to be above average. The increased size of the sector would
have a tendency to produce an average response time for a
call for service in that sector above that found for a call
for service in the high-crime small sector. The role of a
police administrator who has intimate knowledge of his
officers and community is crucial here in striking an accept-
able balance between these and other such conflicting goals.
He should be able to determine the effect of various work-
load imbalances on police morale and also, depending upon
the political realities of his community, determine what
represents an acceptable imbalance in average response time.
A second reason for desiring user interaction is that a
number of objectives are not easily quantifiableo Larson [ 9J
mentions as one objective in sector design the maintenance of
neighborhood integrity so that, where possible, sector boun-
daries do not cut traditional neighborhoods in two. Another
example of a non-quantifiable objective is evidenced in a
recent proposal to redesign a sector in Boston. The district
commander asked that the sector boundaries lie along the ma~n
thoroughfareR in order to facilitate police patrol ~3J.
A final reason for developing an interactive system rath-
er than a set of packaged programs is that this will facili-
tate implementation of the models. A number of recent
articles have addressed the problem of what factors influence
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3.2 Model Assumptions
A district or precinct is subdivided into a set of
smaller regions called beats or sectors. Each sector con-
sists of a set of reporting areas (subregions) or atoms. A
reporting area is the smallest geographical unit for which
police data are collected.
In combining a group of atoms to form a sector, only one
major constraint (Cl) is placed on the design of the sector.
(Cl) A sector must consist of a set of contiguous atoms.
There will, however, be one additional constraint that will
be applied in a heuristic manner.
(C2) Every attempt will be made to maintain compactness
in the sector designs.
The dispatch policy (i.e. the procedure by which units
are assigned to answer calls for service) used in this model
(MCM) is as follows. Each sector is assigned a patrol unit
which has primary responsibility for that sector. Primary
responsibility involves two things. 1) The patrol unit per-
forms preventive patrol (time not spent answering calls for
service) in that sector. While £n preventive patrol the time
spent in each atom in the sector is ~ssumed to be in direct
proportion to the number of calls for service emanating from
that atom. 2) Any calls for service that arise in the sector
are assigned to the patrol unit with primary responsibility
for that sector if it is free regardless of its l~cation. If
it is not free, the available unit estimated to be closest is
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dispatched to the call.
The estimated distance of a unit from a call for ser-
vice (for dispatch purposes ) is calculated as follows. The
unit is assumed to be at the weighted (on the basis of calls
for service) center of gravity of its sector. The call for
service is assumed to be at the center of mass of the atom
from which it comes o The distance between the two centers is
the sum of the (absolute) differences of the respective (X,Y)
coordinates.
If when calls arrive no unit is available, the calls are
queued in the order of their arrival and the first unit to
become available is dispatched to the call at the head of the
queue. This completes a description of the only dispatch
policy presently allowed in the model~ However, it is not
difficult to change the model to allow for a wider range of
dispatch policies (Larson [ 8,10J) and it is envisioned that
future versions of this model will contain this added flexi-
bility. The various statistics (e.g. workloads, travel times,
etc.) which describe the functioning of the district's patrol
units are calculated by using Larson's approximation procedure
~OJ. A description of this procedure is not offered here and
the reader is referred to Larson [l~. However, one remark
on this procedure is worth making. The operating statistics
such as workloads and average travel times to a sector or
atom include not only intrasector dispatches but also include
intersector dispatches.
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3.3 Data Requirements
The basic unit for which data must be supplied is the
reporting area or atom. For each atom the following must be
given
(Dl) Location of the center of mass of the atom.
(D2) The call rate for the atom in terms of calls per
year or any other u2it of time as long as the
user is consistent.
(D3) An atom contiguity vector. For each atom a list
of ~ll the atoms contiguous to it must be provid-
ed.
In addition, if the user is interested in tracking and pos-
sibly constaining the size of each sector either in terms
of area or in terms of street miles, then additional data
must be input for each atom.
(D4) Number of street miles in the atom.
(D5) Area of the atom.
Finally, the user must specify for the district as a whole.
(D6) Number of sectors.
(D7) Average workload for the units.
(D8) An initial sector design.
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3.4 System Design
Once the data files have been input, +he t ·
'" sys em 18 ready
to operate. The system's initial interaction with the user
will be to request that he choose a major concern from among
five possibilities:
1 0 Equalize workloads.
2. Equalize preventive patrol coverage.
3. Equalize average travel times to a sector (region) •
4. Equalize average travel times to an atom (subregion' ) .
5. Equalize workloads of arnalg~mated sectors.
For each of the five options, a subsystem has been designed
which will guide the user in an iterative manner towards
improving a particular performance measure (workload, preven-
tive patrol coverage, average travel time) imbalance. At the
core of each subsystem is a program that operates in either
one of two modes at the discretion of the user (See Figure
301). In one mode the program generates several alternative
small modifications (transferring an atom from one sector to
another) of the present configuration that improve upon the
imbalance in the performance measure specified by the user.
The user may then choose from among these alternatives,
whereupon the modification is carried out and several new
alternatives are generated. In the other mode, after the
user has specified the imbalance to be corrected, the program
carries out on its own a series of small modifications of
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Figure 3.1:An Interactive System for Sector Design
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the present configuration in order to improve on that imbal-
ance.
Before proceeding with the description of the system, we
will discuss briefly the distinction between the goal of sub-
system 1 (equalize workloads) and subsystem 2 (equalize pre-
ventive patrol coverage). In addition we will outline the
basic problem that the last subsystem (equalize workloads
of amalgamated sectors) is designed to address.
3.4.1 Option 2: Equalizing Preventive Patrol Coverage
In calculating the average workload for a precinct and
the individual workload for each patrol unit, we have included
not only calls for service but also time spent for meals.
Consequently, the fraction of time a patrol unit has available
for preventive patrol is simply one minus its workload.
Therefore, if the workloads are balanced, then obviously the
number of patrol hours allocated to each sector are also
balanced. However there are other definitions of an equitable
allocation of patrol effort which do not coincide with
requiring that the total number of patrol hours for each
sector be the same. For example, a decision maker might
question if it is equitable for two sectors, of different
size or with different crime rates, to be allocated the same
number of preventive patrol hours. A decision maker might
feel that a better standard ~f equity is for the number of
patrol hours per street mile to be the same in each sector
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or, alternatively, for the number of patrol hours for each
Part I type street crime to be the same in each sector.
In response to these and other alternative definitions
of equitable preventive patrol coverage the interactive
system was designed (Option 2) with the flexibility to
allow the decision maker to specify his own measure of equity.
Equity can be defined as requiring that patrol hours be allo-
cated in proportion to street mileage or street crimes or in
proportion to any other parameter (e.g. the product of street
mileage and crime rate) that is specified.
3.4.2 Option 5: Amalgamating
Past and present police literature have recognized that
crimes and calls for service are not uniformly distributed
over time a~d space. A number of manpower allocation metho-
dologies (Walton [16J, Ficklin [5 ], McClaren [12J, Larson
[7 J. to cite a few) have been developed in an attempt to
mirror and take advantage of this nonuniformity. Once tempo-
ral and district-by-district allocation Plans have been
decided upon, the next step is to design the beat structure
for each district. Ore option available is to design a
different beat structure for each of the various police
shifts (early morning, day, night, weekend). However, to
avoid the necessity of drawing up a set of extensively
different beat boundaries for each shift and the confusion it
f
might produce, police often settle on a compromise. The
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basic beat design is formulated for thE shift which has the
maximum number of cars. For shifts with lower call rates and
fewer men assigned, they simply combine some of the sectors
(i.e. one man will patrol two or more sectors). The fifth
subsystem will attempt to determine which sectors should be
combined to produce a minimum workload imbalance.
To aid the manager in his decision-making he can request
that additional information be provided at each step. He can
receive data with regard to any or all of the factors listed
below:
1. Car workloads
2. Preventive patrol coverage
3. District wide average travel time
4. Sector travel times
5. Three (user may specify own number) worst atom travel
times
6. Percentage of cross-sector dispatches
7. Number of street miles in each sector
Although the option exists to ask for all of the above
factors, it is advisable that the user be selective and pin-
point the information he feels is critical in choosing bet-
ween alternative designs. The natural tendency, of course,
is to ask for whatever information is available; unfortunate-
ly, trying to work with too many variables at one time may
only serve to confuse and slow the iterative process.
Consequently, the police manager should first analyze what
parameters he considers crucial before attempting to use the
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system. In this way he will avoid the problem of information
becoming misinformation (Ackoff [1 J). An alternative to a
constant flow of information is to set up a series of con-
straints. For example:
(C3) A maximum and/or mln2mum limit is placed on the
size of a sector. Whenever a potential sector
design violates this constraint the user is
notified.
or
(C4) If the user's major concern were sector travel
times, he might set a constraint on the maximum
workload for any particular sector car.
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3.5 SUbsystem Designs
The next section of this chapter will discuss the
methodology used by each of the first four subsystems to
guide in the construction of a satisfactory sector configura-
tion. The fifth subsystem, combining sectors, will, however,
be discussed separately as it entails a fundamentally differ-
ent approach than the others. In each of the four subsys-
terns, the user proceeds iteratively from an initial sector
design until an acceptable design is reached. The general
procedure (GP) for each of the four subsystems is as follows:
(GP1) An initial sector design is specified by the
user.
(GP2) At each iteration the most recent design is
modified by transferring one atom from one
sector to another without violating the sector
contiguity constraint. (Cl)
(GP3) A transfer is specified by the atom transferred,
the sector losing the atom and the sector receiv-
ing the atom. The criteria for determining
these variables will vary with each subsystem,
and even the order in which they are determined
will vary.
(GP4) At each iteration the user will be offered a
choice between two or three atom transfers
which reduce the disparity in the parameter of
major concern (either workload, sector travel
time or atom travel time).
(GP5) Each of the candidate atoms offered the user is
first screened to make sure that its transfer
will not violate the contiguity constraint (Cl).
This involves checking the structure of two
sectors.
a) The sector, R, receiving the atom, At must
presently be contiguous to that atom. This
fact can be determined by checking if any
of the atoms presently in sector Rare
contiguous to atom A.
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b) The sector, L, that loses the atom, A, must
not be left split in two. To determine if
sector L is still contiguous, the sector is
modelled as a network with nodes of the net-
work representing atoms and the arcs between
nodes representing the contiguity of atoms.
The iSS1..le then becomes "Is it possible to
travel from anyone particular node in the
network to every other node in the network?".
To answer this question a node labeling
algorithm is used that is analogous to the
shortest route algorithm of Ford and
Fulkerson [6J. (See Appendix A.)
(GP6) Information will be provided to the user about
the effect of each transfer on the parameter of
major concern and on any other parameters he has
previously specified~
(GP7) The user can also offer another candidate for
transfer, in which case, the effect of the trans-
f~r on the various parameters will be calculated
by the system.
(GP8) The user selects the atom to be transferred and
the transfer is then carried out. Steps GP2 thru
GP8 are repeated until an acceptable sector
design is reached e
There is one additional powerful option available to the
user. Computer programs have been developed that will reduce
the imbalance of anyone particular pa~eter without user
interaction at each iteration. The option is as follows:
(GP9) The user can allow anyone of these programs to
run for n (user defined) iterations or until the
sector or atom witij the worst imbalance is
brought within p% (user defined) of the average.
(GPIO) Upon reaching the user-defined stopping point,
the new sector design is described to the user
and the system returns to step GP2.
3.5.1 Typical Scenario~
These relatively non-interactive programs offered in
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step GP9 have the potential of significantly reducing the
various imbalances unaided and all but eliminating any
imbalances in car workloads and sector travel times (see
computational experience sections). However, it is envi-
sioned that the non-interactive programs will also be used
in a more limited (carry out 5 iterations) fashion without
realizing their full potential. The motive behind
restrained usage of the programs is that full utilization,
for example, of the program to reduce workload imbalances
could result in totally unacoeptable travel time imbalances. 5
These probrams (GP9) might be used instead to speed up one
dimensional searches for an acceptable sector design. For
example a typical scenario might be
1. The user decides that the initial design has too
large a workload imbalance and requests the
program that reduces workload imbalances to run
on its own for five iterations.
2. Reviewing the resultant design, the user now
decides to shift focus and concentrate on travel
time. He requests that the program that balances
sector travel times carry out three iterations.
3. Reviewing the newly generated beat configuration,
he decides to improve once again the workload
imbalance, however, with himself now in complete
control of each iteration.
4. The user requests the generation. of three alterna-
tive atom transfers that reduce the workload
imbalance and that supplementary information be
provided about precinct-wide average travel time
and sector travel ,times. -
5. The user proceeds to choose from among the three,
the atom transfer which has the most beneficial
impact on precinct-wide travel time and which, of
course, improves also the workload imbalance.
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6. The user then may request three more potential trans-
fers and proceed again with the above process.
Having completed our discussion of the general or shared
procedures (GPI-GPIO) that are common to each of the first
four subsystems, we will next focus on the unique character-
istics of each of these subsystems. The discussion of each
of these subsystems will be presented in three parts. The
first part will analyze how an atom transfer affects the
parameter of interest. The hpe is that this analysis will
provide additional insight into the development and procedure
of each of the subsystems. Secondly, the manner of selecting
each of the atoms suitable for transfer will be described in-
eluding a description of the programs that run without direct
user interaction. Finally, some computational results with
the above-mentioned programs will be presented~
Before proceeding with the description of the subsystems,
it should be noted and emphasized that the main focus of
these subsystems is the equitable distribution of workloads
and police services as ~easured by response times. As a
result, no program to reduce precinct-wide average travel
time is presented here. However, the effect of any atom
transfer on district-wide average response time is monitored
at each step and the user can take into account this effect
when choosing between alternative designs. In addition, the
interactive, iterative approach, p~~nted in this paper will
provide the user with a better understanding of the various
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tradeoffs that exist in sector design. District-wide response
time is usually increased in order to reduce imbalances in
the sector and atom travel times. Workload imbalances must
often increase in order to reduce travel time imbalances and
vice versa.
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3.6 Workloads
3.6.1 Effect of Atom Transfer
Shifting an atom out of (into) a sector has two effect~6,
a primary effect (El) which reduces (increases) the sector
car's workload and two complementary effects, (E2) and (EJ),
which counter-balance and reduce the magnitude of the primary
effect.
(El) Shifting an atom out of (into) a sector directly
reduces (increases) the primary responsibility of
the sector car, thereby, decreasing (increasing)
his workload.
(E2) The first secondary effect is that by decreasing
(increasing) the sector car's primary responsi-
blity, the car is now morel (less) frequently
availab~e for intersector dispatches, consequent-
ly, increasing (decreasing) his workload.
(E3) The other secondary effect is that by transferring
an atom out of (into) a sector, S, and into (out
of) an adjoining sector, At the adjoining sector
will have an increased (decreased) workload. This
will in turn necessitate more (less) intersector
dispatches into sector A. The result is that the
sector car for sector S will be called on more
(less) frequently to respond to calls for service
in sector A.
The magnitude of these second order effects (E2) and (E3)
will vary according to the centrality of location of the sec-
tor. The more centrally located the sector, or in other
words, the larger the region for which this sector car is the
2nd and 3rd most preferred car respectively, the greater the
magnitude of this second order effect [10J. Consequently,
an atom transfer in outlying sectors will in general produce
a greater change in workload than an atom transfer in
centrally located sectorso
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3.6.2 Computer Program
The program, if reduced to its essence, can be described
by outlining the steps by which it determines the previously
mentioned (GP3) three variables involved in each atom trans-
fer, (the atom transferred and the two sectors).
(WSl) The first step in equalizing workloads is to
find the sector with the workload furthest from
the mean, either above or below it.
Unfortunately, this program could not concentrate solely on
reducing high workloads without simultaneously increasing
the workloads of underworked cars. This is true because the
average workload is a constant which depends only on the
total call rate for the district and the number of sectors
and not upon the particular sector configuration.
If the workload for sector car A is the one furthest
from the average and it is above average, then procedures
(WS2) and (WS3) are followed.
(WS2) A search is made of the sectors contiguous to
sector A to determine which of the contiguous
sectors has the sector car B with the lowest
workload.
(WS3) The atom transferred from A to B is the atom in
sector A, that is contiguous with B, and whose
center of mass~ is closest to the center of
gravity (weighted call rates) of sector B. This
atom transfer must of course not violate any
cpntiguity constraint (Cl)7 (See also GP5). If
it does violate (Cl), the second closest atom
is transferred.
Although simple calculations could have been carried
out to determine which atom transfer from A to B would have
.,
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had the most dramatic effect on the workload imbalance, this
simpler criterion (WS3) was used for one basic reason. This
criterion proved to be a good heuristic method for maintain-
ing a degree of compactness (C2) in the sector receiving the
atom. To summarize (WS2) and (WS3), the procedure is to first
determine the two sectors which were to be involved in a trans-
fer and then to select an atom on the basis of compactness.
If the worst imbalance occurs in an under-utilized sector
car, A, then procedures (WS4) and (WS5) are followed.
(WS4) A search is made for the closest (as defined in
WS2) contiguous atom, C, to sector A rather than
first searching for the sector B that is contig-
uous to A and whose sector car B has the highest
workload.
(WS5) Once the atom, C, that is to be transferred into
A has been found, the sector that will lose the
atom is implicitly determined.
In short, the atom to be transferred was chosen without
first selecting the 2nd sector to be involved in the transfer.
The reason for not paralleling the procedure outlined in
(WS2) and (WS3) is that this method proved to be more effi-
cient at maintaining compactness in the sector receiving the
atom.
In the mode (GP2-GP8) in which the user decides at each
i ter·ation which atom will be transferred, "the procedures, (WSl)
through (WSS), are repeated to produce the two best (compact-
ness criteria) candidates to reduce the worst workload
imbalance. A third atom transfer is offered which involves
the sector car with the second worst workload imbalance.
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In the non-interactive mode, (GP9). the computer program
iteratively carries out the above steps, (WSI-WS5), until
the user defined stopping point is reached.
3.6.3 Computational Experience
The non-interactive program was run on data from
District 4 in Boston. Seventy reporting areas were to be
combined into 6 sectors. If the number of reporting areas
is too large (a number as yet undetermined), it may prove
necessary to group the reporting areas into slightly larger
regions before using the models. The average workload for
the 6 cars was 50%. The measure of imbalance that was used
in this program was the ratio of the highest workload to the
lowest workload. Minimizing the imbalance is equivalent to
bringing the ratio closer to one G In the initial design, the
car with the lowest workload was in sector 5 and was busy 42%
of the time. The highest workload was for sector car 2 with
a workload of 56%. The ratio of highest to lowest was 1.33.
In other words, sector car 2 was busy 33% more of the time
than sector car 5 was. After 14 iterations, ~e sector car
with the lowest workload was sector car 6 (49.5%) and the
sector car with the highe~workload was car 5 (50.5%). The
ratio of highest to lowest workloads was 1.02, a significant
improvement.
The program was run for 20 iterations; however, no im-
provement occurred after the 14th iteration. Tab~3.1 contains
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the workloads of the cars for the 14 iterations. In general,
once the ratio of highest to lowest workload was less than
1.05, it was difficult to find an atom transfer that could
reduce further the imbalance.
The 20 iterations required 17 c.P.u. 8 seconds or an
average .85 seconds per iteration. The core storage required
was 200K. The limited number of iterations required to elim-
inate a significant workload imbalance and the rapidity of
the iterations would serve to validate the feasibility of an
iterative approach.
-92-
Table' 3.• 1 Balancing Workloads:District 4.Boston
CARS
Iteration. 1 2 3'-4 5 6 Ratio=High/Low
~~ ~~i~
Initial .498 .559 .502 .494 .421 .526 1.33
1 .~98 :-559 .500 .493 ~n24 .526 1.32
,,~
2 .494 ~5_58 .499 .492 -:431 .525 1.30
·n· {~*
3 .483 .558 .499 .491 .41+3 .527 1.26
i} " ~,")~.,~
l+ .496 .549 .498 .488 .442 .527 1.24
~} ~~~}
5 .497 .543 .496 .486 .458 .520 1.18
)t,
-:458
.5186 .497 :534 .497 .497 1.17
7 .494 ~-533 .496 .497 -:-463 .517 1.15
~5J4 {:...:~8 .492 .49_2 .494 .478 .510 1.12
9 .496 {;.514 .510 .495 -~~76 .509 1.08
10 .484 -:515 ~ .510 .496 ·:~86 .509 1.06
i;- 510 {}~-
.506 .11 .497 .507 I •494 , .485 ' 1.05
;(. ·:~89
.50512 .498 ._507 ~50f .494 1.04
13 .497 -:511 .502 ~492 .505 .493 1.04
14 .497 .505 .502 .496 -:505 ~t95 1.02
~} Highest vVorkload
** Lowest Workload
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3.7 Preventive Patrol Coverage
Earlier in this chapter we discussed the distinction
between balancing workloads and balancing preventive patrol
coverage. However, despite the differences between the two,
it was not necessary to develop an entirely separate subsys-
tem in order to provide a capability for balancing preventive
patrol coverage. Instead this capability was easily provided
by making several minor modifications of the workload balanc-
ing subsystem. In essence the function of these changes was
so that when the user specifies preventive patrol coverage
as the major concern, the program uses, for example, one
minus the workload divided by the sector's street mileage in
determining which sector has a patrol allocation that is fur-
thest from the mean instead of looking at the workloads.
Once that sector has been located then if its patrol allcca-
tion is above average, the sector is enlarged by adding an
atom and if its allocation is below average the sector is
modified by removing an atom. Before proceeding with the
description of the other changes, it is important to stop
and realize one consequence of the above substitution for
workloads. If the street mileage or crime rate is not ap-
proximately the same for each sector then not only are bal-
ancing workloads and preventive patrol coverage not equivalent
but also the two goals of necessity conflict.
In addition to the above substitution, the only other
changes involve the obvious need to input data either about
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the street mileage or crime rate of each atom and calculate
and update (after each atom transfer) the total street mile-
age or crime rate of each sector. Except for the modifica-
tions described above, no additional effort was required in
adapting the workload balancing subsystem to be used alter-
-natively to balance preventive patrol coverage. Thus, for
example, the selection of the atom to be transferred between
sectors follows the same procedures as described in the pre-
vious section (steps WS2 through WS5).
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3.8 Se~tor Travel Times
3.8.1 Effect of Atom !ransfer
Transferring an atom, C, out of a sector affects the
average travel time to a call in that sector in three ways.9
(E4) First, if the average travel time to that partic-
ular atom C, is above (below) the average for that
sector, removing the atom will lower (raise) the
average travel time for the sector.
(E5) By decreasing the workload of the sector car, it
reduces the need for intersector dispatches into
this sector. Since in general, intersector dis-
patches have larger travel times than iPtrasector
dispatches, it will reduce the average travel times
to calls in that sector. 10
(E6) Since the atom removed from the sector will usually
be relatively far from the center of gravity of the
sector, the average distance from the center of
gravity to the atoms in the sector will decrease.
3.8.2 Computer Program
A di3cussion of the computer program that aides the
user in reducing sector travel time imbalances will also
center on how the three variables (atom transferred and the
sectors between which the atom is transferred) are deter-
mined.
(881) First, the sect~A, with the worst average
travel time is located.
(382) The sectors contiguous to sector A are compared
to determine which sector, B, has the lowest
average travel time.
(883) Of the atoms in A contiguous to sector B, the
atom farthest away from the center of gravity of
A is transferred. (E6)
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In steps (851-553), no explicit attention is paid to the
first effect (E4) in choosing the transferable atom as it is
assumed that there is a strong correlation between the dis-
tance from the center of a sector to an atom in that sector
and the average travel time for the atom~ The farther away
from the center of gravity the atom is, the larger the aver-
age travel time to the atom. In addition, even if the travel
time for the atom transferred were below the average for the
sector, the second and third effects (ES) and (E6) could out-
weigh the first effect~ In the sample runs, this, in fact,
happened a couple of times. Also by disregarding (E4) and
concentrating on the distance (E6) in choosing an atom, a
greater degree of compactness is maintained in the sector
losing the atom.
(SS4) If, however, i~ is found that the removal of a
particular atom under step (55)) increases the
average travel time for the sector A, then step
(553) is repeated to find the second farthest
atom from the center of gravity.
At first it seemed reasonable to design a slightly
simpler procedure instead of step (552) followed by (S53).
(Alt) From the sector with the highest average travel
time, transfer the atom farthest from its center
of gravity and COlltiguous to some other sector.
However, this procedure often eventually led to the following
sce~ariot a scenario which was repeated by all of the first
three subsystems whenever the imbalance was reduced below 5%.
Atoms were transferred out of an outlying sector A, which
had a high average travel time.. into a neighboring
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sector B until the average travel times in both
sectors were equally above average. At this point
the situation was ripe for a "ping-pong" effect,
e.g. transference of the same atom back and
forth between the two sectors (A and B).
By using the criteria of lowest travel time to first choose
among neighboring sectors (832), the above scenario was all
but eliminated. Sector B would not transfer its atoms to
sector A but rather to some more centrally located sector,
C, which had an even lower travel time than either A or B.•
The above procedures (SSl-SS4) are used to find two
atoms in the sector with the worst travel time and one in
the sector with the second worst travel time whose removal
will reduce the average travel time for their respective
sectors. The user must then choose among these three pos-
sible atom shifts e In the non-interactive mode (GP9), the
above procedures (SSl-SS4) are repeated until a user defined
stopping point is reached.
The procedure designed to equalize sector travel times
differs in one fundamental way from the one designed to
equalize workloads. With regard to sector travel times, the
programs try to reduce high average travel times and not
increase low travel times, although, of course, the two are
not independent. The reason for this is that unlike the
average workload, the average district-wide travel time is
not a constant and will vary with the particular sector
configuration. It is hoped that by concentrating solely on
reducing high travel times, it may be possible simultaneously
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to reduce the district-wide average travel time (which did
not happen in the test runsll ) or at least hold any increases
to a minimum.
3.8.3 Computation Experience: District 4, Boston
The non-interactive program was run on data from District
4 in Boston. In the initial sector design (6 sectors) the
average travel distance for the district was .543 miles12•
Sector 5 had the worst average travel distance .696 miles
(28% above average) and sector 2 had the best average travel
distance .483 miles (11% below average). The ratio of the
worst to best travel distances was 1.44 or in other words, on
the average it took 44% longer to respond to a call in sector
5 than it ~d to a call in sector 2. After 13 iterations, the
sector with the highest average travel distances was sector
5 (.591) and the sector with the lowest average travel dis-
tance was sector 2 (.559). The ratb of highest to lowest was
now 1.06. Unfortunately, some of this reduced imbalance was
paid for by a 6% increase in the district-wide average travel
distance which now was .577 miles.
No improvement was made after the 13th iteration and
each iteration required on the average 1.5 csp.u. seconds.
The reader1tll note that iterations in this subsystem are
significantly longer than for the first subsystem. One
reason for this is that the calculation of the average
travel times is much more time consuming than the calculation
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Table 3.2 Balancing Sector Travel Distances:District 4.Bost£n
Iteration
Initial
1
2
6
8
10
11
12
1
SECTORS iTRAVEL DISTANCES)
1 2 4 6 Ratio=Hi h Low
1.44
1.40
lit
1. 2
1.2
1.2
1.22
1.16
1.16
1.11
1.06
1.06
{~ Largest Sector Travel Distance (in '~Miles)
i~~~ Smallest Sector Travel Dis;tance (in Miles)
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of th~·workloads. However, the results still validate the
feasibility of an iterative procedure. Table 2 contains the
sector travel times for the 13 iterations.
It is worth noting that in the final design sector car
5 had a workload of 35% and sector car 2 had a workload of
56%, or 60% higher than that of sector car 5. This result
highlights the previously mentioned tradeoffs that exist in
sector design and underscores the necessity for police
manager involvement in making these tradeoffs.
3.8.4 Computational Experience: New Haven
In a recent technology transfer project involving the
New Haven Department of Police Services [ 3J, the non-
interactive program was used to explore how one particular
precinct's 13 configuration could be modified to improve on
imbalances in travel distances. In the succeeding para-
graphs we will describe how the program improved imbalances
in sector travel distances as well as its impact on the
other performance measures. The results display even more
clearly the potential of this sector redesign program since
the initial imbalance in sector travel distances as esti-
mated by the hypercube model was a factor of 2 as compared
to 1.44 in the previous example.
The iteration by iteration changes in the sector travel
distance and precinct wide average travel distance are
summarized in Table 3.3. Initially the minimum average
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sector distance was .46 miles, in sector 3. while the maxi-
mum was .92 miles, in secto~ 7. After fifteen iterations of
the program (22 c.p.u. seconds using 250K of core storage),
the imbalance was reduced to 1~29 with the maximum average
sector travel distance now .74 miles, 20% less than it was
before. However, once again, we find that this improvement
was at the expense of the precinct wide average travel dis-
tance which increased by 6% from .63 miles to g67 miles. In
addition there was a deterioration in the workload imbalance,
which changed from 1.29 to 1.59 (see Table 3.4). Interesting-
ly, during the first seven iterations, there was an improve-
ment in imbalances in both travel distances (from 2 to 1.78)
and workloads (1.29 to 1.19)~which suggests that within an
intermediate range of imbalances an improvement in one
imbalance (e.g. sector travel distance) need not be made
always at the expense of the other (e.g. workload).
Although this subsystem in general and its interactive
program in particular do not focus on imbalances in atom
travel distances, an attempt at reducing high sector travel
distances will naturally also impact on atom travel distances.
Table 3.5 describes how the distribution of response dis-
tances in the New Haven precinct changed as a result of
modifications in the sector design. Prior to the redesign,
five atoms had average travel distances greater than one mile,
with a high of 1.4 milese Four more had average response
distances between one mile and .9 miles. In the new design
Table-3.3 Balancing Sector Travel Distances:New Haven
I
l-'
o
N
I
AverageSECTORS ('rJ{AVEL ~D_ISTANCES)
-. ... _... _v __....
--
2 3 4 5 6
...---- .... -F"!I .. ·I--·· ___ .. ______ v ............__
.559 .513 :463 .689 .521 -n·Initial .475 --~. 923 1.993 .6)4
~t-~} ·u·
1 .559 .513 .464 .688 .529 .510 .916 1.976 .634
J~~~ ~t.
2
, -
.561 .514 :465 .684 • 54'5 .566 :887 1.906 .630
3 .561 .515 ~1i65 G684 .547 *.572 .886 1.903 .630
.561 .516 ~it67 .)(,4 .682 .561 .627 :869 1.863 .632
5 .561 .516 ~1f,67 .680 .574 .669 ~·848 le817 .632
-:467 ~}6 .561 .516 .679 .581 .685 .842 1.803 .633
'1 .565 .516 :a68 .691 • _S80 .685 :835 1.783 8634
~t-* ~}
8 .564 .518 .469 .683 .653 .787 .799 1~702 .649
it-~} ~I-
9 .574 .521 .473_ .708 8655 .785 .760 1.659 .652
-l~i~ {~
10 .576 .523 .485 .709 .654 .783 .759 1.615 .652
~~·u·
-:76111 .597 .547 .580 .711 .649 .754 1.392 .658
i~~~ it-
12 .616 .565 .635 .719 .646 .755 .749 1.336 .666
-!!-~~ *13 .622 .577 .656 .728 .644 .740 .755 1.309 .669
.623
*{~
*14 .577 .657 .731 .644 .740 .751 1.302 .670
15 .627 {:~77 .657 .735 .645 * &737 1.286 .671.742
Table 3.4 The Impact On Workloads Of Balancing Travel Distances:New Haven
CAR vlORKLOADS
3 4 l- - - - ~- -
- - - - - - - - - r-»- ~"' - - ~ ~ -- - --- - --I -- ~--
Initial .43 .,38 (140 ·~45 038 ·:35 .42 1.286 .778
1 .43 ~~38 .40 ~44 .38 ~36 .41 1.222 .818
~!- ~}-i:-
~ .43 .38 .40 .44 .38 .37 .40 1.189 .841
~!- ~:-*
3 e43 ~.. 38 ~ .40~ . . 044 - .38- .37 .40 1.189 .841
~;. ~}~!-
4 .. 43 .38 .40 .44 .38 .'37 .19 10189 .841
~~ .;<-~~ ~~~!-
5 .43 .'38 .40 .44 .38 • '38 .38 1.158 8864
~~ **6 .43 c '~~8 .40 .44 .39 .38 .38 1.158 .864
* i~;t-7 .43 .38 .40 .44 .38 .39 .37 1.189 .841
.43 .38 .40
;~
e43
·:t-i~ 1.3758 .44 .40 .32 .727
~t- i~·U·
9 843 .38 .40 .45 .40 .43 ,31 1.452 ."689
;~ *i}
10 .43 .38 .40 .45 .40 .43 .31 1.452 .689
·n· ~r*
.66711 .43 .39 .41 .45 .40 .42 .30 1.500
.:t- *i!-
.66712 .44 .39 .41 .45 .40 .41 .30 1.500
~fo *~}
13 •44 .40 .41 .46 .40· ,. .- .41 .30 1.533 .652
it- if-*
14 .44 .40 .41 .46 .40 .41 .30 1.533 .652
-'t. ~~·u·15 .44 .40 .41 :46 .40 .41 .29 1.586 .630
I
......
o
\.JJ
I
* Highes~ Workload *~~ Lowest Workload
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no response distance was greater than one mile and only two
were greater than .9 miles. Much of this improvement,
however, was obtained at the expense cf atoms with short
response distances as the number wi th response, 'distahces "of
less than .6 miles decreased from 33 to 12.
Table 3.5: Distribution of Atom Travel Distances:
New I-Iaven
Over 1
Mile .9-1 .8-.9 .7-.8 .6-.7 .5-.6 .4-.5 .3-.4
Initial 5 atoms 4 14 9 13 20 12 1
Final 0 2 13 21 30 10 2 0
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3.9 Atom Travel Time
3.9.1 Effect of Atom Transfer
In discussing the effect of an atom transfer on the
various atom travel times, two classes of atoms must be
considered: 1) the atom transferred and 2) the remaining
atoms in the sector, A, from which the atom was removed.
(E7) If the atom transferred, T, is closer (further)
to the center of gravity of its new receiving
sector than it was to the center of gravity of
its old sector, there will tend to be a decrease
(increar4 ) in the average travel time for thatatom T.
(E8) The remaining atoms will be affected in two ways.
For one, since there will be a reduction in the
sector car's workload, there will be a decrease
in the number of intersector (relatively far)
dispatches into the sector. This will tend to
reduce the atom travel times of all the remaining
atoms. '
(E9) Secondly, removing an atom, T, shifts the center
of gravity of the old sector in a direction away
from that atom, T. Consequently, atoms in the
direction opposite from atom T will now be closer
to the center of gravity of the seCtEr which
tends to reduce their travel times.
3.9.2 Computer Program
(ASl)
(AS2)
(AS3)
The program procedes to identify the atom with
the worst travel time, T.
A check is made to determine whether or not atom
T is closer ( and contiguous) to the center of
gravity of a sector other than the one to which
it is presently assigned. If the closest center
of gravity is a sector~C, other than its own, the
preferred option offered the user is to transfer
atom T to sector C. (E7)
The one (or two) atom(s), F, farthest away from
atom T that is in the same sector and also
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contiguous to another sector is offered as a
possible atom transfer. If that atom, F, is
contiguous to more than one sector, it is to be
transferred to the sector whose center of
gravity is closest (maintain compactness, C2).
(E9)
In most cases, step (AS2) will prove fruitless and only
(AS3) will yield any potential atom transfers. Unfortunately,
the last step (AS3) utilizes effects (E8) and (E9) which are
rather indirect as compared to (E7) and as compared to those
effects available in subsystems 1 and 2.
3.9.3 Computational Experience
In the initial sector design the district-wide average
travel distance was .543 miles. Atom 70 (worst) had an
average response distance of .965 while atom 23 (best) had an
average response distance of .446. It required, on the
average, more than twice as long (2.16) to respond to a call
in atom 70 as in atom 23.
The optimal design produced by the non-interactive pro-
gram was reached in 9 iterations. At that point, the worst
atom was atom 60 which had an average response distance of
.76, a reduction of 21% in the maximum average response
distance for the atoms. Atom 23 still had the lowest
average travel distance .477. The imbalance ratio (worst/
best) was now 1.59. still significant, but a major improve-
ment over the previous imbalance. Once again, part of the
decrease paid for by increasing the district-wide travel
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distance .584 (an 8% increase) and by increasing travel dis-
tances for atoms with a low average travel distance. Because
of this increase, the more appropriate measure of the program's
worth would seem to be the previously mentioned maximum average
response distance~for the atoms. By either measure, the
program significantly reduced the districts' imbalance.
However, there is still a great deal of room for improvement
and various modifications of the present program are being
explored to see if the imbalance can be reduced further.
Each iteration required, on the average, 1.55 cep.U.
seconds, about the same as for the sector travel time pro-
grame Table 3 contains a list of the initial and final atom
travel times.
To summarize, the computational results of the three non-
interactive programs indicate that an iterative procedure is
certainly feasible (time-wise). Each iteration requires a
maximum of 1~55 c.p.u. seconds and the number of iterations
needed to significantly reduce imbalances is not large.
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Table 3.6 Balancing Atom Travel Distances-:District 4,Boston
AVERAGE TRAVEL DISTANCE AVERAGE TRAVEL DISTANCE
ATOM ATOM
NUMBER INITIAL FINAL 1'1UMBER INITIAL FINAL
1 .494 .;42 36 .510 .500
2 .512 .583 37 .539 .581
3 .458 .522 38 .6)4 .678
4 .592 .690 39 .482 .522
5 .~40 .644 40 .507 .543
6 .512 .624 41 .580 .622
7 .501 .615 42 .611 .650
8 .534 .613 43 .537 .576
9 .484 .570 44 .651 .688
10 .458 .549 45 .710 .751
11 .448 .540 46 .623 .665
12 .575 .613 47 .547 .583
13 .529 .577 48 .539 .581
14 .508 .562 49 •.537 .605
15 • 5(}'t~ .560 50 .672 .733
16 e486 .567 51 8656 .675
17 .461 8539 52 .557 .606
18~ .463 .549 53 .485 .551
19 .463 • .521 54 .782 .584
20 .589 .629 55 .715 .695
21 .517 .563 56 .551 .625
22 .457 .488 57 .507 0568
23 {~~~ .446 -:}-:!- .477 58 .511 .556
2J~ .467 .509 59 .606 .672
25 i}~-. 446 .483 60 .640 ~~. 760
26 .484 ,,51.5 61 .604 .744
27 .485 .519 62 .591 .682
28 .506 .483 63 .640 .663
29 0499 .515 64 e709 .706
30 .462 .519 65 t)668 .720
31 .465 .54.5 66 .703 .533
32 .447 .538 67 .781 .542
33 tP460 .496 68 .819 .549
34 .536 .500 69 .757 .527
35 .662 .581 70 {~. 965 .688
{} Largest Travel Distance (in Miles)
*~r Smallest Travel Distance (in Miles)
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3.10 Amalgamate Sectors
The ~ifth subsystem will attempt to address the problem
of which sectors should be combined to form larger sectors
with a minimum imbalance in workloads. Because of the rela-
tively limited flexibility of design, allowing only for gross
modifications, (adding one sector to another rather than just
one reporting area), it may be impossible to come up with a
design that does not have significant workload imbalances.
In addition, as a result of this limited flexibility, it is
not possible to design an iterative procedure that parallels
the previous subsystems. In an iterative procedure that
would modify an initial beat configuration by transferring
areas the size of sectors, the changes in workloads would be
highly unpredictable because of the gross effects resulting
from each modification. In a sense it would be no better
than a poor unordered method of carrying out a total enumer-
ation of all possible combinations.
3.10.1 A Slowest ~scent Algorithm
At present, no model~r this subsystem has been devel-
oped but a number of directions are being explored. One
approach is analogous to a steepest descent algorithm. J For
example, given a police district divided into b beats where
there are only m cars to man, at least b - m + 1 and at most
2(b - m) sectors would be amalgamated into larger sectors.15
The algorithm looks at all possible ways of combining only
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two sectors and then chooses the one with the smallest im-
balance. The resulting design~has only b - 1 sectors pro-
ducing a sector design with only b - 2 sectors. The
algorithm stops when there are only m sectors left.
The upper bound for the number of combinations that
will have to be compared in the first iteration is
c~ = [b(b - 1)J/2. For b = 6 this is 15. However, it is
important to remember that because of a contiguity con-
straint, we combine only contiguous sectors so that this is
only an upper bound. In the initial design for District 4,
of the 15 possible combinations of the 6 sectors, only 8
satisfied this constraint. Although the number of combina-
tions increases as b increases, it is also likely that the
fraction of permissible combinations will decrease because
there will, in general, be only a very limited number of
sectors to which each sector will be contiguous. An
example of this are the 48 continental states. Of the 1128
combinations of two, only 105 combinations, less than 10%
would satisfy a contiguity constraint.
The slowest ascent algorithm, as described above, is
complete as is; however, it is envisioned that it will be
combined with a heuristic to reduce the number of combina-
tions considered each time. The heuristic would be a simple
procedure for characterizing which sectors are unlikely
candidates for doubling up.
As with the previous systems, this methodology would
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also allow for user interaction. After considering the
various alternatives for reducing the number of sectors
from b to b - 1 to b - 2, etc., the user would then be
provided at each step with information concerning the n
(user defined) best options for reducing the number of
sectors by one e
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3.11 Present stage of Developmen~
For eac~ of the first four subsystems, programs which
independently equalize either workloads, preventive patrol
coverage, sector travel times, or atom travel times have
been written, debugged and run for data of District 4 in
Boston. klthough the nature of user interaction for each of
these subsystems has been outlined, the structure of the
user interaction has not yet been translated into computer
programs. There are some questions that still have to be
resolved with regard to the form of user interactive programs
so as to make interaction as simple as possible. The ease of
interaction is critical since the computer models are intended
for the use of police managers with, at best, limited com-
puter experience. Before a final version of the model is
developed, it is hoped that feedback from various police
managers will provide ideas for improving the interactive
design but the basic format wil follow that of the inter-
active version of the hypercube model that was developed by
Weisberg [17J. The last subsystem, doubling up on sectors,
is still in the development stage and no computer programs
have been written yet.
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3.12 Summary
The models described in this paper -represent an itera-
tive approach to sector design. At each iteration a choice
is made between alternative sector designs and the choice
will depend upon the variables of primary and secondary
concern to the police managers. Experience with the indivi-
dual non-interactive programs has shown this approach to be
rapid enough to be feasible. The usefulness of these models,
however, will depend strongly on the individual police mana-
ger's ability to integrate quantitative and non-quantitative
variables in choosing between sector designs.
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FCOTNOTES J.
Determining what is a community's fair share of police
protection is a difficult task and is a problem not really
addressed in this chapter. It is hoped, however, that the
use of quantitative measures will at least facilitate the
evaluation of the level of police protection afforded each
segment of the community.
The ca.11 rates are deterlnille<l by 1J.~ir)G clEl.ta agg!~ega.lced for
for the time period (patrol shift) for which this sector
design is intended.
If two atoms are contiguous but there is a barrier between
them (e.g. a river), they are treated as if they were non-
contiguous.
Computational experience has shown that p should not be set
less than 5.
This problem can be avoided, to some extent , by constraints
similar to C4.
To simplify the analysis, each effect is treated as if it
were independent of every other effect though in fact the
effects are obviously related.
From now on it is to be understood that all atom transfers
have been first checked by procedure (GP5) to see if they
do not violate the contiguity constraint (Cl).
All computational results were obtained on an IBM 370/165
computer at the M.I.T. Information Processing Center.
Each effect is treated separately even though the effects
are interrelated.
However, one ripple effect is that by transfering the atom
to an adjoining sector and increasing its workload, the
average distance travelled on an intersector sector dis-
patch will tend to increase.
Computational results obtained by various modifications of
the initial sector design used here seem to indicate that
the district-wide average response time for this design
was close to the minimum possible.
Because travel speeds were set to be I, this number
represents the average distance travelled in miles.
13
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For consistency we continue our use of l the words precinct
to describe a collection of sectors and sector to describe
a single patrol unit's area of responsibility even though
in New Haven the respective terms are sector and beat.
The relationship between the distance to the center of
gravity of a sector and the atom travel times is not as
direct as it would seem. The reason is that the travel
time for sector car At to atom C is not calculated by
using the distance from the center of gravity of sector
A to the center of gravity of atom Co Instead it is
calculated by finding the expected distance sector car
A' must travel in order to reach the center of gravity of
atom C. The two are not equivalent. Larson [ ].
It is not always 2(b - m) because a larger amalgamated
sector car can be formed out of more than two smaller
sectors.
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CHAPTER 4
THE BASICS OF SEARCH THEORY APPLIED TO POLICE PATROL
4.0 Introduction
Classical search theory addresses two classes of prob-
blems. The first class centers about calculating the
probability of intercepting a target which exhibits certain
characteristics (e.g. stationary, non-stationary, evasive,
etc.) under a specific search pattern (e.g. random, parallel
sweeps, cross over barrier patrol, etc.) [18J. Included in
this class is the analysis of the operating characteristics
of the detection instrument, be it radar, sonar or simply
the human eye. The second class of problems involves the
determination of an optimal search strategy •
. In this chapter, we will begin our analysis of the
application of search theory to problems of police patrol.
The first sections of this chapter will focus on a basic
search theoretic model of police patrol which is used to
calculate the probability of intercepting a crime. The
presentation will include an analysis of each of the model's
input parameters as well as a discussion of the model's
implicit assumptions. However, the discussion of how to
obtain estimates of the various parameters and the inherent
difficulties in the task will be postponed until our presen-
tation of algorithms and examples in Chapter 6. Next, using
the basic model, we will explore the differences between
overlapping and non-overlapping patrol sectors.
\
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The second half of this chapter will focus on issues
relating to the optimal allocation of patrol effort. The
major part of this section will involve a fundamental analy-
sis of the characteristics of optimal search strategies when
targets (i.e. crimes) arrive randomly and independent of each
other and then depart after a rather limited duration. This
analysis will use Koopman's pioneering work L13J in search
theory as a background and show the limited applicability of
his results to the situation in which t~e targets exhibit the
,
above characteristics. The goal of this discussion will be
to develop a qualitative understanding of the search process
while pinpointing some misconceptions that have arisen in the
application of earlier search theory results to police patrol.
These qualitative concepts will be quantified later in Chapter
5 with the use of a differential equation model of search and
detection. Finally Chapters 6 and 7 build on the insights
developed here to create algorithms for deploying both tacti-
cal and standard patrol units.
-121-
4.1 A Search Theoretic Model of Police Patrol
A number of recent papers [7, 8, 9 p 14 ,19 ,20 ] have
applied the work of Koopman [12J to the problem of calculat-
ing the probability of a randomly patrolling police car
i~rcepting a crime. The general model they follow, with
perhaps one or two minor modifications, is as follows:
t = the observable duration of a crime,
d = probability of detecting the crime conditioned upon
passing it in progress,
m = the total number of street miles in the area patrolled,
s = the speed of patrol,
Pi = probability of interception
where Pi = 1 - exp(-s • t · dim) (4.1)
The exponential form of this equation stems from the use of
the expofiential distribution as an approximation to the
binomial distribution. The actual underlying model of patrol
(the justifiction for equation (4.1)) treats the patrol path
of s • t miles as a series of very small independent paths
of length Ie. On each path of length Ie, the probability of
finding the target is (1 - d • le/m). Consequently a path
of length sot miles has a probability of (1 - d • 1e/m)st/1e
of not finding the target and [1 - (1 - d • 1e/m)st/leJ of
finding it. Applying the exponential approximation to this
binomial distribution yields equation (4.1).
In introducing this first basic model of patrol a num-
ber of assumptions were made. Some were made so as not to
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complicate our initial discussion of the model and will be
relaxed later with only minor modifications of the model.
While some others can not be eliminated without necessita-
ting an almost entirely different approach to modeling
police patrol. In the first category falls the assumption
that at the time the crime is committed the patrol unit is
on patrol and not responding to a call for service. Con-
sequently this initial model is more relevant to a tactical
patrol force or to the patrol units in a split patrol force
that do not generally respond to calls for service. Later in
section 4.1.2, we modify the model to make it applicable to
standard patrol units which spend a good percentage (often
more than 50%) of their time on tasks other than patrol.
Secondly equation (4.1) calculates the probability of
intercepting a crime of a fixed observable duration of t
minutes. However of at least equal importance is the ability
to carry out similar calculations for crimes of a specific
class (e.g. street robberies) whieh may have a common mean
but whose observable duration is a random variable. In
Chapter 6 we discuss calculating the probability of inter-
ception when a probability distribution is given for the
observable duration.
One assumption that can not be modified without immedi-
ately getting enmeshed in complex game theoretic modeling is
that crimes occur independent of the location of the pat-
rolling vehicle. One justification for making this
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assumption is that we are considering only randomized non-
predictable patrol strategies. This unpredictability limits,
but by no means eliminates, the potential usefulness to a
criminal of knowing the location of the patrol unit when
committing a crime. For example, a criminal might wait
to commit a crime until he knows that the patrol unit is at
the other end of the sector. This would provide him with a
minimum time span in which he need not be concerned about
being intercepted by a passing patrol unit. \Vith a standard
patrol unit there is an additional potential violation of
the independence assumption. Criminals may monitor the
police radio in order to initiate their crimes when the local
sector car is busy responding to a call for service [14J.
Should it be found that criminals frequently use information
about the location and status of patrol units when committing
crimes, then the potential applicability of equation (4.1)
and var~tions on it would be limited. One would expect though
that at least for unmarked patrol units (e.g. taxicabs) with
police officers in civilian clothes the validity of the
independence assumption would not be a significant problem.
In addition Larson [14J suggests a number of strategies
(e.g. overlapping patrol sectors) which can be used to
reduce the gain to a criminal of monitoring an individual
patrol unit's activity. These strategies would thereby
restore the independence between the time and location of a
crime and the status of a patrol unit.
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Although the above equation will be discussed throughout
this and succeeding chapters, for now we would like to comment
briefly on just one of i~~components. The observable dura-
tion of a crime, t, is perhaps, the most critical parameter
of the equation. It represents the amount of time (in search
theory terminology: the total search effort) available to a
single patrol unit to detect a random crime even though that
patrol unit may have four or eight hours to spend on preven-
tive patrol. Its small magnitude, often two minutes or less,
is a major reason why even very few potentially observable
crimes are ever intercepted by patrolling police units. The
only way to increase the amount of search effort available is
by adding patrol units. Doubling the number of patrol units
doubles the available search effort, but unfortunately does
not double Pi' the probability of interception, because of
the exponential nature of equation (4.1). When additional
units are added, the model becomes
n = the number of patrol units,
p. = 1 - exp(-n • s ~ d • tim)~
This equation applies if each unit patrols its own separate
sector of min miles. Also, by making a number of minor
assumptions (to be discussed in the next section), it can be
shown to apply as well to n units patrolling randomly the
entire m miles.
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4.1.1 Manpower Requirements
Equation (4.2) does not represent a manpower allocation
formula. However, by looking at the inverse (i.e. solving
for n), it is possible to determine the number of patrol
units needed to obtain a specified level of interception, Pi
(see Elliott [9 J) .
n = (-m/s • t • d) In(l - Pi) (4.3)
In using this equation, it is once again important to under-
stand the impact of t, the observable duration of a crime.
To obtain the same specified level of interception, signifi-
cantly different manpower levels will be required for the
crimes of purse snatching and commerical burglary because
their durations vary so tremendously. Consequently careful
consideration of the duration of various crime types should
be given before developing crime specific desployment strate-
gies. This awareness, in fact, may be the critical factor
in choosing between totally different strategies--whether
to increase patrol strength or set up decoys. In pursuing
this approach, an obvious prerequisite is the estimation of
the duration of the various crimes. (This issue will be
discussed later in Chapter ~)
4.1~2 Standard Patrol Car
The previous discussion and equations more accurately
model a patrol unit W}lose sole responsibility is to search for
-126-
crimes (e.g. a tactical patrol unit) rather than the typical
patrol car which spends a significant fraction of its time
responding to calls for service or handling matters totally
unrelated to crime. To model the latter case the equations
must be modified to allow for the fact that at the time the
crime is being committed the patrol car may be responding to
a call for service elsewhere or may be otherwise occupied.
Let b = the average fraction of time a patrol unit is
busy and therefore not on patrol.
If t is small in the sense that during the entire duration
of the crime a unit is likely to be either busy or free,
then equation (4.1) becomes
p. = [1 - b] · [1 - exp(-s • t • dim)] (4.4)1
If, however, t is large such that during any time period a
patrol car will be busy about (b • t) minutes, then a good
approximation could be
Pi = 1 - exp[-(l - b) • s • t · dim)]
For an intermediate range of t the equation becomes more
complicated.
f(a) = the probability density fUnction-of the fraction of
time available for" patrol during the period of
t minutes.
1
p. = !1
a
f(a) • [1 - exp (a • s • t • d/m)Jda
(4.6)
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In this last expression the average available fraction of
free time, (1 - b), is replaced with a probability distri-
bution, f(a). This distribution, though, is not easy to
determine because each unit's time available for patrol is
a complex function of its interactions with the other patrol
units in its precinct. (It will often respond to calls in
other sectors as well as vice vers~) Its calculation
requires a not at all obvious extension of the hypercube
model. This is because the points in time at which an in-
dividual patrol unit becomes available for patrol do not
constitute a renewal process [11J.
Naturally, of the above three equations, the last is the
most accurate. However, given the complexity of determining
f(a) and the relatively short observable duration of crimes
as compared to the time spent on a call for service, we
suggest using expression ~.4) as a good approximation,
albeit overestimation, for the probability of interception.
In Chapter 7 we use this approximation in developing
algorithms for finding the portion of a sector, in which a
standard patrol should concentrate its efforts.
4 8 1.3 Parameter Control
At this point it may prove useful to review the various
parameters to see what control can be exercised to increase
the probability of interception [4 J. Obviously n, the
number of patrol cars, can be increased. Also, b, the
fraction of time busy, can be decreased by changing the
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dispatch policy to eliminate service calls that could be
handled, just as well, by someone other than a patrol
officer. This will result in an increased probability of
intercepting a random crime. For example decreasing b from
.6 to .4 by definition increases the patrol units availabi-
lity, (1 - b), from .4 to .6. The result is a 50 percent
increase in the probability of interception as calculated
using the approximation (equation 4.3). However, this
increased interception rate will not necessarily generate
an equivalent increase in the actual number of arrests
since criminals may react to the increased patrol by shift-
ing their activities elsewhere. This issue of the impact
on crime patterns of increased or concentrated patrol will
be addressed in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 8.
The speed at which officers patrol, s, can also be
increased; however, there is an inverse relationship bet~
ween s and d since increasing the speed reduces the probabi-
lity of observing a crime in progress [8J. On the other
hand, there are alternatives for increasing d without
reducing the speed of patrol. Better street lighting would
increase the observability of street crimes. Instituting a
concerted effort to have homeowners leaving for extended
vacations notify the police would also increase the probabi-
lity of a passing patrol car noticing a burglary in progress.
Any activity around the vacated house would immediately be
suspicious. Similarly a blinking light attached to the
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front of a store that a storeowner triggers to signal a
robbery in progress would have a similar effect. To some
extent m, the number of street miles, can also be con-
trolled by concentrating patrol in the highest crime areas.
Lastly, one pessimistic note of interest can be sounded with
regard to t, observable duration of a crime. Increasing the
frequency of patrols may cause criminals to work faster
thereby reducing t.
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4.2 Comparison of Overlapping and Non-Overlapping Patrol
Earlier we had stated that for an n man tactical patrol
force, totally overlapping and non-overlapping patrols have
the same probabiity of intercepting a random crime assuming
that crimes arise in a geographically homogeneous manner. In
this section we will outline a proof of this as well as
specify the underlying assumptions. In addition we will
show that for a standard patrol force (often busy responding
to calls for service) the two policies are not equivalent
and th~for a specific set of assumptions overlapping pat-
rols have a higher probability of interception. Lastly at
the close of this section we will digress from the search
theoretic models in order to apply the hypercube queuing
model [15J to measure how overlapping and non-overlapping
patrols compare with regard to travel time.
4.2.1_ Probability of Interception
The first problem to be addressed is the calculation of
the probability of interception for non-overlapping and
overlapping patrol when carried out by a tactical patrol
force. If the region (m street miles) is divided into n
separate sectors then each patrol unit is patrolling min
street miles. In addition, since crimes are assumed to arise
uniformly over the entire region, the probability of a
random crime occurring in any particular sector is lin.
Thus the probability of intercepting a random crime with
~ [1 - exp(-s • t · d • n/m)J
n
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non-overlapping sectors is just the sum (over all sectors)
of the probability of a crime occurring in sector j and
patrol unit j discovering it.
n
Pi = lj=l
= 1 - exp ( -s • t · d • n/m) (4.7)
If on the other hand all n patrol units independently
patrol the m street miles then the probability of a particular
patrol unit, j, not detecting the crime is exp(-s • t · dim).
(This is an approximation in that we have not included a
second order effect, which involves unit j not intercepting
the crime because mother tnithas already intercepted it.)
Since each unit patrols independently of all the other units,
the probability of none of the n units intercepting the crime
is
[exp(-s • t · d/m)Jn = exp(-s • ted • n/m)
and
p. =1 - exp(-s • t · d • n/m)
, J.
tt16 same as before.
The above analysis could have been performed similarly
for geographically non-homogeneous crime rates and the result
would have been the same. The only change in the analysis
would have been that the lin term in equation (4.7) would
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have to be replaced by Pjc' the probability of a crime
occurring in sector j given that it occurs somewhere in the
entire region. However, since the sectors are still of
equal size and the Pjc sum to one; Pi' the probability of
interception, does not change~
Although we have shown that for equal sized s~ctors the
search theoretic model produces the same probability of inter-
ception for totally overlapping and non-overlapping patrol,
it would be incorrect to infer that the two strategies are
totally equivalent. As we have noted earlier, the search
model assumes that the criminal selects his victim indepen-
dent of the location of the patrol unit. This, in fact,
may not always be the case. Larson [14J points out that one
advantage of overlapping patrol is that a criminal would
have to keep track of all n patrol units in order to be sure
that no patrol unit were nearby; while for non-overlapping
patrols, he would only have to keep track of the local sec-
tor car. Thus from this perspective overlapping patrol might
have a greater chance of catching(or perhaps deterring) a
criminal. Conversely, non-overlapphing sectors allow a pat-
rol unit to become better acquainted with its sector,
therefore enabling it to notice more easily things which are
out of the ordinary. The above two examples represent but a
few of the issues that need to be considered when comparing
overlapping and non-overlapping patrol but which are not
incorporated into the search model. Throughout this section,
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though, we will be focusing on either one or two performance
measures with our models. In the process we will be making
a number of assumptions as well as leaving out numerous other
issues (in general those that are not easily quantifiable)
which should be kept in mind when translating our results
to a specific application.
4.2.2 Standard Patrol Unit
In contrast to the previous discussion, the probability
of interception by a standard patrol unit will be different
for overlapping and non-overlapping patrols. Using equation
(4.4) which assumes crimes of relatively short duration, we
will compare non-overlapping and overlapping patrol strategies
for standard patrol units. Three characteristics of the
specific problem to be discussed are
1. Crimes arise uniformly in space.
2. The fractio!l of time each unit is busy is b and is
independent of the particular policy.
3. Each sector is the same size.
For two patrol cars each patrolling its own sector and
for small t, the equation for the probabi~ty of interception
is
2
Pin = 2:j=l t · [1 - b] • [1 - exp (-2 • s • t • dim]
= [1 - b] • [1 - exp (-2 • s • t • dim)] (4.8)
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In this expression the 1/2 is the probability of the
committed crime occurring in sector j and (1 - b) is the
probability that the patrol unit in sector j is free and on
patrol. With a totally overlapping patrol pOlicy the proba-
bility of interception, Pic' is
P. = [(1 - b)/ (1 + b)] • [1 - exp(-2 • s • t • dim)]
~o
+ [2b· (1 - b)/(l + b)] • [1 - exp(-s • t • dim)]
The terms [(1 - b)/(l + b)J and L2b • (1 - b)/(l + b)]
represent the probability that two or one server respectively
is not busy. (See Appendix B.) Thus the first term in
expression (4.9) is the probability of~ntercepting a crime
and both units are on patron and the second term the proba-
bilty of (intercepting a crime and only one unit is on
patrol).
In Appendix C it is proven that for the above example
the probability of interception with an overlapping patrol,
p. , is higher than that for a non-overlapping patrol, p .•
10 1n
The magnitude of this improvement is
Pic - Pin = [b 0 (1 - b)/ (1 + b)J 0 [2(1 - exp(-sot.d/m))
(1 - exp(-2 • s • t · dim)]
(4.10)
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An analysis of this gain shows that it is directly propor-
tional to the probabili~of only one server being busy. In
addition it monotonically increases as s or t increases.
However the difference will be very small since the expression
[2(1 - exp(-s • t • dim)) - (1 - exp(-2 • s • t • dim))] is
close to zero. If the product, s • t • dim were .01
(approximately one percent chance of intercepting a crime)
then the expression is equal to approximately .0001. In
general these results seem to be analogous to the improve-
ment produced when two one-server queuing systems merge into
a one-queue, two-server system.
The above small improvement should not, however, be used
as the real measure of the potential improvement that can be
generated from overlapping patrol. Up to now we have con-
sidered only uniformly distributed crimes•.Although it is
easy for a police decision maker to allocate his resources
when crimes are distributed uniformly, non-uniform crime
rates allow for the concentration of patrol in the areas of
high crime which would result in an overall higher probabili-
ty of intercepting a random crime. In our concluding remarks
on interception probabilities for both patrol strategies, we
will outline some of the differences between the two strate-
gies when calls are not distributed uniformly and the work-
loads are not the same.
Assume sector A has high crime and call for service rates
and sector B, low crime and call rates. Consequently, if each
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sector is assigned a single patrol unit, we would expect for
~he unit in sector A to have the higher workload (even though
we are allowing intersector dispatches). The result is that
the area with the higher crime rate has fewer hours of pre-
ventive patrol and consequently a smaller probability of
intercepting a crime there given the sectors are the same
size. If instead, the two units jointly patrol the two
sectors ahd call assignments are alternated, then,first of
all, both units will have equal workloads which is an
advantage in itself. Secondly, the higher crime rate sector
will receive at least an equal share of patrol coverage.
Perhaps more importantly the overlapping patrol policy pro-
vides the added flexibility to allocate an even larger pro-
portion of the patrol effort in the higher crime area which
is not possible when each patrol unit is assigned to its
own sector. (It should be noted that the same type of
flexible patrol allocation can be accomplished also with a
split patrol force in which the responding cars are assigned
separate sectors and the remainder of the patrol force is
assigned to the highest crime areas.)
The potential payoff from being able to allocate a
greater proportion of the patrol effort to the area where
it is needed most will be significantly greater than the
queuing type improvement discussed earlier in this section.
Tne magnitude of the improvement will be directly related
to the degree of nonuniformity in the crime rate and the
amount of imbalance in workloads. For example assume sector
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A generates 60% of the crimes and that its patrol unit's
workload is .60 while sector B generates only 40% of the
crimes and its unit's workload is .40. Secondly assume
that the product, s • t · dim, is .01. Thenby changing
from non-overlapping to overlapping sectors and even allo-
cating patrol effort in proportion to the crime rate
(which is not the optimal strategy) there would be approxi-
mately an 8% increase in the probability of interception.
With an optimal allocation it would improve by 10% or more.
However, before rushing off to recommend a change from
non-overlapping to overlapping sectors, the impact of this
type of change on other performance measures must be evalua-
ted. In the following section the focus will be on average
travel time (which is also related to catching a criminal at
the scene of the crime [21J) which in contrast to intercep-
tion probability generally improves under non-overlapping
patrol.
4~2.3 Overlapping Sectors: Impact on Travel Times
Larson in his book, Urban Police Patrol Analysis ~4],
discusses overlapping sectors as a potentially more flexible
alternative to the more widely used non-overlapping sectors.
The major advantages of overlapping sectors are that it
decreases the probability of patrol coverage being reduced to
zero and, in general, increases the difficulty for a criminal
to monitor the activity of patrol units and plan his crimes
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accordingly. One issue Larson addressed in depth, as part
of an evaluation of car locator systems, was a comparison of
travel times in a system with over lapping sectors and per-
fect car location information and travel times in current
systems with non-overlapping sectors and no explicit car
location information.
The general conclusion was that:
"If sectors were eliminated and each car were to patrol
uniformly one large area, independently of other cars, and if
perfect resolution car location information were used to
dispatch the closest available car, then the travel time
characteristics of this overlapping sector system are nearly
identical to those of SCM (strict center of mass dispatching;
see Glossary for definition) system with nonoverlapping
sectors."
Since his discussion of overlapping sectors was presen-
ted in the context of evaluating an automatic car locator
system (which makes it feasible for even all of a precinct's
units to patrol the entire precinct), the focus- was on
comparing overlapping patrol with perfect car location infor-
mation to non-overlapping patrol under SCM or MCM (modified
center of mass; see Glossary for definition), In this sec-
tion, we will present a much more limited discussion than
that of Larson of the impact on travel times of overlapping
patrol but with no car location information. The tool to be
used in this analysis is the hypercube model which has the
capability of modeling various levels of overlapping patrol
[15 J. Our focus will be on combining only two sectors. It
is a policy that can be implemented without an automatic car
locator system and is presently used in varying degrees by
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many police departments in the United states o We will assume
that a patrol unit's available time is divided among the
sector's atoms in proportion to each atom's call rate. The
dispatch policy will be MCM with one modification needed to
describe the dispatching of patrol units within overlapping
sectors. In our examples one of the pair of patrol units in
the overlapping sectors was designated the primary responding
car. When a call for service arises in the overlapping
sectors, the primary car is always sent if it is available
and only when it is not available is the other patrol unit
dispatched. In general, though, the impact of overlapping
patrol on travel times would be essentially the same if,
instead, calls were shared equally by the two patrol units.
For a range of average workloads (from a low of .1 to a
high of .9) we ran the hypercube model twice, using data from
District 4 in Boston [16J. In one set of runs, sectors 5 and
6 were separate; in another they were combined to form one
larger overlapping sector. (Calls for service were allowed
to be queued.) For low utilization there was a significant
degradation of travel times (See Figure 4.1). When the
average workload was .1, combining the two sectors increased
the average travel time to the combined region by 53%; for an
average workload of .30 the . increase, although smaller, was
still 30%. As the average workload increased further to .50,
the difference in travel times was reduced to 15%. Thus as
the average workload increased the deleterious impact on
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travel times continues to decrease and as the system nears
saturation (average workload .9) the differences between
overlapping and non-overlapping are almost eliminated (1%
difference).
The explanation of this phenomenon is as follows. With
low average workloads and non-overlapping sectors, almost all
calls for service in sector 5 will be answered by the patrol
unit located in the same sector; the srone is true for sector
6. However, when the two sectors are combined, the car that
is dispatched to a call in sector 5 will often be (approxi-
mately 50% of the time) on patrol in sector 6 and have to
travel much farther to the call. (Remember we do not use or
have car location information.) However, when the average
workload increases, even with non-overlapping sectors the
• patrol car in sector 6 will be sent frequently to calls in
sector 5 because the local sector car will often be busy
answering another call. In addition as the average workload
rises significantly, larger and larger proportion of calls in
sector 5 will be answered by sector cars that are even
further away than car 6. As the proport}on of these overly
long travel times increases, they will tend to dominate a
statistic such as the average travel time thereby reducing
further the impact of overlapping pairs of sectors.
An interesting footnote to the comparision of the two
policies is that the imbalance in response times between
sectors 5 and 6 was not very different for the tw~ policies.
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Ratio of Travel Times
OVERLAPPING SECTORS
NON-OVERLAPPING SECTORS
/.'7
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1.1/
1.2.
1.1
. I .3
.7
AVERAGE WORKLOAD
Figure 4.1: A Comparison of Travel Times for
Overlapping and Non-overlapping Sectors
for a Range of Workloads
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For a .30 average workload, sector 5 had a 23% higher travel
time than sector 6 with overlapping sectors and a 30% higher
travel time with non-overlapping sectors. With a .50 av~rage
workload, sector 5's travel times were 34% and 36% higher
with overlapping and non-overlapping patrol respectively.
4.2.4 Conclusions: Overlapping vs. Non:Overlapping Sectors
The only clear cut conclusion about the preferred strat-
egy that can be stated with any certainty is that it will
depend upon the particular circumstances. With this in mind
we will present our conclusions for a number of situations;
at times, however, our cmclusions will be merely a clearer
statement of the tradeoffs that the decision maker should
c~nsider. Our presentation will first focus on situations
in which a car locator system is not available and later
discuss how the recommendations would change if a car
locator system were available.
Two nonquantifiable issues that will be relevant to each
of the situations discussed are l)Overlapping,patrols reduce
the criminal's abilbity to choose his place and time in such
a way that he is assured of not being spotted by a passi.ng
patrol car; 2)Non-overlapping patrol enables the ratrol
officer to obtain a better knowledge of his particular sec-
tor. Each decision maker must assess the relative importance
of each of these issues in his locality. Do criminals
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frequently plan their activities by monitoring patrol move-
ments? How critical is it for the patrol officer to develop
an extensive knowledge of the~mmunity he patrols?
With these issues as background, we proceed with a
presentation of our conclusions for five different situations:
1) No Car Locator Information: Relatively Homogeneous
Call Rates and Crime Rates
If the crime rate in a region were relatively homogeneous
and no serious workload im0alances existed, then essentially
the only advantage to overlapping patrol is the above mentioned
difficulty of tracking. However, in the range of workloads
within which most police departments operate overlapping
sectors would significantly increase travel times, anywhere
from 15 to 50 percent. Thus unless there were hard evidenceJ
to show that many crimes were planned and committed so as to
coincide with the sector car being either unavailable or far
away, non-overlapping sectors are preferable.
2) No Car Information: Low Utilization and Non-Homoge-
neous Call Rates and Crime Rates
Given the tremendous increas~ in travel time (on the
order of 50%)lthat would result from changing to overlapping
sectors it would require extremely large disparities in crime
rates to justify the change. It is important to remember
that even for large disparities in crime rates the tradeoff
under consideration is not just between higher police initia-
ted interceptions and higher citizen -initiated (police
responding) on site apprehensions. The average
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travel time has wider significance since police also respond
to a large number of non-criminal emergencies. In addition
citizen perception of the quality of police services may be
directly related to the rapidity with which police respond
to a call for service. In short it would be necessary in
this situation to etimate accurately both the impact on
travel time and the potential increase in interception proba-
bilities resulting from a better matching of patrol to crime.
However we would expect the significant increase in travel
time to outweigh the other benefits.
3) No Car Location Information: High Utilization and
Non-Homogeneous Call Rates and Crime Rates
Once the utilization approaches .50, the increase in
travel times resulting from overlapping sectors would seem
to be in an acceptable range (15%) given other benefits that
may accrue. With the variations in call rates, we would ex-
pect imbalances in workloads and an even more serious mis-
allocation of patrol effort. With the potential for increas-
ing interception probabilities by more than 10%, overlapping
sectors are an attractive option to seriously consider.
Under these circumstances it may be that the other issues we
have mentioned will decide the issue in favor of one policy
or the other.
4) Car Location Information: Homogeneous Call Rates
and Crime Rates
With the introduction of a car locator system, travel time
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is no longer a serious consideration. However because call
rates are geographically homogeneous, there is no real pros-
pect of directly improving interception probabilities through
the better allocation of patrol effort. The choice thus
evolves into an analysis by the decision maker of the two
issues with which we began this discussion, monitoring diffi-
culty vs. neighborhood familiarity.
5) Car Location Information: Non-Homogeneous Call
Rates and Crime Rates
The preference for overlapping sectors seems to be the
most clear cut in this situation. Overlapping sectors would
allow a better allocation of patrol without significantly
degrading travel times. The only drawback would therefore
be that with the larger regions topatrol, patrol officers
may lack the intimate knowledge of their area that they
might otherwise have.
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4.3 Problems in Applying Search Theory to Patrol Allocation
The second question that hasbeen approached from a
search theoretic viewpoint is the allocation of police pat-
rol effort in a region where the spatial distribution of
crimes is non-uniform. On this problem Larson [14J has
brought to bear graphical techniques of Koopman [13J
while Olson ~9 ] has made use of the equivalent but more
easily computerized analytical techniques developed by
Charnes and Cooper [5 J. In applying these techniques to
the allocation of patrol both authors have constrained the
patrol car to patrol in a random2 manner with a resultant
reduction in the theoretical efficiency [14J. The motivation
behind this type of patrol, as was mentioned earlier, is that
it reduces the possibility of evasive action (a difficult
thing to model) on the part of the criminal. Elliott [9 ],
on the other hand, in allocating police resources has used
a linear approximation to the exponential distribution to
calculate the probabil~ of interception. He then proceeded
to develop a method for finding a totally deterministic
patrol route which would optimize the probability of inter-
ception of a crime.
4 e 3.1 Classical Search Theory: The Allocation Problem
Before proceeding to analyze the allocation problem in
the police context, it is necessary to provide first a brief
introduction to the classical search theory problem. For
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simplicity, assume there are three regions, A, B, and C, of
equal size but with different probabilities (which sum to 1)
o'f a target being locatad in each and a total available
search effort of 1 hour. Assume further that A has the
highest probabilitiy of the target's being in it, B the second
highest, and C the lowest. The optimal search strategy might
be to search A for 40 minutes, B for 20 minutes and C not at
all. This optimal solution would satisfy the following
equilibrium characteristic.
A differential increase in the search allocation to A,
dta , and a differential increase in the search of B, dtb , will
increase equally the probability of interception, p. or
1.
dPi dPi
dt
a
- dt
b
• In addition, both differential increases, dta
and dtb • have higher payoffs than an initial allocation of
search to region C. However, as more than 1 hour becomes
dPi
available, because there is diminishing return (dt is
a
decreasing as t a increases), the region C will eventually
be allocated some search effort. Conversely, if less than
one hour of search were available, for example only 5
minutes, it is conceivable that the optimal solution would
direct all search efforts to region A. In short, the less
effort available, the smaller the region to be allocated
search.
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4.3.2 Applyin6 Classical Sea£9h.Theory
In applying the Koopman and Charnes and Cooper tech-
niques to police, the time t, the observable duration of a
crime, once again plays an important and unfortunately dual
role. For one thing t, or a multiple of t for several pat-
rol units, repr~sents the total search effort available for
allocation and not the eight hours of patrol. Because t is
typically very small, often less than five minutes, the
likelihood that the~timal solution will be to patrol only a
very small high crime area is great. Secondly, an optimal
allocation (using classical search theory) for a 5 minute
crime, of three minutes in region A and two minutes in B,
does not directly address the problem of how to allocate
the 4 hours or more available for patrol. An initial res-
ponse L 14.] might be to spend three fifths of the time (2.4
hours) patrolling A and two fifths of the time (1.6 hours)
patrolling region B. However, there is a fundamental dis-
tinction between patrolling A for 2.4 hours and thmpatrolling
B for 1.6 hours andpatrolling B for 2 minutes, A for 3
minutes, etc. Under the former strategy after the first
three minutes in A and later after the first two minutes in
B, the search is incurring a diminishing return that was not
accounted for in the original solution (i.e. In the original
solution no search effort and consequently no diminishing
return occurred beyond the basic 3 minutes in A and 2 minutes
in B.) This second constraint seems to place infeasible
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limitations on implementing the optimal strategy, especially
when one uses numbers like 45 seconds for a street robbery
[~qJ. This fact alone raises serious questions about the
straightforward applicability of search theory to finding
optimal strategies for looking for crimes of a short duration.
4.3.3 Implicit Assumptions
All even more fundamental objection must be raised,
however, to the earlier applications of search theory to this
problem. The equations used for calculating the probability
of interception were similar to equation (4.1), which is of
the form amenable to the classical search theory approach.
This equation, however, as previously mentioned calculates
only the probability of interception 90nditional on a crime
occurring. In allocating search effort, though, at the time
the search begins, a crime mayor may not be in progress and,
. even if it is in progress, its observable duration over the
time period of the search may no longer be t. In essence no
adjustment was made for the fact that crimes are starting and
ending at random points relative to the start of the search
effort. In effect a straightforward application of search
theory makes the following unacceptable implicit assumptions:
1. Crimes occur every t minutes.
2. Crimes last t minutes.
3. Patrol has started at the beginning of a cycle.
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In the following sections we will do two thin@& Firstly,
equations will be presented for calculating the probability
of intercepting a crime during a search of fixed duration.
These equations will not be conditioned on the presence of a
target and will allow for the random arrival of a target.
They represent the more appropriate equations to be used in
allocating patrol effort if a classical search theory approach
is to be used. Following that, we will discuss in qualitative
terms, using basic search theory concepts (e.g. diminishing
return) how random independent arrival and short finite
duration of targets (e.g. crimes) impact on optimal search
strategies. The results of this discussion will be to lead
us in the direction of developing simple but potentially
robust heuristic patrol allocation algorithms (Chapters 6
and 7) which do not make use of the allocation methodologies
of Koopman [13] and Charnes and Cooper [5]e Instead they
will be designed to take advantage of some of the insights
we will develop here.
4.3.4 A Search of Fixed Duration
In order to avoid making the above three implicit
assumptions in attacking the allocation problem, the first
problem that must be resolved is the calculation of the pro-
bability of intercepting a crime of duration to minutes
during a search of tl minutes. However to simplify the
analysis we will consider only the situation in which, at
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most, only one crinle is present during the search. In addi-
tion crimes are assumed to arrive in a Poisson process.
Let A(t)= the probability that only one crime will
arrive during a time period of t minutes e
[1 - exp(-set.d/m]dt2
1) The simplest case to solve is for tl=tO'
to
Pi = A(t1 + to) · !o
to
· rl -::: A( 2tO) e J 1 exp(-s.ted/m]dt (4.11)to ..0
'I'he first term, A(tl + to) • is the probability of one crime
occurring that could be detected during the search. It
includes the possibility of a crime beginning before the
search begins but which is ~il1 present (because of its
finite duration) when the search gets underway as well as a
crime which begins after the search has begun but before the
search has ended. Because of the Poisson assumption, if an
observable crime occurs, the probability distribution for the
point at which the crime begins is uniformly distributed over
the t 1 + to minutes. This fact explains the presence of the
second term 1 The factor, 2, is introduced beacuse
tl+to •
there are two equally likely possibilities for a crime to be
present for t minutes during the search. Either it arrived
after the s€arch began and there are only t minutes left in
the search effort or it began before the search commenced
(to be exact to - t minutes before) and will end t minutes
into the search. The last term is j~st the probability of
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intercepting a crime that is detectable for only a span of
t minutes.
2) For the case in which t1<to (i.e. the search is
shorter than the duration of the crime),
2 [1 - exp(-s.t.d/m)] dt
(4.12)
The explanation of the first half of this expression (the
integral) is analogous to that of the previous equation. The
crime may be observable for only part of the search in one of
two ways. Either it began during the search or it began at a
point more than to - t 1 minutes before the search did and
therefore will end before the search itself is completed.
The additional term is necessary to include all crimes that
began within to - t 1 minutes prior to the start of the search
(with conditional probability of to-tl) and were therefore
to+tl
detectable throughout the entire search.
3) The last possibility is tl > to (i.e. the search is
longer than the duration of the crime)
[JO 2 • [1 _ exp (-sotod/m)]o to+t1
o [1 - exp(-sotood/ID)]] (4 0 13)
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The first component looks at the search for a crime which is
present less than to minutes. The second component accounts
for crimes for which the search effort of t 1 minutes totally
overlaps the duration of the crime.
None of the above equations represent exponential dis-
tributions and consequently existing search theory is not
easily applied to the optimal allocation problem. In addition
the three equations only consider one crime type of duration
to minutes. However, it is relatively easy to expand the
equations to allow for crime types of varying durations t 1 ,
t 2 , etc. This would be accomplished by introducing a summa-
tion of the various crime types weighted by their relative
frequency. Unfortunately, it will not be as easy to trans-
late optimal search strategies for single type crimes to
several types of crimes.
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4 e 4 How Certain Charac~eristics of primes Impact on the
Optimal Allocation Problenl
The introduction of randomness in the arrival and/or
departure of a target is not a new problem. Blac tman [2 ]
and Blach.man and Proschan [3 ] have developed search strate-
gies that minimize the expected delay between the appearance
and detection of targets with unknown arrival times; however,
once the target arrives, i t never departs. Barnett [1 ] in a
more recent article developed some very interesting theorems
about optimum search strategies for targets with unknown
arrival times and finite departure times. Gilbert D-o ]
carried out a detailed analysis of the impact of random inter-
vals of target visibility on optimal search strategies and
compared the results to a blind application (making no correc-
tion for random visibility) of Koopman's allocation methodolo-
gy. Although Gilbert's results provide some important in-
sights into the crime detection problem, the problem we are
analyzing is sufficiently distinct from his (a point discussed
earlier in the literature review) to require a separate
analysis. Hopefully this analysis will complement the earlier
work and add yet another perspective to understanding the
impact of randomness and finite duration. This presentation
will, on the whole, be on a more elementary and fundamental
level than the earlier works. In the course of the analysis,
we will construct abstract examples in order to analyze indi-
vidually how the various characteristics of crimes (e.g.
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unknown arrival times) impact on optimal patrol strategies.
These examples are not, however, meant to be models of how
police patrol is carried out. The goal of this analysis will
be to develop a qualitative understanding of the' impact of
various factors within the context of the classical search
theory results of Koopman rather than to generate optimal
search strategi~s.
The analysis will address the following issues:
1) The nature of diminishing return from two perspec-
tives:
a. The ~ priori diminishing return that accompa-
nies the allocation of additional search effort.
b. Sequential (or marginal) diminishing return
occurs when conditional on not finding the tar-
get, the probability of locating the target
;during the next period of search is less than in
the previous period.
2) The impact on diminishing return of
a. unknown arrival times
b. finite duration
c. targets arriving independently of one another
3) In classical search theory when effort is allocated
between two regions A and ~, the order in which the
areas are searched is irrelevant.
a. Analyze the impact on this of random arrivals,
finite duration and independent targets.
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4.4.1 Diminishing Return
a) Assume a target is located somewhere in a region A
and the observer has a probability p of locating the target
with a single glance. If an observer makes two random glances
in the region he has a probability, Pa
(4.14)
of detecting the target. The increase'~Pa' in the total
probability of detection as a result of the second glance
is not the same as for the first glance (which was p) but
rather
2AP = P - Pa
This example portrays the most fundamental form of dimini-
shing return which relates to the a Rriori allocation of
search effort. It should be noted, however, that from a
sequential point of view, the probability of finding the tar-
get on the second glance given that it was not found on the
first glance is still p.
b) Suppose a target is located with certainty somewhere
in either region A or region B and each region is broken into
four equal areas (Figure 4.2). In addition, the target is
twice as likely to be in anyone of the A boxes as in anyone
of the B boxes. Assume also that a single scan can survey an
entire box and determine with certainty if there is a target
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in that box. Consequently the probability of finding the
target with a single glance in region A is
Pa= 2/12 = .167
and in region B is
If two independent glances were cast in region A, the ~ priori
probability of locating the target is
and the increase in the probability of interception is
~Paa= Paa - Pa = 7/24 - 4/24 = .125
Again there is a diminishing return but now with one
distinction, that even when the search is viewed sequentially
there is diminishing return. Given that the target was not
found on the first glance, the probability of finding it on
the second glance is only
as compared to .167 for the first glance. This second form of
diminishing return results from the target not being constrained
to be in region A. Also if we look at the effect on B of the
first unfruitful glance in A, we find that the probability of
finding the target in B on the second glance has increased to
-158-
as compared to .083 previously. In effect the conditional
probabilities of finding the target in A or B in the succeed-
ing glances have begun to change in opposite directions. From
this simple example it begins to become apparent why as the
available search effort increases there is a greater likeli-
hood that the optimal search pOlicy will include searching
region Be The two opposing effects that generate the above
property are very closely related but, as will be seen later,
they can be separated.
As the search of region A continues beyond the second
glance to a third and fourth glance, diminishing return con-
tinues. The result is that by the fourth glance the optimal
strategy would allocate that look to region B rather than
region A.
4.4.2 Unknown Arrival Times
To introduce randomness and yet analyze an almost
equivalent problem, the following case is constructed.
A target is always present in either region A or region
B with the relative likelihoods as displayed in Figure 4.2.
The one modification is that the target can remain in its
place for only the time span of two glances at which point
another target replaces it. The second target selects its
position independently of the first target's position but
with the same relative likelihoods as before. At the time
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the search begins the target is equally likely to have just
arrived as to have been present for the time period of one
glance. A first glance in A has a payoff of
p = 2/12 = .167a
the same as before. However, during the second glance we may
no longer be looking for the same target since the first one
may have disappeared. The probability of finding the target
on the second glance is now
Paa= 1/2 [3/4 • 2/10 + 2/12J = .1583
which is greater than the .15 obtained by the nonrandom case.
If the process is viewed ~ priori, then the probability of
finding the target with two glances in A is
Paa= 1/6 + 5/6 • (.1583) = .299
and
~p = .299 - G167 = .132
aa
which is greater than the .125 for the nonrandom case. From
either vantage point, it is apparent that the introduction of
randomness in the target's arrival and departure slows the
process of diminiShing return because probabilistically we may
not be duplicating our earlier effort. The implication of
this is that under an optimal search strategy more effort
would have to be available in the random case than in the non-
A-160-
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I
PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPTING A TARGET
Nonrandom Arrivals Random Arrivals
1st Look in A .167 .167
2nd Look in A .150 .1583
2 Looks in A .291 .299
3rd Look in A .1323 .1584
1st Look in B .088 .088
2nd Look in B after
1st Look was in A .100 .092
Figure 4.2: The Impact of Random Arrival and Departure
of Targets on the Probability of Interception and on
Diminishing Return
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random case before the equilibrium criterion suggests searching
B.
The above example can be easily extended to include con-
tinuous search. It is also apparent that as the lifecycle of
the target increases beyond two glances the rate of diminishing
return increases and in the limit approaches the non-random
arrival case.
4.4.3 Finite Duration
The next component of the random case to be evaluated is
the impact of the finite duration of a target. To do so we
will allow the search to continue beyond the second glance.
The third glance will again have diminishing return, increas-
ing the ~ priori probability of interception less than the
second. However, if we look at it from a sequential perspec-
tive, the probability offinding the target on the third
glance in A conditional on not finding it during the first
two is .1584. Thus diminishing return continued only as long
as the life (in this example two glances) of an individual
target. As a result, if it is not advisable to search B during
the first two glances, it is never advisable to do so. The
same will be true for the generalized continuous problem. For
targets (e.g. crimes) that last for a finite time period, t,
the conditional probability of finding the target in an in-
crement~ time period will approach and attain a steady state
value when the search is carried on for longer than t minutes.
,
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(The reason why in the above example there was an increase
from .1583 to .1584 is explained by the following, As a
result of not finding the target in the first two looks in
A, there is now a slightly greater than .50 probability (in
fact .505) that the target has just departed and that a new
target is arriving at the beginning of the third glance.
However, in the police context, with assumed Poisson arrival
of crimes, this phenomenon will not occur and a steady state
value will be reached.)
A somewhat intuitive explanation of this bound on
sequential diminishing return is as follows. Since a target
survives only t minute~ the fact that the target was not
fOUIld t + 1 minutes ago in a particular region can yield no
infornlation about whether the target is now present in that
region. Thus as a search is carried on longer than t minutes,
the searcher is continually gaining new information about the
likelihood of a target being present now but at the S~le time
the information that was obtained more than t minutes ago is
becoming outdated at the same rate. The system, in a sense,
is in a state of dynamic equilibrium as long as search is
continued.
4.4.~ Independently Arriving Targets
There is one final complication that has to be analyzed
before closing the door on diminishing return. For this
discussion there will no longer be a constraint on the number
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of targets present and in addition the two regions will
generate targets independent of each other although in the
same proportion as before (A generates twice as many as B).
In this case not finding a target in region A no longer
yields any information about the possible presence of a tar-
get in B. So that when diminishing return occurs in region A
there is no accompanying increase in the probability of
finding the target in B.
The above description of the impact of randomness on
diminishing return can be stmwarized as follows:
1. Randomness slows diminishing return.
2. Sequential diminishing return lasts for a period
equal to the duration of a crime. 5
3. Searching region A does not increase the potential
return from search in region B because of the in-
dependence of the two regions.
These three results compounded by the short duration
of crimes unite to increase the likelihood that the optimal
allocation of patrol (search) effort over several nonuniform
crime regions would be to concentrate on only the highest
crime region within the patrol sector.
4.4.5 Sequencing Search Effort
It was mentioned earlier that even with the straight-
forward application of search theory to the allocation prob-
lem there are serious constraints on implementing the
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optimal solution. For example, an optimal solution (for crimes
of 5 minute duration) of searching region A for 3 minutes and
B for 2 minutes can not be interpreted as equivalent to
allocating 60% of your effort to region A and 40% to B without
simultaneously constraining the search to be cyclical with
frequent shifting between regions. However, we will soon show
that randomness may require that the optimal strategy include
even more frequent shifts between A and B than are implied by
the finite observable duration of the target.
In allocation problems of the type that Koopman analyzed,
the optimal solutions are one dimensional in that they specify
'only the amount of effort to allocate to each region. The
manner in which this effort is carried out is irrelevant.
The probability of intercepting a target is the same whether
you search A for 3 minutes and B for 2 minutes or you search
A for 1.5 minutes, B for 1 minute, A for 1.5 minutes·and,
again B for 1 minute. In essence, for nonrandomly arriving
targets the only important aspect of the search is how much
territory was covered in each region 8 This fact is more a
consequence of the lack of time dimension or dependence in
the search rather than a result of the exponential form of
the equation (4.1) [6 J.
This concept of time independence is illustrated in Figure
4.3 which represents the sequential rate of return of a search
in one of two regions. As the search is carried out sequen-
tial diminishing return occurs. However, if the search effort
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is interrupted, put in abeyance, and resumed several minutes
later, the rates immediately prior to the interruption and
immediately after the resumption of search are the same, and
during the interruption the potential rate of return is con-
stant. In contrast to this, randomness introduces a time
dependence into the rate of return, Figure 4.4. When the
search is interrupted and later resumed, the rate of return
after the interruption is higher than before the interruption
because of new arrivals and throughout the interruption the
potential rate of return is increasing. Under these circum-
stances, it is fairly obvious that there is now a difference
between searching A for 3 minutes, B for 2 minutes and
searching A for 1.5 minutes, B for 1 minute, A for 1.5 minutes
and B for 1 minut~ with the latter strategy having a higher
payoff (but also being more difficult t~ implement by a patrol
unit). As a result of this phenomenon of time dependence, the
optimal search strategy must include both the quantity of
search allocated to each region and the sequencing of search~
In determining this optimal strategy, it is also necessary to-
realize that the two components are not independent.
It would now be useful to present a basic but interesting
case that displays the impact of time dependence on even the
quantity of searmallocated to each region. The easiest type
of optimal solution to implement is, of course, one that in-
volves a search in only one region, A. A necessary condition
for this type of solution is that the marginal rate of return
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Figure 4.3:The Sequential Rate of Return as a Function
of Time for Nonrandom Targets:Time Independent Search
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Figure 4.4:The Sequential Rate of Return as a Function
of Time for Random Targets:Time Dependent Search
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at the end of t (the total available search effort) minutes in
A be greater than the initial return from search in B; however,
because of the time dependence factor, this is no longer a
sufficient condition. 6 The above condition means that 't'
minutes in A is preferred to- 't - dt' minutes in A followed by
'dt' minutes in B; it does not imply that ft' minutes in A is
preferred to 't/2 - dt' minutes in A, followed by 'dt' minutes
in B followed by tt/2' in A. In the latter case we are
balancing search effort in A against search effort in Band
an increased rate of return from the second half of the search
effort in A. An obvious question to be resolved is what are
necessary and sufficient conditions for allocating all your
effort to only one region?
A second interesting consequence of time dependence of
the search is as follows. Assume a target is present for 30
minutes. Then for nonrandom arrivals there is no distinction
between one unit searching for 30 minutes and two units search-
ing simultaneously for 15 minutes. However, with random
arrivals there will be a distinction between sequential and
simultaneous search with sequential search preferred. Similar-
iy increasing the nl~ber of hours of patrol in a sector by
reducing the length or number of busy periods of the sector
car has a higher payoff than an equivalent increase in the
number of patrol hours produced by adding manpower. In the
latter case, part of the additional patrol will be carried
out simultaneously with the already allocated patrol effort,
while in the former case the additional patrol will always
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be performed at points in time when there would otherwise
not have been any patrol in that sector.
4.4.6 Summary and A Differe~Approach to Patrol Allocation
In the preceding sections a number of general proper-
ties of a search for randomly arriving and departing targets
were discussedo Three factors were described: l)random
arrival, 2)finite short duration, and 3)independent targets,
which all tend to increase the likelihood (for nonhomogeneous
regions) that the optimal strategy will be to search only the
high crime area. A fourth facto~ which has a similar impact
and which will be duscussed in detail in Chapter 5, is the time
lost in travel between regions that are allocated patrol
effort. In addition we have described the difficulties
(because of time dependence) of implementing solutions that
would result from applying classical search theory to the prob-
lem. In order to exploit the realization that optimal strate-
gies will require the concentration of patrol to very limited
portions of a sector as well as to avoid generating unimplemen-
table theoretical optimums, we suggest approaching the optimal
allocation problem form a different perspective.
In classical search theory the allocation problem is posed
as follows:
o There exist several predetermined regions with varying
target probabilities. How should the available search
effort be allocated (and sequenced) among these regions?
An alternative to the above formulation which reverses the
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process is:
Assume that one and only one contiguous area will be
searched. What is the optimal size and location of
this area?
Chapter 7 presents an algorithm for constructing from a
collection of atoms (each several square blocks in size), the
single region in which to concentrate the sector car's patrol.
However, any plan that would implement a strategy of this
type must weigh carefully the implications of leaving a
por~ion of a sector 'without regular police patrol. It may be
necessary to moderate the 'theoretical' optimum by making
random widely (timewise) dispersed, highly visible, high
speed passes through the low crime areas with the purpose
being to create an impression of presence. It is possible,
though that this impression of presence ~7J may be created
without any special effort since the sector car will still
be responding to calls for service arising throughout the
sector. An equally important problem that is not necessarily
easy to solve is the reaction of local community groups to
their sections of the sector receiving no patrol. Lastly, a
patrol plan of this nature would have to be continually
reevaluated as the spatial distribution of crimes may vary in
response to police presence. This type of reevaluation would
have to be on a fr~quent basis, probably at least every week,
in order to keep on top of changing patterns of crime. The
obvious critical question in this regard is "How quickly and
in what way do criminals respond to changes in patrol strate~
gies?' Unfortunately, it is a question about which we know
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little especially in a quantitative sense, In Chapter' 8
we will describe an experiment which focuses on obtaining at
least a partial answer to this question.
The approach suggested above has one additional benefit.
Thus far all discussion of patrol allocation has been limited
to a search for crimes of a single class (same observable
duration), However, the standard patrol does not usually
focus on one single class of crrmes. This complication does
not present any significant problems in calculating the pro-
bability of interception or space-time coincidence. All that
would be required to account for the mUltiplicity of crime
types is to take the basic equation (4.1) and sum or inte-
grate it over the various crime types weighted by their rela-
tive frequencies. The introduction of mUltiple crime types
would, however, seem to seriously complicate the classical
allocation approach as even the amount of search effort
available to allocate will depend on the crime type. In the
reversed allocation methodology the impact of multiple crime
types would be basically the same as on calculating the
probability of interception since equation (4.1) forms the
basis of the procedure.
Before proceeding with the development of algorithms that
build on the work of this chapter, we will attempt to quantify
a number of concepts we have discussed here qualitatively. In
the next chapter a differential equation model will be used to
determine under what conditions should a region be excluded
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from search e In addition we will quantifythe impact of
travel time on optimal allocations of search.
12
3
4
5
6
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FOOTNOTES 4
A decision maker, however may be more willing to accept a
50% increase if the change in travel time is from 1 minute
to 1.5 minutes than he would be if the change were from
4 to 6 minutes.
Throughout the paper the term random when applied to pat-
rol will describe the unpredictable non-patterned search
effort. When applied to the target, it is describing its
time of arrival and departure.
The first subscript will refer to where the first glance
was, the second subscript to the second glance and so on.
A line under the last subscript will mean that we are
focusing sequentially on that glance. For example, Pab'
means the probability of finding the target on the -
second glance in b given the first glance was unfruitful
in a.
The duration of a crime is assumed fixed. If a probability
distribution for the duration of the crime is inserted
(with a finite mean), sequential diminishing return will
approach a non-zero bound. See also Barnett [ 1J.
See Barnett [1 ] for a discussion of a similar necessary
but not sufficient condition.
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CHAPTER 5
A DIFFERENTIAL EQUATION MODEL OF SEARCH AND DETECTION
2.0 Introduction
Thus far the description and analysis of the dynamics
of a search for randomly arriving and departing targets has
emphasized the development of a qualitative understanding of
this process r A recurring theme of this analysis has been
that in allocating search effort among competing regions the
optimal solution is likely to concentrate all the search in
one region. In this chapter we will introduce a model that
will be used to quantify the conditions under which the op-
timal strategy is to search only a single regions. The model
(which was suggested by Philip M. Morse) is a set of differen-
tial equations which characterize the continuously changing
state of the system in terms of the number of crimes in
progress. The model will then be applied in three cases to
determine the optimal sequence of, search between two regions
for crimes of a single type. The three cases are
1. Two regions with equal crime rates and no time lost
in switching between regions;
: 2. Two regions with equal crime rates and time lost in
switching between regions;
3. Two regions with differing crime rates and no time
lost in switching between regions.
This chapter will close with a discussion of extensions of
the above examples to allow for mUltiple crime types and
more than two regions.
-178-
-179-
5.1 The Differential Equation Model
The model consists of two differential equations for
each region, one to describe the system (city, precinct,
sector, or reporting area) when no search is in progress in
that region, the other to describe the system when a search
is in progress.
Let s= the ~tate of theqystem (expected value of the
number of crimes in progress).
A= the rate at which crimes arrive (assumed indepen-
dent of the state of the system).
Crimes depart from the system in either one of two ways.
Either crimes leave because they have finished or because
they have been interrupted during a period of search.
F= the constant of proportionality for the rate at
which crimes finish. (This will depend upon the
duration of a crime.)
1= the constant of proportionality for thecrime
interception rate. (This will depend on the
street mileage in the region and the observability
of the crime.)
Both of these rates are proportional to the number of crimes
in progress.
Using the above parameters (S, A, F, I), a set of dif-
ferential equa~ns to describe the changing system can be
written as follows. During a period of no search the
system is described by
ds - Sf = A F.Sdt- -
The equation states simply that the system is changing
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because targets are arriving at a rate A and are departing,
as a result of finishing at a rate, F· S, proportional to the
state of the system. The solution of the differential equa-
tion is
s= C1 exp(-F • t) + Alp
C1 is a constant that depends on the boundary conditions and
Alp represents the steady state number of crimes in progress
if no search were ever carried out. During a period of search
the equation becomes
ds = Sf = A - (F + I) • Sdt
whose solution is
s= C2 exp (-(F + I) • t) + A/{F + I)
(5.3)
Cz is also a constant that depends on boundary conditions with
A/(F + I) the steady state number of crimes in progress during
an unending period of search.
5.1 0 1 Model Assumptions
These equations assume that the arrival process of crimes
is Poisson (i.e.random) and that the duration of a crime is
exponentially distributed. S is therefore the expected value
of the number of crimes. This can be shown by setting up
queuing type equations for the probabilities Pn , where n is
the number of crimes in progress at- anyone time. The general
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equation would be of the form
dPn =
dt
A · Pn- 1 + F · (n + 1) • Pn+1 - (A+n· F) • pn
with the equation for Po just
(5.6)
By setting s= ~nPn ' we arrive at equation (5.1), which
describes the system during a period of no search.
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5. 2 Two Regions--Egual Crime Rates - No ~ime Lost in Trans-
fer
The first problem considered with the differential equa-
tion model i~ finding the optimal strategy for sequencing the
search effort of a single patrol unit between two regions, HI
and R2, of equal size. The objective is to minimize the
steady state average expected number of crimes in progress.
In our analysis two assumptions will be made about the optimal
solutions.
1. The optimal allocation of search effort divides the
available effort equally between the two regions.
2. The optimal strategy will be cyclic of the form X
minutes ~pent in Rl, followed by X minutes in R2, and then
back to RI for X minutes and so on.
The first assumption is intuitively appealing because of
symmetry arguments and will be proven later in this chapter.
The second assumption is motivated by a number of earlier
search theory papers [2, 3, 5 J in which the optimal search
strategies were cyclical. In the situation most analogous
to ours, Barnett [1 J proved that for n regions in which tar-
gets arrive and depart randomly, the strategy which maximizes
the probability of intercepting a random crime must be cyclic.
Given the above assumptions, the problem that remains to be
resolved is "~'lhat is the optimal cycle length or equivalently
the optimal value of X?".
Although the objective is to minimize the total (in both
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regions) average expected number of crimes in progress, it is
more convenient to analyze first the search process from the
separate perspectives of the two regions: Each region will be
viewed independently as experiencing alternating periods of
search and no search. This split can be made because the re-
gions are generating arrivals and departures independent of
each other; consequently searching R2 can yield no informa-
tion about the likeli~ood of a crime being in progress in hI.
This split also makes it clear that the solution to the first
two region problem will in addition answer the following
question.
Given that only 50% of a patrol car's time is available
for patrol, what is the distinction between short
numerous intervals of search and a few long intervals of
search?
Before proceeding with the analysis, it might clarify the
discussion to first outline three steps common to each of the
examples presented in the chapter:
1. Two differential equations are defined for each
region. Cne to describe the dynamics of the region while it
is being searched, the other to describe the region while no
search is going on.
2. For each region two boundary conditions of the
following form are established:
Under steady state conditions, the level of crime in
each region at the end of a period of search must equal the
level of crime at the beginning of a period of no search and
vice versa.
These conditions are simply a continuity constraint on S, the
-184-
number of crimes in progress, not allowing discrete shifts in
the values of S as a result of the patrol unit entering or
departing a region. Cnce thetoundary conditions are defined,
each of the constants in the differential equati~is deter-
mined.
3. The average level of crime, S, in the total area is
calculated by integrating each of the four equations over its
respective period of searcll or no searclL, sllnln~ing the :fcux'
values and dividing by the cycle length. The resultant
expression for S is a function of the parameters of interest
in each of the particular examples and is sUbsequently analyzed
to determine an optimal strategy.
Turning back to the original problem, we will focus the
analysis on only one of the regions, Rl, with all discussions
applying similarly for R2 because of the symmetry of the
search. In Rl the two equations describing the periods of
search and no search are just the previously defined equations
(5.1) and (5.3) and whose ~olution equations, (5.2) and(S.4),
are rewritten here:
s= C1 exp(-F • t) + Alp
S= Cz exp(-(P + I) • T) + A/(p + I)
The continuity constraint on S is used to generate the
following equations:
Cz exp (-(F + I) • X) + A/(p + I) = C1 + Alp
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The left hand side represents the end of a search period of
duration X minutes and the right handside the beginning of a
no search period. Conversely,
C1exp (-F · X) + Alp = Cz + A/(F + I)
Solving for C1 and Cz as functions of X yields:
C = [-A · I/(F • (F + I))] · [1 - exp(-(F + I) · X)]I1
Ll-exp(-(2F + I) • X)J (5.9)
C2= [+A • I/(F • (F + I))J • [1 - exp(-F · X)]!
[1-exp(-(2F + I) • X)]
The expected level of crime in each of the regions at any
instant in time can now be written as a function of only one
parameter, X,the half cycle length. To compare various cycle
lengths, equations (5.2) and (5.4) are combined into a single
equation representing the average expected level of crime in
Rl or R2 during a cycle.
X
AVE. 81 = 81 = _1_ J'
2X 0
1
+ 2T
C1 exp (-F • t) + A/F dt
X
J Cz exp (-(F + I) · t) + AAF + I)dto
•
with C1 and Cz as defined in equations (5.9) and (5.10)
respectively. Integrating equation (5.11) yields
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Sl= -(C1/(2F' X)) • (1 - exp(-F • X)) + A/2F
- (c2/(2(F + I) • X)) • (1 - exp (- (F + I) · X)
+ A/Z(F + I) (5.12)
The average for the entire region, S, is merely twice that of
any individual region.
s= 31 + 32 = 2 • 31
In Appendix D it is then shown that S (or equivalently
81) monotonically increases as X increases. In other words,
the average expected level of crime in each region decreases
as the frequency of transfers between the two regions in-
creases. To use the terminology of Chapter 4, by spacing
out the available search effort as much as possible the
amount of diminishing return is reduced to its absolute
minimum. This result is directly comparable to that of
Gilbert [3], who showed (using a probabilistic search model)
that it is optimal to switch from one region to another when-
ever the region being searched has received a longer time of
search than the other region. He also defined a limit strate-
gy which approaches the theoretical optimum strategy as
switching becomes instantaneous.
Earlier we had noted an equivalence between sequencing
search between regions and scheduling the patrol time of a
single unit that spends 50% of its time answering calls for
service. Thus from one perspective if somehow preventive
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patrol activities Vlere scheduled in long blocks of time (i.e.
increase X), the model predicts a decrease in the probability
of interception. l However, this decrease will be very small
since even the two extremes, infinitely long cycles and in-
finitesimally small cycles, typically differ by less than 2%.
(See Table 5.1 for a ratio greater than 30) Therefore other
aspects of the problem, not presently captured by the model,
are likely to be more crucial. From a psychological per-
spective, scheduling patrol could modify the attitude of
patrolling officers towards this activity. At present,
patrol is often viewed as time left over from their main
activity of responding to calls for service. Scheduling
patrol in long blocks of time might then increase the value of
patrol in the eyes of the officer. This change would manifest
itself quantitatively by increasing I, the rate of detection.
If it were possible to actually specify I as a function of the
cycle length then also this issued could be easily included
into the model. The optimal cycle length then would not be
infinitesimally small.
5.2.1 Magnitude of Impact of Short Cycles
Having shown that shorter cycles increase the probabi-
lity of) interception, the obvious next step is to determine
~the magnitude of the improvement produced by the shorter
cycles. Because S, 81 and 82 are monotonically increasing
functions of X, their highest values occur as the cycle
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length approaches infinity. For example the limit of 31 as
the cycle length increases is
lim
2X~
81 = (1/2)· (A/F) + (1/2)e(A/F +1)) = A • (2F + 1~
2F · (F + I
(5.14)
The first term, A/F, is the steady state level of crime for
the region not being searched and A/(F + I) is the steady
state level of crime for a region being searched.
For short cycles the average level of crime in Rl is
calculated by applying L'h~pital's Rule twice to equation
(5.12) (see Appendix E) to yield
lim 81 = 2A/(2F + I)
2X~O
The ratio then of the average crime level, SI, (similarly for
S) for short cycles as compared to long cycles is
Ratio = short/long = L2AA2F + I)Jj[A(2F + I)/2F • (F + 1)1
(5.16)
which reduces to
1 - (1/(2F + 1))2
which not surprisingly is independent of the arrival rate, A,
of crimes. Thus if crimes were discovered at a rate equal to
the rate at which they are completed then
F = I
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and
Ratio = 1 - 12/912 = 1 - 1/9
Under these circumstances optimally' sequencing the same total
amount of search effort in each region reduces the average
level of crime by 1/9. If, however, the two policies are
compared with regard to their relative impacts on the crime
level, then the reduction resulting from shorter cycles seems
more significant~ For example, consider the reduction in the
average crime level produced by long cycles. If no search
were carried out the average number of crimes in progress
would be A/F. The ratio of the average number of crimes in
progress in long cycles over the average number when no
search is carried out is
Ratio' = Long cycles = fA· (2F + I P/[A/F]
No search L2F • (F + I J
= 1 - r/< 2 • (F + I))
which for I=F is 1 - 1/4. For short cycles the ratio is
Ratio = Short cycles = [ 2A J / [ ]
No search 2F + I A/F
= 1 - I/{2F + I)
(5.20)
which for I=F is 1 - 1/3. As a result long cycles reduce the
level of crime by 25~~ wI-tile short cycles by 33 1/3%. In
relative terms this means that short cycles reduced the crime
level one-third more ((1/3)/(1/4) = 1 1/3) than long cycles.
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The measure of effectiveness that was just introduced,
namely the ratio of a policy's cr~ level to the crime level
when no search is carried out has a deeper significance than
may be apparent at first. As we shall show, there is a
simple relationship between this measure and the probability
of intercepting a crime.
Under the two limiting policies (i.e. infinite and in-
finitesimal cycles), it is possible to calculate directly the
probability of intercepting a random crime. (We are assuming,
still, that crimes arrive in a Poisson process (rate A), have
an exponential lifetime (mean I/F) and are discovered at an
exponential rate (mean 1/1).) For long cycles the fraction
of crimes that are intsrcepted during a period of search is
simply II (F + I). Since half of all the crimes occur
during the period of search, the fraction of all crimes that
will be intercepted is
I
2(F + I;
Calculating the probability of interception for infini-
tesimally short cycles is also relatively straightforward
and is based on the following argument. No matter how long
a crime lasts, during half the lifetime of the crime, the
patrol unit will be searching the same region as the crime is
in because the cycles are infinitesimally small. Consequently
the probability of intercpeting a random crime is
191-
00
J F exp(-F · t) · (1 - exp(-I • t/2}dt
o
where F exp(-F • t)dt is the probability that a crime has a
lifetime of fnear' t minutes and (1 - exp(-I · t/Z) is the
probability of intercepting a crime of that duration. Equa-
tion (5.23) reduces to
00
= 1 - (F/(F + 1/2)) · ! (F + 1/2) · (1 - exp(-(F + r/Z),t)dt
o
= 1 - 2F2F+I =
I
2F+I
Not surprisingly the probability of intercepting a crime under
each of the two policies is exactly the same as the reduction
in the average crime level (Equations (5.21) and (5.22)) as
calculated with the differential equation model.
Table 5.1 contains a comparison of the two limiting
policies for a range of F and I. When crimes are discovered
at a rate equal to their competion rate, short cycles as com-
pared to long cycles reduce the average number of crimes in
progress by 11% while they increase the probability of inter-
cepting a crime by 33%. As the rate at which crimes are com-
pleted increases relative to the discovery rate to a factor of
5, the improvement produced by short cycles is less than 1%
, for the average number of crimes, but 9% for the probability
of interception. Increasing the relative discovery rate still
further to a factor of 50, which brings it closer to the level
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/RATIO=F I AVERAGE EXPECTED PROBABILITY of INTERCEPTION
NUMBER of CRIMES
Short/Long Short Long (Short!Lone>:l
---
I .111 .333 .250 .333_
2 .040 .200 .167 .20
3 .020 .143 .125 .143
4 .0123 .111 0100 .111
5 .0083 .091 .083 .091
10 .0023 .0476 .0455 .0476
20 .000'59 .0244 .0238 .0244
30 .00027 .0164 .0161 .0164
40 .00015 .0123 .0122 .0123
50 .000098 .0099 ,,0098 .0099
Table 5.1: A Comparison of Short and Long Cycles with
Regard to Interception Probabilities and the
Average Expected Number of Crimes in Progress
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at which police typically function, reduces the impact of
short cycles to a .01% improvement in crime levels and a 1%
improvement in the probability of interception.
It should be obvious already from our presentation that
only the ratio of F to I is needed in comparing the relative
impact of the two extreme policies. This can be seen
clearly by rewriting equation (5.17) as
Ratio= short/long = 1 - 1(2 · (FIr) + 1)2
Perhaps more significantly, the probability of intercepting a
crime under either of the two policies is also dependent upon
only the ratio Fir. Reformulating equations (5.22) and(5.25)
for long and short cycles respectively yields
Frob. of Interception (Long Cycles) =
Probe of Interception (Short Cycles) =
1
2(F!I + 1)
1
2F!r + 1
A similar reduction in the number of significant input para-
meters also arises later in the chapter when we consider a
broader range of search strategies.
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5.~ Two Regions - Equal Crime Rates- Time Lost in Transfer
In ,Ohapter Four's analysis of the search process in
classical search theoretic terms, it was noted that because
of the short duration of'crimes and their randomness that an
optimal solution is likely to be to search only the highest
crime region. In that analysis, though, one component of the
actual search process was not included, namely, the time to
travel be-CYieen two regions. This time is either lost totally
from the search or is, at best, a period in which the detec-
tion rate is significantly reduced. This added motivation for
limiting search to one region will be analyzed through a
modification of the previous example. A parameter L will be
introduced that will represent the time lost every time a
transfer between the two regions occurs. Then, using the
differential equation model, two questions will be addressed.
18 What is the optimal value of X, the time spent in HI
before switching to R2? The optimal value is
obviously no longer infinitesimal.
2. Is there a simple analytic expression which specifies
for which values of L it does not even pay to switch
regions?
Al though papers by Gilbert [l ] and Kisi [4 ) have
addressed problems in which time losses for switching were in~
eluded, those problems, however, did not allow for arriving
and departing targets. Since the optimal strategy for static
targets requires that eventually each region be searched, no
method was, therefore, presented which can be used in prob-
lems similar to ours to determine when a region ought to be
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excluded from the search. This will be a principal question
\
addressed here. In tackling the problem with the differen-
tial equation model, we will again make the assumptions that
the optimal solutionis cyclic (both Kisi and Gilbert have
cyclic strategi~s) and that the search effort will be divided
equally between the two regions. Optimal solutions which
limit the search to only one region will appear in the analy-
sis as solutions in which the optimal value of X is infinite e
5.3.1 Applying the Model
In the application of this model to this second problem,
which ascribes a penalty for switching regions, the basic
equations which describe the periods of search and no search
do not vary from those of the previous example. The solutions
to these equations for one of the regions are rewritten here
for convenience.
s= C1 exp (-F • t) + A/F
describes a period of no search and
s= Cz exp(-(F + I) • t) + A/(F + I) (5.30)
describes a period of search. However, the introduction of
the switching time, L, does affect the continuity boundary
conditions since a no search period in each region has a
duration of' 'X + 2L' minutes. (The L is multiplied by 2
because two switches must occur, one leaving region HI and
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and a second upon returning to Rl, during any single cycle.)
The result is that although equation (5.7), which states that
the level of crime at the end of a period of search is equal
to that at the beginning of a period of no search, remains
the same,
Cz exp(-(F + I) i X) + A/(l + F) = C1 + A/F
equation (5.8) is modified to be
C1 exp{-B • (X + 21» + A/F = Cz + A/{F + I)
Solving the equations for C1 and C2 yields
C1 = -[A • l/{F • (F + I»].[exp{-(F + I) • X) - IJ/
[exp(-«(2F + I) • X)+(2F • L)) - 1J (5,33)
C2 = +[A • l/(F · (F + l»J Lexp{-(F • X)+{2F • 1» --1/
[exp (-((2F + I) ·X)+(2F • L)) - 1J (5.34)
We now have equations for the expected number of crimes in a
region at any point in time as well as solutions for the con-
stants C1 and C2 • The next step is to define a single equa-
tion that specifies the average expected number of crimes,
81, in a region for a complete cycle of length 2X + 21. That
equation i$ generated by integrating equation (5.29) (a period
of search) over a time period of X minutes and equation (5.30)
(a period of no search) over a time period of X + 21 minutes.
The resultant equation divided by the length of a cycle is
just
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1
......r
L\..
! Cz exp (-(I + F) · t) + A/{I + F)dto
C1 exp (-F et) + A/F dt
)~+2L
J
o
1
+ 2(X+L)
Integrating out, sUbstitutung for C1 and Cz and combining the
terms produces the following equation for SI, as a function of
the variable X and the parameters L, I and F.
S1= Alp - [(p. · I • X) / ( 2 (X + L) + F • (F + I» ]
(5.)6)
Al though equation (-5.36) is a relatively complicated
expression for the average expected number of crimes in
progress, once values have been assigned to P, I and L, it
is a function of only one variable, X. Therefore, it is a
straightforward task to carry out a one dimensional search
for the optimum value of X for the given parameters. In
Figure 5.1 the optimum value of X is shown for a range of L,
F and R, where R is the ratio of F, the finishing rate, and
I, the interception rate. There are graphs for twovalues of
F, one for F equals 20, in which case crimes last an average
of three minutes, and one for F equals 10, in which case
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crimes average 6 minutes. For each F a range of ratios is
presented with R as high as 20 (Crimes are completed twenty
times as fast as they can be detected.) and as unrealistically
low as .01 which means that crimes are intercepted at a rate
one hundred times as fast as they finish on their own. The
lower values for R were included less for realism than to dis-
play how the curves behave as R approaches the limit of zero.
Looking at the series of curves in Figure 5.1 a number of
points stand out, but perhaps themost striking characteristic
is the asymptotic nature of each curve. For each value of R
as L approaches some limiting value (different for each ~),
the optimal value of X goes off to infinity. lIowever, an
infinite value for X is the equivalent of searching only one
region. This means that for given values of F and R, as L
increases above some point the optimal solution is always to
search one region. For example for crimes of a three minute
duration (F=20) when R equals 10, as L increases above
(approximately) .3 minutes it no longer pays to switch regions;
the same is true for crimes of 6 minutes, R equal to five and
as L increases above 1 minute. Another interesting general
observation is that the asymptote for each curve is less than
the mean duration of the crime and in the limit as R
approaches zero the asymptote approaches the mean duration of
a crime. In other words, if the travel time between regions
is rrreater than the mean duration of a crime, then, no mattero
what the detection capabilities, switching regions is cQunter-
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productive. The higher payoff that would accrue initially
from switching to the other region is outweighed by the
time lost in travelling there.
Two additional remarks about the curves, which are
corollaries of the above points, are
l)For a given value of L as the ratio, R, decreases, the
optimum X also decreases,and
2)As F decreases (from 20 to 10) the value of the asymp-
tote for a given R increases.
All of the above issues will be addressed more formally in
the succeeding sectioh in which an analytic expression for the
asymptote as a function of F and P is derived.
5.3.2 When to Search Only Qne Region
The development of an analytic expression to search only
one of the regions builds on the realization that the curve
for the average expected level of crime (Sl) as a function of
X (i.e. the length of a visit to a region) can take on only
one of two forms. (See curves B and C in Figure 5.2) For
both forms as X approaches zero, the average number of crimes
in progress increases fu~d approaches A/F, the steady state
value when no search is carried out. As X increases, however,
the curves behave differently. In the first curve (B), 81
monotonically decreases asymptotically to a limiting value.
Consequently the optimal value for X is infinite (i.e. search
only one region). In the second curve (C) as X increases, the
-201-
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level of crime again decreases until a minimum value is ob-
tained for a finite value of X. Then as X continues to in-
crease, 81 increases asymptotically to a limiting value. In
both instances the limiting value is A • (2F + I)/(2P'(F+I))
(See equation (5.14).)
The key, then, to our problem lies in analyzing the
derivative of SI, dSl/dX, (or equivalently dS/dX) as X
approaches infinity to determine not whether the derivative
approaches zero,· since it always will, but rather the direc-
tion from which it approaches zero. If the derivative ap-
proaches zero from the positive direction then some finite
X is optimal, otherwise infinite X is optimal.
The derivative of Sl is 'simply'
~+-A • I2F· ( I +F) • (X+L ) 2dSl-dX-
+ 2(X+L) .F2. (I+F)2 [
-1
X+L
+
+
However, with regard to the limiting behavior of this equation
some of the components can be immediately disregarded since
some approach zero faster than others. The slower components,
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of course, dominate in the limit, which allov/s us to eliminate
all expressions that approach zero faster than l/(X' + 1)2.
Therefore the problem reduces to analyzing
lim dSl = -AeI
X"'oo dX -r'"(X-\.+-r.....-rJ )~2-.......21"....-1.~("""I"-+-F) [ L + I + IF' ( 1+F ) -F-.(~I-+-F')
(In Appendix F we prove that all other expressiuns in equa-
tion (5.37) approach zero faster than 1/(X+L)2.) The focus
though is on the direction from which the derivative
approaches zero which reduces the expression of interest
still further to
lim
x-tJoO - [L + F' (F~I )+ F. fF+I )
12-eXP~-(I+Fi .X~ - exp~-Fo (2L+X) i)]
\ exp -2Fo(X+L - I'X - I
The limit of this expression is
+ IF·(I+F) +
I
Fe(I+F) . 6.]-1
or equivalently
I L = 1F'(F+I) - -F·~(F~/~I-+~l~) - L (5.40)
This will be negative and the optimal value of X is infinite
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whenever
L > 1
F· (Fir + 1)
This ineql.lali ty states that if the travel time is greater than
the mean lifetime of a crime (1/F) divided by one plus the
ratio of the competion rate to the interception rate (Fir),
then is is not worthwhile to switch regions. This inequality
consequently confirms the graphical analysis (Figure ScI)
that was presented earlier. For example, since l/{F/I + 1)
is always less than one if L, the travel time is greater than I/F
(the mean duration of a crime), it must also be greater than
the previous expression.
L > 1F >
1 1F · -'-(F-l"-r~)+-1
This means that if it takes longer to travel between regions
than the average duration of a crime, then no matter what the
detection rate is, the optimal strategy will be to search a
single region. Perhaps more significantly if the completion
~
rate of crimes were, for example, ten times the interception
rate (by no means an unreasonable figure) and the travel
time were longer than one-eleventh the duration of a crime
(e.g. 11 seconds for two minute crimes; 16 seconds for three
minute ones, etc.), it does not pay to switch regions.
In light of the above inequality, the short duration of
crimes, and high rate of completion relative to interception,
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the propensity will be to search one region even when the two
regiens generate crimes at the same rate. Once the crime -
rates vary this tendency is further compounded. Unequal call
rates alone, even without penalties for transferring between
regions, may also produce optimal strategies which limit the
search to a single region. It is this last phenomenon that
is explored in the next section. However, in order to
isolate the effects of just unequal crime rates we will not in-
clude in the example time lost in travel between regions.
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5.4 Two Regions - Differing Crim~ Rates - No Time Lost
5. J}.l Introduction
The final example to be analyzed involves two regions with
differing crime rates. RL, -the low crime region, has crimes
arriving at a rate of A, while RH, the high crime region, has
crimes arriving at a rate of M • A where M is greater than one.
In both regions all crimes have the same completion and inter-
ception rates, F and I respectively. Once again our analysis
will revolve about cyclic policies, this time of the form ,
X minutes in RL followed by K • X minutes in RH.
Although one problem of interest is, of course, the
finding of the (K,X) pair which minimizes the average ex-
pected number of crimes in progress, the discussion will not be
limited to that, since in all instances the optimum is ap-
proached as X tends towards zero, an unimplementable optimum.
Therefore the development will also address the issue of the
optimum value of K for a given value of X. Setting)C to be a
specified value is interpretable as establishing a feasibility
constraint on the search process. The constraint states that
whenever a patrol unit enters the low crime region, RL, it
must patrol there for at least X minutes. Completing the dis-
cussion of this section and more in line with the thrust of
the rest of the chapter is the description of conditions under
which patrolling only the high crime region is optimal. In
the analysis solutions of that form will appear as the optimal
value of K being infinite.
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The discussion that will follow, then, can be categorized
briefly as:
1. A single expression is developed to be used in
searching for the optimal value of K for a given X.
2. An analytic expression is found for K optimal as X
approaches zero.
3. Evolving directly from 2 is an expression, in terms of
F and I, for determining, for which values of Bare
the optimal K infinite for all values of X.
4. Lastly an expression is found which specifies the
values of X, as a function of t'1, F, and I, for which
...
the optimal K is again infinite.
5.4.2 Applying the Model
Unlike the previous two examples in which it was possible
to focus on only one region because of symmetry, it is now
necessary to define a different set of differential equations
for each region. In the low crime region the equations
remain as before with the solutions just
SL = C1 exp(-F t) + A/F (5.42)
during a period of no search and
SL = C2 exp(-(F + I) • t) + A/(F + I)
during a period of search. However, the continuity boundary
conditions have changed since a cycle as viewed from the
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perspective of the low crime region is now X minutes of search
followed by I"~.J( minutes of no search. The simultaneous
equations that are generated by the constraint to be used to
solve for C1 and Cz are
Cz exp(-(F+I) oX) + A/(F+I) = C1 +A/F (5.44)
which equates the level of crime at the end of a period of
search to the level at the beginning of no search, and
C1 exp(-FoKoX) + A/F = Cz + A/(F+I)
which equates the levels at the end of a period of no search
ancl the beginning of a period of search . Solving for C1 and
Cz yields
and
Cz =
-A·I
F-(I+F)
A-I
p. (I+F)
r~-exp~-F+I) oX ]~-exp -(poK + F + I)oX
~-exE~ -poKoX) J
~-exp -(FoK + F + I)otJ
(5.46)
In the high crime region, RH, the differential equations
are slightly different from before because crimes are arriving
at a rate of ~1~. The equations therefore are
dSH = SH': MeA - F-SHdt
during no search and
(5_48)
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SlI t = I'\~. A - (F+ I ) · Sir
during search. The solutions are similar to equations (5.42) and
(5.43) only with M • A instead of just A.
SH ::: CJ exp(-Fot) + r.~oA/F
SH = C4 exp(-(F+I)·t) + M • A/(I+F)
To solve for C3 and C4, we use these simultaneous equations,
which are almost the mirror image of equations (5.41) and (5.45),
and prod~ce the following solutions:
C = (:-M °A° I )3 \Fo (F+I)
C4= (IVI' A• I )F' ( F+I) ( l-exPt-FoX) \l-exp'-(F+I)oKoX - FoXy
Now that the preliminary groundwork has been laid out, the
next step is to develop a single expression for the average
expected number of crimes in progress, S, in the two regions
combined. This expression is generated by integrating each
of the four equations «(5.42). (5.43), (5.50) and(S.51)) over
their associated portions of the cycle and dividing their sum
by the length of a cycle, (K + I)·X. Carrying out the above,
results in
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s= 1(K+l)'X
K'X
!
o
C1 exp(-F·t) + A/F dt
Cz exp(-(F+I)·t) + A/(I+F) dt1+ (K+l)'X
1
+ (K+l)"X C3 exp(-P"t) + M"A/P dt
+ 1(K+l)'X
K'X
! C4 exp(-{F+I)·t) + ffi'A/(I+F) dt
o
The first two components represent the average number'of
crimes in progress in the low crime region, SL, and the
last two, the average in the high crime region SHe After
integrating out, sUbstituting where necessary, and com-
bining terms wherever possible, the resu~ is (and by no
means simply)
s=
(.5.55)
As complicated as this expression looks , finding the
optimal value of K for a given set of N, F, I, and X still
requires only a one dimensional search that is easily carried
out by computer. (A patient individual could find the optimum
with a calculator.) Before displaying graphically the opti-
mal value of K for a range of M, F, I and X, we will note one
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facet of the equation that should be stored for later reference.
The first two components, ~l·A/(F+I) and A/F, do not vary with
either K or X. The third decreases as ~ increases, is posi-
tive (tI is greater than 1) and is also independent of X. The
last component is unique both in that it is negative and also
in that it is a function of both K and X. This information
will later be used to determine for which values of X is the
optimal value of K infinite (Section 5g 4.5).
Figures 5.3 through 5.6 graph the optimal value of K for
different values of X. In all four figures crimes are of a
five minute duration (F=12), but both I and M are allowed to
vary. A common characteristic of all curves, except for the
M equal to one curve, is that as X (the minimum duration of a
visit to the low crime region) grows larger, the optimal K
eventually becomes infinite. (In the next section an ana-
lytic expression will be presented for determining that value
of X.) This cutoff value or asymptote decreases both as M
increases and as R (the ratio of F to I) increases. The
latter can be seen, for example, by comparing the curves for
which M is 1.2 in each of the four figures. In the first
figure the cutoff value of X is at approximately .43 hours
and in the succeeding figures the cutoff decreases to.J3, .23
. and .18 hours respectively. Another aspect of these curves
that stands out is that as R increases the initial value (at
X equal to zero) of K optimal increases. Thus it is not
surprising that for large enough R it does not pay to visit
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the low crime region (K optimal is infinite) even though the
minimum duration of a visit to that region is infinitesimally
short (X near zero).
In completing the discussion of these figures, the focus
will be on one behavioral characteristic of the curves that
seems counterintuitive. In each of the curves as X initially
increases from zero, the optimal value of K decreases. This
means that by constraining the search in the low crime area
to be of a minimum continuous duration~the optimal solution
may reduce the total fraction of time (K/K+l) .spent in the
high crime area, even to the point where it is allocated less
than half the search. This is precisely what occurred for
the curve marked ~=1.2 in Figure 5.3.
This phenomenon occurs consistently for the ~1=1 curves.
Even though the two regions generate crimes at the same rate,
if a constraint is placed on the minimum continuous duration
of a search in one of the regions the'optimal solution may
allocate less than half the search to the other region. The
explanation that eventually became apparent was that there
were two conflicting forces at work. The more intuitive one
was that as X increases the searcher is forced to incur in-
creasing diminishing return in any visit to the low crime
region and eventually the cost for visiting the region RL
becomes so prohibitive that it no longer pays to search the
region. This force dominates in the long run. However there
is an advantage in general to having short cycles and as X
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increases there is only one way of restraining the increase
in cycle length and that is by decreasing K. This propensity
for shorter cycles seems to dominate the behavior of the
optimal value of K for small values of X turning K optimal
initially into a decreasing function of X.
Because the differential equation model allows for an
explicit constraint on the continuous duration of a search
in only ~ of the regions, and because the optimal value of
K can be less than one, any desired constraint on the other
region must be made post hoc. For example, suppose that
both the high and low crime regions were to have the same
lower limit on the duration of a visit. The differential
equation model might find the optimal K to be less than one,
which vkiates the high crime region constraint. Under those
circumstances, the optimal feasible solution is to set K
equal to one.
Although in the above discussion we have noted that the
optimal K may decrease with X, this should in no way be con-
fused with the impact that increasing X has on the crime
level. Figure 5.7 shows that the level of crime increases
as X increases even though the searcher consistently uses
the optimal strategy for that X and that the optimal value of
K decreases initially as X increases~ (See the corresponding
curve in Figure 5.6).
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~4.3 No Constraint on the Minimum Duration of a Visit
In the previous section, an expression for S, the average
number of crimes in progress, was presented and was used to
determine the optimal values of K over a range of values
for X. In this section we will narrow our perspective to
telescope in on the limiting behavior of S as X approaches
zero (i.e. no constraint on the minimum duration of a visit
to a region). Although as X approaches zero the optimal solu-
tions are no longer implementable, the analysis of the limit
properties will prove significant, mostly because the abso-
lute minimum of S is also approached as X goes to zero. (See
Figure 5.3 in the previous section for an illustrative example.)
In addition this analysis will be facilitated tremendously by
the relative tractability of the expression for the limit as
compared to the expression for S itself.
The obvious first step, then, is to determine the limit
of S as X goes to zero. Referringback to the general
equation for IT (equation (5.55)) the only component that is
affected by changing X is
(5.56)
In order to find the limit of that expression, it is not
possible to substitute in X equal to zero because the result
is zero divided by zero. Instead L'h~pital's rule is
-218-
applied twice to the expression and the resultant value for
its limit is
-A·I;}
. [ r~ + 1 r] (5.57)F· (F+I) - (K+l) F'(Y~+l) + I'K F'(K+l) +
Combining this with the components of S which are not functions
of X, yields the following for the limit of S
Il-m -S =
x-'O
r'~'A + ~..L.
I+F F"
F' ( F+ I ) • ( K+1 )
Simpler than the general expression for S, this expression
can be analyzed to find the optimal K. by the standard pro-
cedure of setting the derivative equal to zero and solving
for K. However, prior to doing just that, we will again (See
section 5.1) display the equivalence between the two statis-
tics, the probability of intercepting a crime and the reduc-
tion in crime as a result of the search process.
Since we are considering cycles that are infinitesimal
in length, it is possible to calculate directly the probabi-
lity of intercepting a random crime for a cycle of K-X
minutes in RH and X minutes in RL. For any crime arising in
RH and lasting for T minutes the patrol unit will be in the
same region on patrol for (K/K+l)-T minutes during the
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commission of the crime. Therefore the probability of inter-
cepting the crime is
co
! Fexp(-Fet)·(l-exp(-I·(K/K+l)et) dt
o
which integrated yields
I· ( K!K+1 ) ( 6)
F + I· (K!K+1 ) 5. 0
The equation can be interpreted as follows. Imagine two
streams of targets leaving a system in two separate Poisson
processes, one at a rate F (completion), the other at a rate
I (interception). In addition targets that wish to leave in
the second stream (rate I) must also face a lottery before
they can leave. This lottery allows them to leave in that
stream with a probability of K/K+l (i.e. the fraction of time
the searcher is in the high crime region). Cf all the targets
that leave the system, the fraction that depart in the second
stream is just the above expression. Similarly for the
low crime region, RL, the probability of intercepting a ran-
dom crime is analogously
1 - F/{F + I·(l!(K+l)) = 1 - [F.(K+l)/((K+l).F + r] (5.61)
Since the proportion of all:crimes that occur in region RH
is (r.1/(I\1+1)) and in region RL, 1/(rv1+1), the probability of
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intercepting a random crime is
r:f /, F 0 ( K+1 2 \~+l • ~ - Fo(K+l) + 1 0 K)
= 1 -
F· (}(+1 )
Wt+l F'(K+l) + I·K +
With regard to the differential equation model the measure
that will be compared to the interception probability, is
again simply the proportional reduction in the average number
of crimes in progress as a result of the search process.
When no search is carried out in both regions the average
number of crimes in progress is
T!l •A/F + A/F = A· (r~+1 )F
The reduction in the CriJ1E level is then just one minus the
ratio of, the number of crimes in progress for the particular
search strategy (equation (5.58)) over the average when no
search is carried out. This is abbreviated as
1 - lim
x...a (A' (IV1+1 )/F)
substituting in the relevant expression for the lim of S
and combining the appropriate terms the expression reduces
to not surprisingly
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F' (K+lj r. W!
1 - M+l • ~'(K+l) + I.K +
- F· ( F+ I ) • ( K+1 )a
trie same as the probabili ty of in''terception, proving the
equivalence between the two statistics even in the more
general problem (two regions with unequal call rates).
We return now to our interrupted search for that analytic
expression at the end of the rainbow which will be used to
calculate the optimal value of K for limiting strategies. As
was mentioned earlier, the procedure to be followed requires
first the differentiation with respect to K of the expression
for the limit of S
d lim S
__x_"-..O_ =
dK
F' ]+ (F.(K+l)+I)13
(5 .• 66 )
•Although at first glance the derivative seems toocom~icated
to be easily solvable for K,when the derivative is set to zero,
it can be rewritten in a form more amenable to solution.
By combining all the terms into a single fraction, the ex-
pression can be reformulated as a multiple of a quadratic
expression of the type
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In particular the expression to be set equal to zero is
1\· ( 2 ( I-Til ) •F' (F+ I )
~(F~i-.(~K~-+-1~1+-·-~~)2~.~(-F-.~(I-{+-1~)~+-I-'-K~~)~2 • ~2. 81-M)'F2+~'(2F+I~
+ F2-I','l' (F+ I )~ (5.68)+
0=
Thus any value of K which makes the quadratic component zero
makes the entire expression zero. Therefore by using the
formula for solving a quadratic equation we find K to be
I~ (optimal )=
or equivalently
=
-2R' ·vM
where" R=F/I. With the above substitution, it is clear that
the optimal value for K does not depend upon the independent
values of F and I but only on their ratio, thereby reducing,
once again, the number of critical parameters. Table 5.2
displays the optimal K for a range of M and R. ene particular
value of M is of special interest. For M equal to one, which
means that the two regions generate crimes at the same rate,
the optimal value of K does not depend upon R but is always
one (i.e. equal search in both regions), as was assumed
earlier in the chapter. The obvious reason for this is that
for M equal to one, equation (5.70) becomes
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R The Optimal Value of K
M .1 .5 1 2 5 10 20 lQ 40
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.1 1.06 1.10 1.15 1.27 1.71 3.00 85.0 00 00
1.2 1.12 1.20 1.32 1859 3.01 45.0 00 00 00
1. ,3 1.17 1.30 1.49 1.97 6.16 00 00 00 00
1.4 1.22 1.40 1.67 2.45 25.0 00 00 ex) 00
1.5 1.28 1.51 1.87 3.04 00 00 00 OQ 00
2 1.52 2.05 3.12 13.1 00 00 00 co 00
.-
2.5 1.74 2.64 5.16 00 00 00 00 00 00
3 1.95 3.31 9c.20 00 00 00 . 00 00 00
3.5 2.15 4.09 21.2 00 00 00 00 00 00
4 2.33 5.00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Table 5.2: Optimal Cyclic strategLoo for Regions with
Differing Crime Rates and No Constraint on
the Minimum Duration of a Visit to a Region
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$ 10 I~ .ao ~5
Figure 5.8: A Characterization of when to ~
Search only One Region as a Function of Two
Parameters: M, the Ratio of the Two Crime
Rates, and R, the Ratio of the Completion and
Interception Rates of Crimes
=K(optimal)
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= 2(2R+l)
2(R+l)2-2R2 = 1
One aspect of the quadratic equation that needs clarifi-
cation is that since there are two solutions it is possible
for both solutions to be positive. As it turns out that
cannot happen. In Appendix-G it is proven that for values
of M for which both values of the numerator in expression
(5.69) are positive~ the corresponding denominator will be
negative. This last result provides, in addition, an almost
too obvious bonus in that it contains the key to findi.ng
under what conditions the optimal solution is infinite.
5.4.4 When to Sear~ .Only One Region
Whenever both solutions to the aforementioned quadratic
equation are negative, it beems intuitively clear that for M
greater than one the optimal solution will be at the upper
bound of the feasible region, namely K optimal will be in-
finite (i.e. search only one region). A direct corollary,
therefore, of the last result is that the optimal solution is
infinite when the denominator is negative or zero. Consequent-
ly if M (the ratio of the crime rates in the high and low crime
areas) is larger than (R+l)2/R2 ,
M >
the search should be limited to the high crime area. To be
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riGorous, the ab~proof only showed that in the limit as X
approaches zero tl1at tl'"2.8 inequality specifies vlhether or
not the low crime region should be searched. It, however,
is clear that if it does not pay to ever search HL for an
infinitesimally short duration there will be no incentive to
ever search R1 if the minimum duration of a visit is instead
some number larger than zero.
Now \vould seem the appropriate time to step baclc for a
second to attempt to obtain a more intuitive feeling for the
above inequality. The method to be used, and which in some
~Nays COllld be considered this d~issertation's other theme
song, is to analyze the limits. As R increases, the rieht
side of the inequality approaches one. So that when crimes
are finishing at a fast pace relative to their interception
rate, even small differences in the two regions fcrce the
concentration of search into one region. Cne explanation
is tlla-c the relatively rapid completion I'ate does not allovJ
for much diminishing return in the high crime region; .nor,
unfortunately, can even a total concentration of search
effort in that region impact enough on the crime level to
reduce it below that of the low crime region. Conversely
as R goes to zero, the right hand side approaches infinity.
This means that when the interception rate is relatively
high even for large disparities in the crime rates there is
reason to visit; the lOVI crime region every once in a \vhile.
necause of the relatively high interception rate there will
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be a significant amount of diminishing return from focusing
search in HE. In addition because of the same high inter-
ception rate even infrequent searches in hL can have a high
payoff in terms of reducing that region's crime levee The
tV10 reasons togetl1er therefore conspire to include I~L i11.
the search.
Figure 5.8 displays the convex region in which no search
would be carried out. For example if R (the ratio of com-
pletion to interception) were only 10 then if RH generated 21%
more crimes than RL, only RH would be searched. If~
realistically R~ 20, ]Q, .Q£. 40, t11en if I-~}I generated
respectively 10%, Z2 or ~~ crimes than RL,. again only
the high crime region would be searched. The result is a
second (iile first was based on travel times between regions
strong limitation on the likelihood of searching more than
one region. If there are even small variations in the crime
rate and the two areas are relatively large (i.e. the inter-
ception rate, which is a function of the size of the area, is
large compared to the completion rate), the model suggests
limiting search to the high crime area.
The last parameter to be microscopically examined for
symptoms that may contribute to the tendency to limit the
search to one region is the parameter X, the specified
minimuTh duration of a visit to the low crime region. Tucked
away earlier in the chapter and stored for Ja:ter use was the
key to determining the critical X above which it is no longer
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profitable to search region RL. l-~emerl1ber that in t11e
expression for S (eqllation (5.55)) only tvvo cOluponents, one
positive a11d 01'18 nega·cive, varied vIi th 1~, ,vi t11 only tl1G
negative one a function also of ~{. The two components are
1
and
1
- (I'C+l)'X
+
If for some X the absolute value of the first component
were greater than that of the second COmpOl1.ent for all values
of K, the sunl of the tVIO \''lould, of course, always be positive.
However, since by driving K to infinity both expressions can
be forced to zero, the obvious way to minimize the average
number of crimes when the sum is positive, is to let K be
infinite. The problem therefore reduces to finding under
what conditions the following inequality holds.
> 1 A' 12X • -11'--2-,-(-F-+-r""'P"')"a (5.73)
The problem is all but solved by the realization that both
f1(X) and fZ(X) are bounded from above by one. This is
easily seem once it is recognized that both flex) and f 2 (X)
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are of t11e form
which is always less than one. As a result the inequality
of interest becomes
> 1X • (1':1+1 )
Solving for X yields
x > = (r.~+l) 1( I'.,I-1) • -'-cF-.......,...(F~7..-I-+-l ) (5.76)
which depends, not only on the ratiD of F to I, but also on
their individual values.
Gne easily identifiable characteristic of this inequality
is that as N approaches on~ the right hand side tends
towards infinity. Interestingly and perhaps not too surprising-
ly this expression, except for the mul tiple (1'Jl+l/rI1-1) p is
identical to the inequality obtained earlier for 1, the time
lost in switchine, equatioh (5.41)
L > 1
As would be expected, the bound on X is strictly greater
than the corresponding bound onL (i.e. (Til+1/r:l-l) is greater
than one) since in the latter case the time is totally lost
while in the former, it merely has a reduced payoff because
of the lower crime rate. In fact, this last expression can
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be considered a special case of equation (5.71). If we treat
the travel ·tin18 as if a11 equivalent tinle v/ere spent in a second
region in vlhich 11.0 crimes occur t11el1. I'vI (t11e rati9 of cl~inle
rates in the high and low crime areas) would be infinite. In
tlle lirnit as Ii approacl1es infinity, tl1e expression I:~+l/l.~-l
approaches one. This reduces equation (5.76) to the inequality
found previously for L.
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~ 5 Sumrnary
In this chapter a differential equation model of a
search process was developed which has the potential for
callturinG tl1e C1JrY18.mics of a sequel1tial cyclic searC}1
strategy. In displayinc the application of the model to a
nUfl1ber of excunples, vie 11ave del"'ived a nun1bex" of il1.dependent
quantifiable constra..ints vl11icll lin1i t the nurnber of regions to
be searched and Wllich are summarized in Table 5.). ':,'ii th
regax"d to the t\\TO time pax"aneters, Land :(, vIe have fou~nd
that the Itey limits resul t first from t11e short mean duration
of a crin1e, (lip), \vhicl1 is then further reduced ( divided by
R+1) by the rate of crirl1e cOTIlple-Giol1 relative to tIle rate of
interception. The last parameter based constrail'1t, vlhitJh
involved r~, l,lnli}~e the other t\VO, vIas infl1...1enced solely by
the ratio of the completion rate to the interception rate.
The develcpment of these constraints strongly affected
and simplified the construction of algorithnls for allocating
police patrol. In Chapter 6 we consider the allocation of a
tactical patrol force among various high crime areas of a
city or precinct. The algorithm we present was made possible
by the travel time constraint. It allowed us to consider only
solutions in which patrol upits do not divide their time (and
hence do not have to travel) between two or more of the regions.
Chapter 7 presents an algorithm for finding the optimal region
for a standard patrol unit to patrol. The algorithm constructs
a single contiguous (again the travel constraint) region from
-2)2-
Table 5.3: A List of Three Criteria for When
Search Should Be Limited to One Region
1
L > FelF7I + 1)
x >
M >
M+l • 1
M-l F·(F!r + 1)
2
(~
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a series of small regions. For the algorithm to be effective,
the r~gions need to be small so that neither the X, the mini-
mum duration of a visit to the area, not the F/I is too large.
~emember that I depends also on the size of the area.) If,
however, the regions were large in the above sense, there would
be little flexibility in constructing the region to patrol
since the algorithm would be reduced to findingthe atom with
the highest payoff. Before concluding this chapter, we will
briefly discuss extensions of the model to mUltiple crime
types and m~ than two regions.
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5.6 Exten,eions
5.6.1 I~ultiple Crime Types
Of the two extensions to be considered, multiple crime
types vlill be analyzed first because conceptually the exte~­
sian is simple. In order to include the multiple crime types
in the model, it is necessary to add for each crime type
(different I and F) a pair of differential equations for each
region. Then to calculate the state of the system, S, under
a particular search strategy, each of the crimes is initially
treated separately. The total average number of crimes in
progress is then just the sum of all the individual averages.
The resultant expression is, however, still a function of only
X or K and :{, and can be analyzed in the same manner as before.
For example, if n crime types Vlere introd"Llced into the last
example, tIle inequality involving :C cOl.lId easily be general-
ized from equation (5.76) to be
i=l
Lastly in the event that the different crime types are to be
weighted differently, this too can be easily incorporated in
the search for optimal strategies. This is done by intro-
ducing the appropriate weighting factors when adding together
t118 averabe number of crimes in progress to generate the
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overall a-:lerage.
5 0 6.2 I,:ore T11an Tvvo Regions
Introducing more than two regions into the problem,
significantly increases the complexi ty of analysis. 1\.1 tliOl-1C11
any of tl1e earlier th)~ee ineqllali ties can, vii tl10u.t difficl.l]~ty
be applied pairwise to all the regions to exclude as many as
possible, the complications enter when more than two regions
are still left. The heart of the problem lies in the diffi-
culty of defining one si~e cycle type to be analyzed. In
the two region case, in addition to assuming a cyclical
search pattern, we made a second reasonable simplification in
considering only simple cycles of the form, X minutes in one
region followed by X or [.X minutes in the second region and
back to the first region again for X minutes. We did not,
however, allow a sinE~e cycle to contain more than a single
visit to eacl1 rer;ion. Thus cycles of the form, }~ minutes in
RL follovved by I~' J{ minutes in RI,'~ followed by Y minutes in r~L
and bacl\: to I~}{ for J. Y minutes and then finally bac}~ to F~L for
X minutes, were not considered e With three or more regions,
though it is not as easy to justify considerinG only cycles of
the form, visit Rl, trlen ft2, then R3 and baclc to F~l 8.nd dis-
regard cycles of the form TIl, H2, Rl, R3, R2 or some variation
on it. The result is that in order to analyze more than two
regions, the optimal solutions must be determined separately
for each 'reasonable' alternative cycle. In addition as the
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number of regions increase the number of alternative cycles
increases faster than linearly, which only further compounds
this complication. Therefore an important primal step in
expandinG the model in this direction is the development of
a methodoloGY for selectinG 'reasonable' cycles.
1-237-
FOOTNOTES-2
Although Appendix D proves only that when allocating 50%
of your search effort to a region the optimal cycle length
is infinitesimally small, an analogous proof can be
derived to show that for any fraction of time spent in a
region the optimal dispersion of that search is also in
infinitesimal cycles.
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CHAPTER 6
AN ALGORITHM FOR DEPLOYING A TACTICAL PATROL FORCE
6.0 Introduction
In the preceding chapters we have developed and expanded
upon-a theoretical foundation of search theory applied to
police patrol. Building on that foundation, we will present
algorithms for both deploying a tactical patrol force (Chapter
6) and for finding the optimal patrol region for an individual
patrol unit (Cha~er 7). In general the impact of the earlier
work was in the form of simplifying assumptions that were
used to determine the structure of the optimal solution.
This structure naturally facilitates the search for optimality
QY reducing the class of solutions that need to be surveyed.
Later, in the discussion of each model's assumptions, we
will describe these simplifying assumptions, their justifica-
tion and their specific relationship to the algorithm.
The first algorithm to be presented provides a methodo-
logy for deploying a tactical patrol force. rhroughout the
chapter we will use the term 'tactical patrol force', in a
broad sense, to describe a patrol force with the following
characteristics: l)Its major focus is on crime with, at
most, very limited responsibility for responding to calls for
service; 2)The deployment of the force can be rather flexible
(not limited to individual patrol units patrolling separate
sectors), Thus,the term is meant to include, for example,
the portion of a split patrol force that has been relieved
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of most of its responsibility for calls for service.
The optimal allocation of a tactical patrol force is
formulated here as the following problem:
...
Allocate l'~ patrol uni ts among r[ high crime regions to
maximize the weighted probability of intercepting a
random crirne ..
The mathematical programming formulation of this problem is
C
T''1A''.f~~
1 .r,.. L..J
i=l
E F(i,j)' F(i,j, I«j))
i=l
FE T:( j) = r
j=l
N( j) ~ 0 and integer I I" )\0.1
The \;(i) are the (subjective) weights assigned to each of C
crime types which reflect the relative importance of inter-
cepting different types of crimes. F( i, j) is t11e (relative
or absolute) frequency of each crime type i in each region j.
The N(j) are the control variables which represent the number
of patrol units allocated to region j. Lastly, P(i,j, N(j))
is the probability of intercepting crime type i in region j
when N(j) units are patrolling the region. The functional form
of P{i,j, N(j)) will be discussed in later. sectionSa For
now we limit ourselves to noting that it is, in addition, a
function of these input parameters: the street mileage of the
region, the speed of the patrol car, and the duration and
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observability of the individual crime types. In our later
discussion of these parameters, we will pay special attention
to the issues and problems that arise in obtaining estimates
of the last two parameters, duration and observability. Cne
point that will be emphasized is the critical need for
research concerning these aspects of crimes. Good estimates
are essential both in the development of effective patrol
strategies and in obtaining a more accurate picture of the
potential impact of police patrol on street crime.
The presentation of the optimal allocation algorithm
will proceed in the following sequence. First its underlying
assumptions and data re~uirements will be spelled out. Next
the individual steps of the algorithm will be described in
conjunction with a discussion of calculating P(i,j, N(j)).
Finally, closing out the discussion of the basic algorithm
will be an illustrative application of the model to a prob-
lem involving the allocation of ten patrol units to five proto-
type high crime areas. The second half of the chapter will
focus on algorithms for carrying out sensitivity analysis on
each of the input parameters. It will be clear from our dis-
cussions that we consider this sensitivity analysis capability
not an added frill but an essential part of the methodology
for deploying the patrol force. It is not hard to see why we
have developed such an attitude, given the subjectivity of
some of the input parameters,(e.g. weights),chSngeability of
others (e.g. F(i,j), the frequency of different crimes in
-242-
each region), and the difficulty of 'accurately' estimating
the crime type related parameters.
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6.1 r.ode1 9 8 Assumptions
A detailed step by step descripQon of the algorithm will
be presented in section 6.3. }Iowever, in order to place each
of the underlying assumptions in perspective, it will be
necessary at least to sketch the various components of the
algorithm. The most fundamental component of the algorithm
is the expression for calculating P(i,j, l!(j)), the probabili-
ty of intercepting a crime of t,rne i in rep-ion .i if N( .1 )
patrol units are a8Ri~~pn tn +r~+ rp~jon~ ~he expression
used here is essentially the same as the one introduced
earlier in Chapter 4 (equation (4.2)) for calculating the
probabiJ.i ty of interceptint: a crime when n units are on patrol.
Consequently the discussion in Chapter 4 of that equation's
assumptions is equally applicable here. The most crucial
assumption was the independence between the location of a
crime within a region and the location of a patrol unit in the
same region. This assumption is most justifiable if the tac-
tical patrol force consists of plainclothes policemen
traveling in unmarked cars. For a more visible patrol force
(e.g. part of a split patrol force), this assumption may not
be valid. However until information is available about the
magnitude of the dependence, it is impossible to assess how
inaccurate the model's estimates of interception probabilities
are. Of course any implementation of the model should keep
this issue in mind, recognizing that the model may be over-
estimating the interception probabilities.
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A second, related assumption is that the frequency of
crimes in the different regions isnot immediately affected
by the deployment of the patrol force. The key word is
'immediately'. We sould expect criminals to eventually
shift their activities away from regions with a high risk of
interception. However, if this process is not too rapid, the
algorithm can be rerun as the chang~ crime patterns begin to
emerge. As soon as one or two criminals are caught in a
particular region, it may be necessary to rerun the algorithm
(or use sensitivity analysis) to find a new optimal alloca-
tion. The new input data might even anticipate the disappear-
ance of crimes of a particular class from the region in which
the criminals had just been caught. As we shall see the
algorithm ( and its sensitivity analysis ) is simple and fast
enough to allow for even on line usage to update the patrol
allocation. Largely, the speed and frequency with which the
patrol force can be redeployed to react quickly to, or even
anticipate, crime pattern changes is limited more by command
and control issues than by any difficulties in rerunning the
algorithm. If however criminals react so quickly that the
present optimal deployment plan is outdated even before any
criminals are caught, the algorithm to be described may be of
little value. The only alternative under those circumstances
is to take a game theory approach to the problemQ
There is one assumption of the original expression (4.2)
that will be relaxed. The algorithm does allow for the speci-
fication of a probability distribution for the observable
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duration of a crime. On the other hand, one potentially
important aspect of police patrol that is not captured by
the algorithm nor by any of the search theory models is the
possible crime preventive component of patrol.
The second major component of the algorithm maps out the
route followed while approaching the optimal allocation of all
n patrol units. It starts out by determining the best region
in which to place a single patrol unit. Having optimally
allocated the first unit, it then determines the best location
for the second unit. It proceeds iteratively until all n
patrol units are deployed. The key simplification that lies
at the heart of this procedure is that at each step we allo-
cate the patrol time of each additional patrol unit to one and
only one region. We do not consider dividing that time between
one or more regions which would require the unit to travel
back and forth between the regions. The motivation for con-
sidering only integer allocations to each region derives
from our analysis (Chapter 5) of the two region problem in
which time was lost (from search) while travelling between
the regions. Our analysis there showed that even for identi-
cal regions the time lost travelling would usually outweigh
the benefits that might accrue from the transfer. This
assumption immediately reduces the number of possible solu-
tions from a non-countable infinite set to a relatively small
finite set. The algorithm described later in detail, in
essence, is just a procedure for searching the finite set for
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an optimal solution without enumerating all possible solutions.
There is one important assumption that we have not made.
We have not assumed that the best way to deploy a tactical
patrol force is for the units to patrol randomly. It may
well be that stakeouts are more effective against burglaries
and decoys more effective against muggings. The goal of this
chapter is to develop an algorithm to deploy optimally a
randomly patrolling tactical patrol force. Once that is
achieved, it is then possible to compare the relative
effectiveness of two completely different strategies (e.g.
random patrol vers~stakeouts). Without this capabili~,
however, a comparison of the two strategies would be like
comparing for sweetness a ripe Me Intosh apple with an
unripe Delicous apple.
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6.2 )llPut Data
An obvious prerequisite for using a model in a real en-
vironment is that it be possible to generate the model's
input paramet~ from existing data. However, there are in-
stances where the development of a model antecedes the
existence of usable data. Under those circumstances the
creation of a model ma~l prove a catalyst in tIle development
of the needed data by focusing on which data is needed and
why that data is critical. It is hoped that the search
theoretic models presented here provide such a stimulus to
the development of an accurate street crime data base. As
we shall see, the data needs of this model are not really
model specific in that any attempt at increasing the efficien-
cy with which police intercept street crimes requires that
the same data be collected or generated. With this in mind
we proceed with the discussion of the data.
~.2.1 Crime Weights
Early on in the development of the modeljit was recog-
nized that different values may be attached to intercepting
different crimes. This facet of the problem was incorporated
into the model by allowing for different weights to be asso-
ciated with intercepting each of the various types of crimes.
These weights may be city or precinct specific reflecting
the subjective assessment of only the local decision maker.
In that case the decision maker would, of course, be required
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to go through the process of quantifying his subjective
feelings. This process would be aided by techniques in the
field of statistical decision theory, for assessing utility
functions. The source of these weights can also be based on a
broader theoretical and empirical foundation. Maltz, in a
recent article [ 2J, suggests a number of measures of
effectiveness for crime reduction programs which could be
used to determine the weights. One existing measure is the
Crime Seriousness Index (CSI) developed by Sellin and
Wolfgang [5J. Questionnaires were administered to various
groups affiliated with the criminal justice system in order
to determine how the groups assessed the seriousness of each
crime relative to a standard crime. The weights were found
to be fairly consistent from group to group_ Maltz suggests
other measures which are multidimensional extensions of CSI.
The use of these vector measures in the search thoretic frame-
work presented here will require first the application of mul-
tiattribute utility theory to produc,e a single objective
function.
An alternative to the somewhat subjective measures
offered by Sellin and Wolfgang and by Maltz would be measures
based on the existing criminal justice code. The criminal code
has, in a sense, already quantified society's attitudes
towards the various crimes by assessing different penalties
(prison terms) for the commission of different crimes. A
variation on the same theme would be to weight crimes
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according to the actual prison terms handed down by judges as
a measure of the relative seriousness of each crime type.
Another less subjective measure, that can be used alone
or in conjunction with other measures similar to CSI, attempts
to capture the impact on the crime rate of intercepting a
particular criminal. This measure is the relative rate at
which criminals involved in a particular class of crimes
commit crimes of that type. For example if a burglar carries
out 5 burglaries per month and an auto thief steals 10 cars
per month, auto theft would be assigned a weight twice that of
burglary. As was noted earlier this measure need not, however,
be used alone but can also be mUltiplied by the associated
value of the CSI for that class of crimes. With this type of
weightsJthe objective of the allocation model would be to
maximize the longer range weighted impact on crime levels.
The concept of weighted impact suggested here has broader
applications. This concept can be applied to measure any
crime reduction program that focuses on the criminal rather
than on the crime. Thus recently suggested mandatory senten-
ces for ,certain specific types of crimes can easily be
evaluated using the above measure. Another program already
being implemented in different partsar the country is an
emphasis in the courts on bringing to speedy trial criminals
charged with certain types of crimes. This measure can be
used to optimally allocate resources among competing crime
types in order to maximize the program's weighted impact on
crime e
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6.2.2 Crime Frequency
The second parameter to be discussed is the relative
frequency of each crime type in each region. In our example
we used data from the published FBI Unifor~ Crime Reports.
One oft mentioned problem with crime data from this source
or police records is that it seriously underestimates the
actual number of crimes. From our perspective, however,
there is an even more serious problem with available police
data especially since the introduction of victimization
studies have begun to determine levels of unreported crime.
The problem is that the typical data often does not distin-
guish between a personal robbery committed on the street or
in the hallway of the tenth story of a high rise apartment
house. No distinction is made between a rape in which the
initial encounter was on the street and one which occurs
through a rapist gaining entrance to the victim's residence.
Similarly~the data may not distinguish between a burglary
which occurs in a location where a patrol car has access and
a burglary where a patrolman would need telescopic, x-ray
vision in order to notice anything unusual. In short if the
decision maker is choosing between competing patrol strategies
and allocations, he lleeds complete information about what
fraction of crimes in each category can.possibly be affected
(intercepted) through street ,atrols.
The changing nature of this parameter also requires that
the crime data be continuously tracked and updated. The
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algorithms for sensitivity analysis can help this tracking
~rocess. They point out how sensitive the optimal solution
is to changes in the frequency of the various crime types.
This allows the major part of the ongoing data analysis to be
concentrated in a limited number of critical (with regard to
the optimal solution) crime categories.
6.2.3 Duration and Observabilityof Crimes
The last set of data to discuss and the most difficult to
obtain is the crime descriptive data. Police nersonnel are
... ,
certainly aware that the chances of apatrol car passing an
auto theft in progress are very slim because the crime is so
short. Similarly they recognize that the likelihood of a
passing patrol officer spotting a burglary in progress is
very small. Yet ask them how long an auto theft takes or how
observable a burglary is and you realize that these questions
~ave never been asked even though their knowledge and informa-
tion gained through experience is sufficient to at least
partially answer these questions. Even departments that have
begun to review their crime data to determ~ what fraction
of crimes are observalbe have not asked to what degree and
for how long can the observable crimes be seen. The succeeding
paragraphs will discuss, in a somewhat anecdotal style, how
we obtained the crime descriptive data used in the examples.
However in the application of the model presented later, we
will suppress all names of crime types. The reason for doing
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this is that the numbers we used do not have a very solid
foundation and are the result of a very limited number of dis-
cussions with police personnel. Our goal in these discussions
was not to generate a good data base (which is a massive under-
taking) but rather to make sure that the hypothetical examples
we constructed do not use absurd values for observability and
duration. Thus to avoid any unjustified inferences being
drawn from our later examples, the names have been changed to
protect the innocent. Instead of the more eye catching terms
such as rape, manslaughter and commerical burglary , we have
generally substituted the innocuous terms Type I, II and III
crimes. However, our discussion here will use some standard
names in order to illustrate one way to approach the data
collection task. In addition we will attempt to generalize
from our limited experience about the possible problems to
be faced in generating the data.
The initial stumbling block, and by no means unique to
police,were the patrolmen's uneasiness with attempting to
define a single number for the average duration. Instead
they often referred to those rare instances when crimes took
an unusually long time (e.g. the rape in which the woman was
held captive for ten hours). This problem of outliers was
easy to overcome mainly because our primary concern was the
observable duration. Therefore, even in the extremely long
crime~typicallYJonlyduring a small fraction of the time
could a passing patrol officer have possibly noticed some-
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thing suspicious. As the discussions continued it seemed that
patrolmen were ·little more co~fortable with assigning a small
range to the average observable duration. One estimate for a
commercial burglary was between 5 and 10 minutes. For our
examples an estimate of 7.5 minutes was used. However, in
future discussions it would be worthwhile to explore the
range in more detail asking if 5 minute crimes were more
frequent than 10 minute ones and if so, how much more, etc.,
in order to derive a functional form for the probability dis-
tribution of the observable duration. An important tool used
in assessing the observable duration and even more so the
observability of a crime, was the constant comparisons bet-
ween crime categories in order to be assured of consistent
estimates.
The determination of the observability of a crime proved
a much more difficult task. The first barrier was the need
for the officers to comprehend and internalize the concept of
conditional probability. The reason for this is that observa-
bility parameters describe the probability of noticing (inter-
cepting) a crime conditioned on passing it while it is in
progress. This problem was compounded by the fact that there
is not much in a policeman's past experience that he can call
on to estimate the average observability. How frequently
does a patrolman pass a crime in progress? The result was
that some of the estimates may be low since the conditional
probability of seeing a crime seemed to be, at times, confused
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with the probability~of passing a crime in progress and seeing
it, a probability which is very smalle The direction that,
however, seemed mnst useful in assessing the observability of
a crime was to try to build a profile of a typical crime from
each category and then analyze each component of the crime
separately. For example a profile of a potentially inter-
ceptible rape might be described as follows:
In the initial encounter between the man and woman there
might be a struggle lasting for approximately a minute
which a passing patrol car would have a better than 50-50
chance of spotting (set at .6). After that the woman
would then be forced to a more secluded location nearby
in which the actual rape occurred. During that time,
about 5 minutes, there is almost no chance for a passing
patrol unit to spot anything e This probability was
assessed at .02. After the completion Of the rape the
rapist might run (20 seconds) which would attract atten-
tion with a probability of .5. Thus the average obser-
vability during the total crime was about .14.
The same was done for other crimes. Another example is
personal burglary:
During the commission of the crime, which includes the
breaking and entering, there is almost no chance of
spotting the burglar (assessed at .01). However, when
leaving the premises with stolen property (last half
minute of a ten minute crime) there is a 50-50 chance of
a passing patrol officer being suspicious.
,These numbers, as the officers pointed out, will often depend
on when the crime was committed. At 2:00 A.M., in the morning,
a man lugging a stereo or television is likely to attract
more attention than at 2:00 P.M., in the afternoon. For our
examples we disregarded all such variations.
In determining the observability of a crime the statistic
that was calculated was the average over the duration of a
crime. The average .~ observability is a sufficient statistic
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because each region is allocated its own group of patrol units
and those patrol units are assumed to be on patrol in their
respective regions throughout the course of the crime. If,
however, patrol units were leaving and entering the region
in which the crime occurs, then it would be important to know
during exactly which stages of the crime it is most observable.
Moore [3J addresses the problem of detecting targets whose
observability changes over time and as can be seen from his
analyses it is a very complicated problem to analyze.
In the above discussions we have attempted to sketch some
of the issues and problems that arose in generating our sample
data. The problems addressed here are certainly crucial in
effectively deploying a patrol force to attack street crimes;
yet no significant research to date has been done in this area.
Although we recognize the inherent problems in determining
these parameters, we also realize that these are the numbers
that are needed.
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6.3 An Algorithm to Allocate a Tactical Patrol Force
The algorithm to allocate a tactical patrol force is
unabashedly simple and involves but two stages. During the
initial stage each region is analyzed separately to determine
the payoff (weighted probability of intercepting a random
crime) resulting from introducing a single patrol unit into
that region. The regions are then ranked in order of their
potential payoff from a single patrol unitiwith the region
ranked highest allocated the first patrol unit.
Once the first unit has been allocated, the next stage,
requiring even fewer calculations than the first p iteratively
allocates the additional (N-l) units. Because it is assumed
that adding a patrol unit to the region, RH, does not affect
the probability of intercepting a crime in any of the other
regions, the payoff from adding a unit to any of the other
regions has not changed. Therefore only in region RH does
the incremental payoff of adding a patrol unit change. As a
result it is necessary to evaluate for that region the
following expression
c
L
i=l
W(i)'F(i,j)~P(i,j,2) - P(i,j,l))
for j=RH (6.2)
Then using the just updated incremental payoff for RH, its
rank relative to the other regions is also updated. The
region now ranked first with regard to the marginal payoff of
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an additional patrol unit is allocated the second patrol unit.
Afterwards the updating process is repeated for that region!
Thus we cycle again through the entire procedure described
above until all N patrol units are allocated. The general
form of expression (6.2) is
c
E
N=l
W(i)·F(i,j){?(i,j,N(j)+l) - P(i,j,N(j»)]
for j=RH (6.))
with N(j) the number of patrol units allocated at present to
the region RH. The second stage is a marginal allocation
procedure which can be briefly summarized a3
1. Allocate the kth patrol unit to the region ranked
first on the incremental payoff list.
2. Update that region's incremental payoff.
3. Update its rank on the incremental payoff list.
4. Return to step 1.
An important feature of the steepest ascent algorithm just
presented is that in the process of determining the optimal
allocation of N patrol unite, it also finds the optimal
allocation of any number of patrol units less than N. In all
instances the solution is a global optimum (See section 6.4
for a discussion.).
In the above algorithm, an obviously central calculation
is tmdetermination of P(hj,N(j), the probability of inter-
cepting a crime of type i in region j with N(j) patrol units
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in that regions The basic formula to be used"in the calcula-
tion was introduced previously in Chapter 4. It assumes that
the units are randomly patrolling their assigned region and
is written
where
1-exp ( - N( j ) • S • T ( i )-0 B( i )1M( j ) ) (6.4)
N.( j)= number of patrol units in region j
S = patrol speed
T(i)= observable duration of crime type i
O~i)= average (over the observable duration of the crime)
observability of crime type i
M(j)= number of street miles in region j.
The above equation, though, calculates only the probability
of intercepting a crime of fixed duration, T(i). However, in
the developement of the algorithm it was recognized that all
crimes of a single type are obviously not clocked by a special
timer with a 24 second buzzer signalling the crime to end.
Cons,equently, the programmed version of the algorithm allows
the 'user to specifY anyone of four distributions t (1) determin-
istilC, (2) exponential , (3)kth ortier Erlang, and (4)uniform,
for ·the duration of anyone or all of the crime types. Even
the above four options~do 'not really reflect the full flexi-
bility of the algorithm. It is easy to include any distribu-
tion for which it is possible to evaluate either
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00
1 - !f(t)-exp(-N-Sat·OB/M)dt
o
for a probability distribution function, f(t) or
~
1 - ~p(t)oexP(-N.SotoOB/M) (606)
t=o
for a probability mass function, p(t). It is even envisioned
that in order to describe accurately the observable duration
of a crime, it may be necessary to divide the total duration
into two or more components, each with its own probability
distribution. For example, from an operational perspective,
the commission of a crime can often be divided into three
stages:
(1) The initial encounter between criminal and victim
(target) including perhaps a struggle (breaking in);
(2) Time during which the criminal actually obtains his
desired goal;
(3) The criminal's hasty departure from the scene of the
crime with the goods.
The degree of variation in the duration of each of these stages
may not be the same, requiring therefore three distributions
(assumed independent) to describe the crime. Expression (6_5)
could then be modified to be
00
1 - [£ f(t1 ) 0 (exp(-NoSot1oOB(1)!M)) dt1
00
• ~ g(tZ) 0 (exp(-NoSotzoOB(Z)!M») dtZ
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Notice that the average observability is also allowed to vary
with each stage. The three integrals in the expression are
-
multiplied together because each calculates separately the
probability of not intercepting the crime during their
respective stages. The probability of not intercepting the
crime at all is therefore just the product o~ the three. It
is assumed for now that the duration of each stage is indepen-
dent of the other two stages a
Prior to programming the present algorithm, with its
flexibility of also handling three non-deterministic distri-
butions, expression (6~5) was first evaluated for each of the
distributions. For the exponential distribution with mean
(l/A) it is
00
1 - j A - exp(-A-t) • exp(-N-S-t-OB/M) dt
o
1 A = N·S·OB
- A+(N-S·OB!M) M-A + N·S·OB
for an Erlang o~ order k it is
00
(6_8)
1 - J'
n
v
(Aot)k-l " exp(-A"t) " exp(-S"t"N"OB)M) dt
(6.9)
and lastly for the uniform distribution of [A,e] it is
C
1 - J'A
1
C-A exp(-S-t-N-OB!M) dt
= 1 - M
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[exp(-S-N-OB-A!M) - exp(-S-N-OB-C/M)]
(6.10)
The above discussion of alternative distribution functions
for each crime type leads to an obvious question, "How much
difference does it make whether we use a constant for the
duration time or an exponential distribution (with the same
mean) for it?". In the next section we will present two
examples of applying the algorithm. The first example assumes
constant duration; the other, exponential.
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6.4 Allocating Ten Patrol Units to Five Regions
6.4~1 Equal Total Crime Rates: Different Distribution of
Crime Types
The algorithm requires two sets of data, one to describe
each different crime type, the other to describe each region.
It is necessary to specify for street mileage and the frequen-
cy of each crime type for each region. To simplify the
analyses in our example all regions will contain 15 miles of
streets. In the first example, in order to focus on how even
the distribution of crime types, alone, can affect the optimal
solution, the total crime rates were set so as not to differ
from region to region. However, the distributions of crimes
by type within each region do differ. In order to generate
realistic distributions, we used National-Crime Panel Surveys-
data [4 ] for the five largest cities (Chicago, Detroit, Los
Angeles, New York and Philadelphia). (The appropriateness of
this source of data for the model was discussed earlier in
the chapter.) Focusing on six potentially detectable crime
types (e.g. personal robbery, commercial robbery, auto theft,
personal burglarJ, etc.), we determined for each city the
fraction of crimes that fell within each of the six classes.
Thus. in the summary of the region input data for the first
example that is contained in Table 6.1, the distribution of
crimes by type in each region is the same as that found in
one of the five cities.
For the crime type descriptive data, we first assigned
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a weight of one to each crime so that in effect we were
maximizing the (non-weighted) probability of intercepting a
crime~ The data describing the average duration and average
observability of each crime type is summarized in Table 6.2.
The generation of this dat~ was described in the previous
section. As for the probability distribution of the observ-
able duration of a crime, two separate examples are presented
in order to display how changing the distribution can affect
the optimal solution. One example assumes a deterministic
distribution (i.e. constant duration); the other, an exponen-
tial distribution with the same mean. Our choice of distribu-
tions is not, however, meant to imply that either distribution
duplicates the real world although the exponential is likely
to be closer to reality.
6.4.2 Optimal Solution: Crime Durations Assumed Constant
The most striking aspect of the optimal allocation (des-
cribed in Tables 6.3 and 6.4) is the wide disparity in the
allocation of units, Region A was allocated six and C none,
even though the total crime rates in both regions were the
same. Even more striking,perhapstwas that the first five
units and six of the first seven units were assigned to A
(Table 6.3) with Region B allocated one of the seven. In
order to comprehend why A received the largest number ~f units.
better described as a whale's share, we will first look at
Table 6.4, which displays the probability of intercepting each
of the crimes in each regiono
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REGION DATA
Frequency of Various Crime Types
II III IV V VIIReglons 1. es
A 15 0.022 0.202 0.142 O.46t5 0.136 0.033
p
B 15 0.015 0.161 0.132 0.468 0.174 OG050
C 15 0.016 0.104 0.153 0.530 0.171 0.026
D 15 0.009 0.184 0.105 0.276 0.324 0.102
E 15 0.010 0.194 0.150 0.388 0.199 0.059
Table 6.1: Region Descriptive Data:Frequency
of Various Crime Types in each Region
CRIME DA~eA
MW · htTc ·rlme lype el.g, 18 rl \,1 ~on ean serva 1 1. ;y
J~
, "
I 1.0 Deterministic 0.100 0(1140
II 1.0 Deterministic 0.066 0.100
III 1.0 Deterministic 0.037 0.100
IV 1.0 Deterministic 0.167 0.030
V 1.0 Deterministic 0.125 0.040
VI 1.0 Deterministic 0.066 0.060
Table 6.2: Crime Descriptive Data:Weight, Mean~
Distribution, and Average Observability
of each Crime Type
{~ The mean is in hours not minutes.
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The first point that stands out is that crime type I
has the highest probability of interception in the five re-
gions as a whole, .034, and similarly in each individual
region. The region with the highest interception probability,
.081, is region A, as would be expected. A distant second,
but of greater significance because of its higher frequency,
was crime type II. It had an overall interception probabi-
lity of .015 far below that of Type I. This was still more
than one-third higher than its next nearest competitor,
crime type IV which had an interception probability of .011.
The cause of the higher interception probabilities for type
I and type II crimes obviously lies in the original data
describing the duration and observability of the crimes
(Table 6.2).
In the data we used, type I crimes had an observable
duration of six minutes and a patrol car passing during that
time had, on the average, a one in seven chance of noticing
something suspicious. This average observability is signifi-
cantly higher than for any of the other crimes, especially
those crimes of longer observable duration. In addition its
own observable duration is the tnird highest. Both factors
combined generate an interception probability over twice that
for type II crimes.
Comparing types II and IV, we see that although the
latter has a duration two and a half times the former, its
average observability is less than one-third that of type II.
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This explains why the probability of intercepting type II
crimes is 33% higher than that for type IV. Combining the
above. with the fact that Region C, which receives no units,
generates a larger fraction of the type IV crimes than it does
type II crimes, explains why type II crimes have an overall
46% higher (.0148 versus .0102) probability of being inter-
cepted.
Turning back to the region data, Table 6.1, we can now
understand why patrol is concentrated in region A. Both
type I and II crime~ which have the highest interception rates,
~re a larger proportion of the crimes in that region than in
any other region. While in region C (no patrol units)
these crime types, together, make up only 12% of its crimes,
the lowest for any region.
The above discussion explains Why Region A is assigned
the most patrol units and C the least. It does not, however,
fully justify why so many are allocated to the former and
none to the latter and so few to all the other regions. In
order to understand this phenomenon, we must first realize
that the algorithm is not using the following logic: Assign
to Region A proportionata-V more patrol units ,. as it has a
higher proportion of more interceptible crimes, and conse-
quently __ 'a... random crim~ occurring there has a higher chance
of being intercepted by a . patrol unit. Using the con-
cept of diminishirg return presented in Chapter 4, it is
•
possible, though, to explain the lopsided optimal solution.
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SEQUENTIAL ALLOCATION
Patrol Unit Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Allocated to Region A A A A A B A E B D
--
Table 6.3: Sequential Allocation:The Order in Which
Patrol Units areAllocated to the Various
Regions Under the Optimal Policy:
Equal Total Crime Rates-Duration of Crimes
Assumed Constant
RESULTS OF OPTIMAL ALLOCATION
Probability of Interception of Crimes
I II III IV V VI A
Cars
AllRegl0ns oe. verage
A 6 .081 .039 .022 .030 .030 .024 .0314
B 2 .028 .013 .007 .010 .010 .008 .0102
C 0 !OOO .000 .000 .900 .000 .000 .0000
. , D 1 .014 .007 .004 .005 0005 .004 .0051
E 1 .014 .007 .004 .005 .005 .004 .0051
-
Average .034 .015 .007 .010 .008 .007 .0103
Table 6.4: Probability of Interception of each
Crime Type in each Region under the
Optimal Allocation Strategy:
Equal Total Crime Rates-Duration
of Crimes Assumed Constant
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The initial payoff for introducing a single patrol unit into
A was only about 3% higher than that for B. However, as more
units are allocated, none are assigned to region B until the
incremental payoff from adding another unit to region A has
been reduced, by diminishing returns, below that of an,
initial payoff "in the other~ region (B). Because the dimin-
ishing return is occurring so slowly, cutting into the
incremental payoff by only slightly more than one-half of one
percent for each additional unit assigned to At it is not
until the sixth unit is to be allocated that diminishing
return has erased what was initially: only a 3% advantage.
The same analysis, of course, can be used to explain why
region C is not allocated patrol units even though the
initial difference between it and A was only 4%.
6.4.2 Equal Total Crime Rates--Duration Assumed to be
Exponential
In the next example the input data (region and crime
type) to the model is the same as before except that the
observable duration of each crime type is assumed to follow
an exponential probability distribution with the mean the
same as before (Table 6.2). When the algorithm was run
with this slightly modified data, the optimal solution
(Table 6.6) significantly decreased region A's allocation,
reducing it from six to four. The two cars were reallocated,
one each to regions D and E, which were now allocated two cars
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apiece. An analysis of the rate of diminishing return shows
clearly how exponentiality affected the optimal solution.
In both examples the initial difference in payoff bet-
ween a unit assigned to A and one assigned to B was only
2.5%. For the constant duration, it was noted earlier that
adding a patrol unit decreases the incremental payoff by
only slightly more than one-half of one percent. However,
introducing exponential distributions increases the rate of
diminishing return to almost 1.2%. Thus by the time the
fourth unit is allocated here (see Table 6.5), the first in
line to receive that patrol unit is no longer region A; instead
it is region B. . . In the first example, B did not
receive any patrol units until the sixth one was allocated
(Table 6.3). This increased rate of diminishing return also
affects region' C. Sensitivity analysis carried out on the
optimal solution showed that if an additional unit (the
eleventh) became available, it would be allocated to region C
if the crime duration distribution were exponential but to
region A if the distribution were deterministic.
There is one last ancillary effect that should be noted.
Because each-region's crime, when broken down into the six
categories, is different, shifting units between regions
affects the overall probability of intercepting crimes of a
particular type. Region A has a hi~her proportion of type I
crimes while in D and E criminals prefer crime types V and VI.
As a result, shifting the units out of A decreases the
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SEQUENTIAL ALLOCATION
Patrol Unit Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Allocated to Region A A A B E D A B E D
Table 6.5: Sequential Allocation:The Order in Which
Patrol Units are Allocated to the Various
Regions Under the Optimal Policy:
Equal Total Crime Rates-Duration of Crimes
Assumed Exponential
RESULTS OF OPTIMAL ALLOCATION
f C ·fItcars ro all :y 0 n ercep lon 0 r mes
Regions AlIce. I II III~ IV V VI Average
A 1.} .053 ,,026 .01S .020 .020 .016 .0208
B 2 .027 .013 .007 .010 .010 ~OO8 =0102
C 0 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .0000
D 2 .027 .013 .007 .010 .010 .008 .0102
E 2 .027 .013 .007 .010 .010 .008 .0102
Average .029 .015 .007 .010 .010 .008 .0103
Table 6.6: Probability of Interception of each Crime
Type in each Region under the Optimal
Allocation strategy:
Equal Total Crime Rates-Duration of Crimes
Assumed Exponential
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probability of intercepting a type I crime by 17% (from .034
to .029) and increases the probability of intercepting a type
V crime by 13% (from .008) to .0096) and a type VI crime by
16% (from .0068 to .008). Results analogous to the above will
appear in the next example when we consider regions with
differing total crime rates.
6.4.4 Differing Total Crime Rate: Duration Assumed Exponential
Previously we analyzed the impact of the differing crime
categories and the functional form of the observable duration.
In this next example we explore how differing overall crime
rates compound the above effects and, more importantly, address
the question of what gains are associated with the optimal
allocation. An obvious prerequisite for measuring the gains
generated by an optimal deployment is the existence of a
standard with which to compare. The straw man to be used is
the linear model which allocates patrol units to each region
in direct proportion to its total crime rate.
The crime type descriptive data used here is the same as
in the previous example including the assumption that the
observab1e duration is exponential (which seems to be more
realistic than a",deterministic distribution). However, the
region data was modified in the following manner. The frequen-
cy of each crime type in regions A and C was tripled so that
both regions had total rates of three crimes per unit time.
Region B's total crime rate was doubled in the same manner
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while the crime rates in regions D and E remained unchanged.
A linear allocation model would allocate three patrol units
each to A and C, two to B and one each to D and E. With this
allocation a random crime would be intercepted witha probabi-
lity of .012) or approximately one chance in 80. The inter-
ception probabilities of the different crime types range from
a low of .008 for type VI crimes to a high of .035 for type I
crimes and are summarized in Table 6.8.
The optimal allocation algorithm was run on this problem
and it suggested that seven patrol units be assigned to region
A, three to B and none to the other three regions~ The im-
balance between A and C which have the same overall crime rate,
was due to region A generating a higher frequency of crimes II
with higher interception rates (crime types I and II).
However, with the optimal allocation, the probability of
intercepting a random crime increased 22% from .0123 to .0152.
The increases in the individual crime categories, though,
varied widely. For crime types V and VI, the increases were
less than 10% and for types I and II, they were greater than
30%. The determining factor in the size of the increase in a
particular crime category was the distribution of that crime
type among the regions. Regions B, D and E (allocated no
patrol units) generate a high proportion of type V and type
VI crimes.
To add another dimension to the comparison,we have intro-
duced another statistic which is the inverse of the
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SEQUENTIAL ALLOCATION
Patrol Unit Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Allocated to Region A A A A C A C A C A
Table 6.7: Sequential~'Allocation: The Order in Which
Patrol Units are Allocated to the Various
Regions Under the Optimal Policy:
Different Total Crime Rates-Duration of
Crimes Assumed Exponential
RESULTS OF OPTIMAL ALLOCATION
Probability of Interception of Crimes
I II III IV V VI A
Cars
AllRegJ.ons ac. verage
A 7 .089 .045 .026 .O3l} .034 .027 .0355
B 0 .000 • 000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .0000
c 3 .040 .020 .011 9015 .015 .,012 .0151
D 0 0000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .0000
E 0 .000 • 000 .000 s 000 .000 .000 .0000
Average .048 .021 .011 .015 .012 .008 .0152
Linear Model .035 .015 .009 .012 .011 .008 .0123
Table 6.8: Probability of Interception of each Crime
Type in each Region under the Optimal Allocation strategy:
Compared to Linear Allocation Model: Differ~nt Total
Crime Rates-Duration Assumed Exponential
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probability of interception. This statistic is the expected
number of crimes committed until one is intercepted. It can
be interpreted in terms of interdicting a career path of a
criminal. Thus with the linear allocation, a non-discrimina-
ting criminal (commits all types of crimes) would, on the
average, commit 81 crimes (1/.0123) before being intercepted
by a passing patrol unit. Under the optimal allocation this
is reduced to 61 crimes (1/.0152). Similarly a criminal who
specializes in type II crimes would have his expected
career length reduced 36%. These improvements suggest that
for regions with disparate crime rates, the algorithm can
significantly wercentage-wise) increase the probability of
interception. The increases generated in this last example
are perhaps more impressive when compared to the goals of a
one ;million dollar crime reduction proposal submitted to
LEAA [ 1 J. In it Atlanta's police department set a goal of
increasing on-site apprehensions by 5%, with the term on-site
apprehensions including all criminals captured within an
hour of the crime. A better deployment of a tactical patrol
force might by itself generate that level of improvement 0
At this point, however, we would like to reiterate our
earlier remarks. Even with the improvements (over propor·
tional allocation) that the model generates, the resultant
allocation of randomly patrolling units may not be the best
strategy. The probabilities of interception are still only
on the order of .015. other totally different strategies,
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such as stakeouts, may be able to generate higher probabili-
ties especially when the focus is on' only one crime -type
(e.g. burglary).
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6*5 Sensitivity Analysis
The following sections present algorithms which perform
sensitivity analysis on each of the allocation model's input
parameters. The development of each algorithm revolves
around understanding how changes in a particular parameter
affect the following necessary and sufficient condition of
optimality:
"If there exists no region such that adding a patrol
unit to that region increases the weighted probability of
intercepting a crime, more than removing a patrol unit from
some region reduces the same objective function, the solution
is optimal.
This optimalityoondition can be formalized:
C
max 2:j
i=l
C
< min 2:k
i=l
W(i)-F(i,j)·[P(i,j,N(j)+l) - P(i,j,N(j))]
W(li)'F(i,k)-[P(i,k,N(k)) - P(i,k,N(k)-l)]
(6,11)
The left hand side of the inequality represents the increase
produced by adding a patrol unit to region, j, and the right
hand side describes the decrease resulting from removing a
patrol unit from region, k. If the above inequality does not
hold, there must exist a pair of regions, j and k, such that
adding a patrol unit to j has a higher incremental payoff
than the decrease produced by removing a unit from region k.
In which case, the present solution can be improved upon by
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switching one unit from region k to region j. This proves
that the above condition is necessary for optimality. The
sufficiency of this condition is a direct consequence of
diminishing return. If transferring one unit does not im-
prove upon the present solution, transferring more than one
certainly can not. Because of diminishing return the second
patrol unit that is added to a region increases the inter-
ception probabilities there less than the first; while con-
versely, the second unit removed from a region decreases the
probability of interception even more than the first.
6.5.1 Frequency of the Different Crime Types in Each Region
The first algorithm analyzes the optimal allocation with
respect to the frequency of each crime type in each region.
The need for sensitivity analysis on this parameter is a
natural consequence of its changeability. Crime patterns
change over a period of time in regard to both the absolute
and relative frequency of each crime type. In addition since
the allocation model sugge~ concentrating the patrol force
in a limited number of regions, criminal reaction to police
deployment may speed up the process of change significantly.
The goal of sensitivity analysis on this"set of parameters
will be twofold: (l)To determine how much the frequency of a
particular crime type in each region can vary before affecting
the optimality of the present deployment, (2)To pinpoint
the crime type-region pairs to which the optimal solution is
-278-
most sensitive. The decision maker would use this informa-
tion in determining which crime rates to monitor most
closely for chan~~s.
Compared to the other parameters, sensitivity analysis
on the crime type frequencies is easy to carry out because
increasing the frequency of a crime in a particular region,
j, affects the incremental payoff in only that region. The
determination of when the optimal solution changes, there-
fore, requires making only one comparison. That comparison
will be between region j and the region ~ther than j) with
the minimum decrement. As F(il,j), the frequency of crime
type i1 in region j, increases, the incremental payoff of
region j increases linearly. (The slope of the line
W(il).[P(il,j,N(j)+1 - P(il,j,N(j»].) Thus to find the
upper limit, UF(il,j), to which F(il,j) can rise without
altering the optimal solution, it is necessary to deter-
mine the intersection point of two straight lines. One line
is the incremental payoff equation (a function of F(il,j)
of the region j; the other is a constant representing the
minimum decremerE. The intersection point is
UF(il,j)= [(Min
k,klj
c
~ W(i)·F(i,k)·~(i,k,N(k))-P(i,k,N(k)-l))·
i=l
(6.12)
c
- ~ W(i)·F(i,j)\P(i,j,N(j)+l)-P(i,j,N(j)))]
i=1, ilil
-------------------------------------------------------[W(il)·(P(il;j,N(j)+l)-P(i,j,N(j»)]
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If the F(il,j) increases above this limit, UF(il,j), the the
present optimal solution can be improved by transferring a
unit into region j from the region with the present minimum
decrement.
The calculation of the lower limit on F(il,j) is directly
analogous to the above. Instead of Equation (6.7) the
relevant expression for determining the two line intersection
point is
LF(il,j)= Max [0, [Max ~ W(i)oP(i,k) ° (P(i,k,N(k)+l) -)
k,kfj ~ P(i,k,N(k))
i=l
c
-L: W(i)oP(i,j)o(P(i,j,N(j»-P(i,j,N(j)-l»]
------Ew(il~~~;~~~:j:~(j)-:-p(il:j:~(j):l)j---------------]
(6.13)
If the frequency of F(:il,j) decreases below its lower limit
then transferring a patrol unit from region j into the region
with the maximum incremental payoff, improves on the present
deployment. There are. however, two distinctions between
searching for the upper and lower limits on F(il, j). First-
ly the lower limit LF(i1,j) can not be less than zero. Sec-
ondly, for regions which presently are not allocated any pat~
rol units, decreasing the frequency of any crime in that
region can not alter the optimal solution.
As an illustration, sensitivity analysis was carried out~
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on the last example in which in the optimal solution, region
A, was ~llocated seven patrol units and region C, three.
Table 6.9 summarized the results of this analysis. Notice,
first of all, that there would have to be significant increases
(at least double) in any of the individual crime rates in the
regions E, D or E before the optimal solution would allocate
any patrol units to these regions. However, the optimal
solution is far more sensitive to changing crime patterns in
regions A and C. In the extreme it is highly sensitive to any
increases or decreases in the rate of crime type III in either
of the two regions. An increase (decrease) of only J% in the
type III crime rate in region A will warrant transferring a
unit from (to) region C to (from) A. The same is true, in
reverse, for changes in region C's rate. There are some
crime types, even in these regions, to whfuhthe optimal
solution is not overly sensitive. Changes of 30% or more in
the type VI crime rate of either of the two regions do not
alter .the optimal solution. Also, for example, a 30% increase
or 14% decrease in the rate of crime type I in region A
would not affect the optimal solution.
The methodology for sensitivity analysis described here
has been of very limited scope. It analyzes the impact of
changing only one of the F(i,j) while all others are assumed
constant. Naturally crime rates are not constrained to
change in this manner. There may be an across the board
increase in the total crime rate of one region, or one
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Table 6.9: Sensitivity Analysis on the Frequency of the
Different Crime Types in the Different Regions
G ·I B d R
REGION A
U B dR· LFrlme requency. oun eglon oses . J oun eglon alns
I .065 .. 084 c .056 C
II .606 .640 c .587 C
III .. 426 .484 c .394 c
IV 1.395 1.439 c 1.370 c
V .408 .452 C 038'3 C
VI .099 .153 c .069 c
c ·
LI B d R
REGION B
U B d R a LFrlme reauency. oun eglon oses J oun eglon oses
I .030 .358 A - -
II .322 1.003 A - -
III .264 1.477 A - -
IV .936 1;845 A - -
V .348 1.259 A
- -
VI .100 1.232 A - -
c ·
G •"L B d R
REGION C
U B dR· l' ~Fc ·rlrne requency oun eglon oses oun eglon alns
I .048 .056 A .032 A
II .,J12 .329 .. A .280 A
III .459 .490 A .402 A
IV 1.590 1.613 A 1.547 A
V .513 .536 A .470 A
VI .078 0107 A .025 A
G ·L B d R
REGION D
dBFrlme requency U oun ReglOn Loses oun eglon alns
I .009 .714- A
-
..
II .184 1.646 A
- -
III ,105 2.711 A
- -IV .276 2.229 A
- -
V .324 2.281 A
- -VI .102 2.533 A - -
c ·
G ·L B d R
REG IO!'l E
dR· LU BFc ·rJ.me requency oun eg].. on oses oun egl.on alns
I .010 .714 A
- -
II .194 1.655 A - -
III .150 2.752 A - -
IV .388 2,338 A - -
V .199 2.153 A
- -VI .059 2.487 A
- -
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particular crime may increase or decrease in all of the
regions 0 or some combination of both may occur.
The sensitivity of the optimal solution to the former
type of change (all crimes in one region) can be analyzed
through a natrual extension of the methodology already pre-
sented. In order to find an upper bound, UB, on the increase
in the total crime rate in region jl (assuming the relative
frequency of the crime types remains the same), it is
necessary to modify equation (6.11) to be
C
UB(ji)= Min ~ W(i)·F(i,j)·(P(i,j,N(j»-P(i,j,N(j)-l»
j. jljlLJ
i=l
--------------------------------------------------c
2:W( i ) · F ( j 1 ) • fp (i, j 1 , N( j 1 )+1 ) - P( i , j 1 , N( j 1 ) )
i=l (6.14)
In addition it is also possible to relax the assumption that
as the total crime rate in the region increases the relative
frequency of each crime type in that region remains fixed D
This a.dded complication is accounted for by introducing a
vector, V(i), of values into the denominator, which reflects
the expected relative rate of change in each crime category.
Our discussion of analyzing gleb,al changes in a single
crime category will be postponed until we present the algo-
rithm for sensitivity analysis on the weights, W(i),
associated with each crime type. As we shall see, the two
problems are equivalent.
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6.5.2 Crime Weights
In contrast to the crime rates, the development of this
sensitivity analysis capability was not motivated by the
changeability of the crime weights. Instead the motivation
lies in that the crime weights will reflect, at least in part,
a subjective assessment of the relative seriousness of each
crime type. Because of the difficulty in accurately trans-
lating subjective attitudes into quantifiable measures, it is
important to determine the range over which each weight can
vary without affecting the present optimal solution.
As before, the essence of the sensitivity analysis algo-
rithm consists of determining for what values of W(i) does the
optimality condition, maximum increment less than the minimum
decrement, no longer hold. This task is complicated by the
compounq effect produced by changing the weight of a specific
crime category, As the weight of a single crime type increases
not only does the increment associated with adding a unit to
a region change but the ranking of the regions according to
their potential increment also changes. Thus for one value of
W(i), region j might have the highest increment,while for
another value, region k may have the highest increment. Con-
sequently, even though each individual region's incremental
payoff is a linear function of the crime weight, W(i), the
maximum increment is a piecewise linear convex function of
W(i) (See Figure 6.1). Analogously, the minimum decrement
produced by removing a patrol unit from a region is a piece-
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wise linear concave function of W(i).
The sensitivity analysis algorithm we constructed con-
sists of two components. The first component maps the two
piecewise linear functions, for the maximum increment and
minimum decrement over the entire range of positive values
of W(i) (in Figure 6.1, curves A and B respectively). The
second component determines the intersection point of the
two curves thereby determining the upper, UW(i), and lower,
LW(i), limits within which W(i) can vary without affecting
the present optimal solution. As W(i), however, increases
above the upper limit, UW(i), the present allocation can be
improved upon by tranferring a patrol unit. Since each line
segment represents a different region, the two regions
oorresponding to thc-intersecting lines at UW(i) are the ones
between which the patrol unit should be transferred.
The process of mapping a piecewise linear function re-
quires the specification of only the starting point and slope
of each line segment. The algorithm presented here uses the
list which ranks the regions (for the present value of W{'i))
according to their incremental payoffs.as a starting point in
determining these numbers. Analyzing increases and decreases
in Wei) separately, it performs a series of pair wise compari-
sons and calculations with consecutively ranked regions on
that list to generate the maximum increment curve. For example,
in order to determine the effect of increasing W(i) the
following computations are performed.
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As was mentioned earlier, each region's incremental pay-
off is a linear function of W(i) with a slope of F(i,j)'
(P(i,j,N(j)+l) - P(i.j.N(j))). This expression is used to
compare the slopes of the regions ranked R and R+l. If the
region ranked R+1 (lower payoff) has a smaller slope, then
for increases in W(i) its incremental payoff will always be
dominated by that of region R. Therefore, for increases ,in
W(i), it can never represent the maximum increment and can be
eliminated from further consideration. I~ on the other hand,
its slope is greater than R, a second claculation is performed.
The intersection point of the two lines, IP(R), is determined.
Thus for W(i) greater than IP(R) the region ranked R+l dominates
and for W(i) less than IP(R) the region ranked R dominates.
Next IP(R) is compared to the previous intersection point
IP(R-l). If the point IP(R) occurs prior to IP(R-1), relative
to increases in W~i), the region ranked R can be eliminated
from consideration. Using Figure 6.1 as an example the
justification is as follows. The lines marked 1 through 4
represent the regions whose incremental payoffs are respec-
tively ranked 1 through 4 for the present value of W(i).
Although the line marked 3 dominates the line marked 4 up to
the point IP(3), it itself is dominated by the line marked 2.
Between the points IP(3) and IP(2), line 3 is now dominated by
both lines 2 and 4 and above IP(2) it is also dominated by
line 4. Thus over the entire range of increasing W(i) line 3
X D
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Figure 6.1: A Graphic Description of the Method
for Finding the Maximum Increment and the Minimum
Decrement .
,/ I
PRe~epT VAt.·fle
$r WL..&.) W(A.)
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can never represent the maximum increment. Once the line
ranked R (in our example, R is 3) is eliminated, the intersec-
tion point, IP'(R-l), of the lines ranked R-l, (2), and R+l,
(4), is determined and compared to the previous intersection
point, IP(R-2). The final product of all of the above
comparisons of slopes and intersection points is a list which
is a subset of the original incremental payoff list. This
new list is simply an ordering of the line segments in the
seqeunce that they appear in the piecewise linear curve as
W(i) increases. When the last comparison has been completed
the maximum increment has been completely specified since the
startllgpoint of each line segment is the already determined
intersection point of consecutively ranked line segments.
The above series of comparisons are then reversed to find
the maximum increment curve for decreasing values of W(i).
For example if the incremental payoff for the region ranked
R+l has a higher slopethan that of the region raked R, it can
be eliminated from the list. Lastly an analogous set of com-
parisons are performed in order to graph the minimum decrement
curve. The upper and lower limits on Wei) are then found by
locating the intersection points of the two curves.
Table 6 e l0 summarizes the results of sensitivity analy-
sis carried out on the weights. The optimal solution is least
sensitive to a change in the weight on type VI crimes, with
the solution totally insensitive to a decrease in the weight.
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This insensitivity is the result of a combination of two
factors: (l)Type VI crimes make up less than 5% of all the
crimes in these six categories, (2)they have the second
lowest probability of interception with only 'the interception
rate of type III crimes lower. At the other end of the
spectrum, even minor changes in the weights on either type IV
or V crimes affects the optimal solution. If the weight on
type IV crimes were greater than 1.1, instead of the present
value of 1, then shifting a patrol unit from region A to
region C improves upon the present deployment. Conversely if
the weight were less than .840, a patrol unit should be
transferred from region C to region A.
In the above example, and throughout the discussion of sen-
sitivy analysis, the focus has been on determining over what
range of values does the present solution remain optimal.
Changes in the input data which~ just~ above or below the
limits will require the reallocation of only one unit to
achieve the new optimal solution. As a contrast is might be
interesting to illustrate how drastically the optimal solution
can change when far more s~icant changes occur, for example,
in the weights. Consider a situation in which a decision
is made to place an emphasis on catching criminals who
specialize in type IV and type V crimes. To reflect this
emphasis the weights on these crime types are doubled. Using
the same data as in the last example, we find that the optimal
solution is exactly the reverse of before. Region C is now
CRIME TYPE .. WEIGHT
REGIONS
UPPER BOUND LOSES GAINS
REGIONS
LOWER BOUND LOSES GAINS
- I- 1.0 2.6 c A .31 A C
II 1.0 1e12 C A .93 A c
III 1.0 1.74 A C - - -
l"v 1.0 1.10 A C .84 c A
V 1.0 1.2 A C .66 c A
VI 1.0 4.1 C A
- - -
Table 6.10: Sensitivity Analysis on the Crime Weights
I
N
OJ
\...0
I
CRIME TYPE
REGION REGION
PARAMETER MEAN _UPPER BOUND LOSES GAINS LOWER BOUND LOSES GAINS
I OBSERVABILITY1 .14 I .65 A c .03 A c
DURATION .1Ohrs .46 A C .02 A C
PRODUCT .014 .065 A c .003 A c
II OBSERVABILITY .10 .12 C A .09 A c
DURATION .066 .08 c A .06 A c
PRODUCT .0066 .008 c A .006 A c
III OBSERVABILITY DID .16 A C - - -
DURATION .037 .06 A c - - -
PRODUCT .0037 .006 A c - - -IV OBSER'VABILITY .03 .033 A c .025 c A
DURATION .167 .184 A C .142 C A
PRODUCT .005 .0055 A c .0043 C A
V OBSERVABILITY .04- .048 A C .026 C A
DURATION ~125 ~150 A c .081 C A
PRODUCT .005 .006 A c .00]2 C A
VI OBSERVABILITY .06 - - - - - -
DURATION .066
- - - - - -
PRODUCT .004
- - - - - -
Tabel 6.11: Sensitivity Analysis: Crime Descriptive Data
I
N
'-0
o
I
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allocated seven patrol units as compared to three before, with
~he remaining three assigned to region A, which had seven
before. Although changes of the above magnitude can be ex-
plored through sensitivity analysis algorithms, the more
appropriate response it to rerum the original algorithm for
the changed data base.
One final point to be discussed with reference to the
weights is their relationshipto the crime frequencies, F(i,j).
In expression (6.11), which describes the conditions for opti-
mality, the two parameters always appear as the product,
W(i)·F(i,j). Consequently, doubling the weight on a particular
crime type is equivalent to doubling the frequency, in each
region j, of crimes of type i. Therefore, the above sensiti-
vity analysis on the weights can also be applied to changes in
the total frequency of the different crime types (assuming the
distribution among regions remains the same). Therefore by
referring back to Table 6.10, we can determine that type II
crimes would have to increase 74% across the five region area
before the optimal deployment strategy would change; while a
decrease in that crime's total rate would not affect the
optimal solution. On the other h~ld, a 10% increase in the
five region type IV crime rate would necessitate a reassign-
ment of one patrol unit from A to C and a 12% increase in
type II crimes would have the reverse impact.
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6.5.3 The 0bservability and Duration of a Crime
The last set of parameters to be analyzed are the tvo
crime descriptive ones. The need for a sensitivity analysis
capability on these parameters is unfortunately all too ob-
vias. No data exists at present with regard to these para-
meters nor is there research being carried out to determine
these numbers. Consequently early applications of search
theoretic models will have, at best, only very rough esti-
mates to work with and even with extensive research in the
future, it is not clear how good a set of estimates can be
obtained~
Sensitivity analysis will be performed simultaneously on
the observability and duration of each crime type~ This can
be done because the critical input parameter in calculating
the probability of interception (see equations(6.6) through
(6.10)) is the product~of the two numbers, l/A(i) (mean
duration) and OB(i) (observability), and not their individual
values. Of course once the limits on the product have been
calculated, the limits on the individual parameters follow
directly. Aside from this simplification, sensitivity analysis
of' these parameters is far more complex than for the'i'oweights
or cr~me frequencies.
The key problem is that not only is the incremental pay-
off for a region not a linear function of l/A(i) or OB(i), it
is not even a monotonically increasing function of these para-
meters. Assume for example that the duration of a crime is
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exponential. The payoff of adding an additional patrol unit
to region j is:
(6.15)
Notice that as all the OB(i) or l/A(i) approach either
~ or infinity, the incremental payoff approaches zero (if
N(j) is not zero). This phenomenon can be explained as
follows. For large OB(i) there is a hjgh probability of
intercepting the crime even with only one patrol unit; thus
additional patrol units can ~ot have much of an impact. At
the other extreme for small OB(i), since there is only a
small probability of intercepting a crime, adding one more
patrol unit can not significantly increaEe (in absolute terms)
the probability of intercepting a crime. For intermediate
values, though, the incremental payoff is certainly not zero.
The nonlinearity of the incremental payoff expression
complicates the task of sensitivity analysis but the non-
monotonicity has an even more profound effect. It necessitates
a different understanding of the upper and lower limits. For
example, as OB(i) increases above its present value it may
reach a point, Urn"a) , above which the present solution is not
optimal because the maximum increment is greater than the
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minimum decrement. However as OB(i) increases further the
maximum decrement will begin to decrease which may result in
its becoming once again less than the minimum decreme~leaving
the present solution still optimal.
Although cognizant of the above issues, the algorithm to
be presented will focus only on determining the initial bounds
within which the product, OB(i)-l/A(i), can vary without
changing the optimal solution. However, the algorithm will
not, for example, analyze the behavior of the optimal solution
as the product increases significantly above the bound. Even
for this limited problem, sensitivity analysis will be carried
out using a direct brute force approach because of the non-
linearity of the incremental payoff.
Starting from the present value of the product, the pro-
duct is increased by a user specified percentage. The incre-
mental payoff and decrement are compared. If the maximum is
greater than the minimum then the present optimal solution is
not optimal for the new value of the product. If, however,
the maximum increment is still less than the minimum decrement,
then the product is increased again by the same amount and the
comparison is repeated. This procedure is repeated until we
reach a value of product for Which the present solution is not
optimal. or reach a user specified reasonab~ upper bound on the
product. The same methodology is used to determine a lower
bound on the product with an obvious implicit bound of zero
on the product_ The above approach yields only approximations
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of the upper and lower limits; however, these approximations
can be made as accurate as the user desires by specifying
the magnitude of each step, In the example presented below,
the product of OB(i) and ~(i) was first increased by five
percent of its initial value at each step and later the process
was reversed, and the initial value was repeatedly decreased
by five percent.
Table 6.11 summarizes the results of the analysis. Not
surprisingly the results parallel those for the sensitivity
analysis of the crime weights, Table 6.10. Again the optimal
solution is least sensitive to changes in type VI crime data
and rela~ively insensitive to changes in type I and type III
crimes. If the estimates were found to be low by one minute
(.017 hours) or more, then the optimal solution would
reallocatecne patrol unit from region A to region C. The
sensitivity analysis of type I crimes shows an interesting
phenomenon occurring. Whether the actual mean was above .46
hours or below .02 hours, to achieve optimality, the present
solution would have to be modified in~ cases by realloca-
ting a unit from A to C. This phenomenon can not occur in
r
sensitivity analysis of the weights and crime frequencies but
is possible here because of the aforementioned non-monotonicity
of the marginal return.
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6.6 Summary
In the preceding sections of this chapter we presented a
flexible algorithm for optimally deploying a tactical patrol
force among several competing regions. The examples presented
in the chapter were chosen with two purposes in mind. The
first purpose was to display the importance of knowing not only
the total crime rate of each region but also the distribution
of crimes by type for each region. The second was to show the
basic nonlinearity of the optimal allocation. Instead of
allocating patrol in direct proportion to the crime level
the optimal solution tends to focus on just the highest
crime regions. In the example presented this allocation
produced a 22% h~gher probability of interception than a pro-
portional (to t~al crime rates) allocation of patrol. However
of perhaps even greater significance than the above insights
is that througn the perspective of the allocation model we can
see what the critical variables are in developing optimal
patrol strategies. Besides the frequency of observable crimes
of each type, the important parameters are the observability
and duration of each crime type. The need for data of this
type seems almost intuitively obvious and yet no extensive
research has yet been done in this area.
Included in the algorithm are components for performing
sensitivty analysis on each of the input parameters. The
allocation model, we noted, pointed out general data needs
for developing effective patrol strategies. The sensitivity
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analysis algorithms analogously pinpoint, on a more micro-
scopic level, the critical parameters in the particular regions
under consideration (i.e. slight variations can affect the
optimal solution). It will be these parameters that require
the most accurate estimates since small inaccuracies might
change the optimal solution.
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CHAPTER 7
ALLOCATING THE PATROL TIME OF SINGLE AND MULTIPLE PATROL UNITS
7.0 Introduction
The tactical patrol force allocation model that was
presented in Chapter VI is oriented towards deployment issues
on a precin~ or city wide level. In this next chapter we
will present issues more relevant to patrol strategies on a
sector or two sector level, involving a standard patrol car
with responsibility for calls for service. In our search for
and discussion of efficient patrol strategies, we will limit
the class of solutions surveyed to those consisting of patrol
cars concentrating their patrol efforts in a single contiguous
region. This constraint is based on the results of earlier
chapters. In Chapter V we showed that in allocating search
effort between noncontiguous regions, the optimal strategy
will usually be to search only one region rather than incur
the time lost (from search) in travel between the regions.
Thus,the general problem we analyze here involves constructing
from small building blocks, called atoms (2 square blocks in
size), the best contiguous region in which to concentrate
patrol. In applying an algorithm which concentrates patrol
in a limited area to the police environment, it may be
necessary to set aside a minimal amount of patrol time to be
allocated over the entire sector. (~his point will be
elaborated on later in this chapter.) On the whole,
though, the discussion will be exploratory, suggesting one
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approach to the problem and presenting some insights as to the
eventual size of the region.
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7.1 Methodology
The objective function to be maximized is the same as
before, the weighted probability of intercepting a crime. As
a result the data requirements do not change except for the
addition of two sets of data. Since the algorithm constructs
a contiguous region out of a set of individual atoms, infor-
mation is needed to describe which atoms are contiguous to
one another. Secondly, since this analysis involves standard
patrol cars, some estimate must be given for the average work-
load of the unit. The best available method for calculating
this statistic is the hypercube queuing model [1 ].
The basic steps in the algorithm are listed below~
1. Calculate for each atom the payoff (i.e. weighted
probability of intercepting a crime) resulting from
a single patrol unit spending all of its 'free' time
patrolling just that one atom.
2. Rank the atoms in order of their payoff.
3. Incorporate the highest ranked atom into the region
to be patrolled.
4. List all atoms (not yet in the region) that are
contiguous to an atom that is already included in
the heavily patrolled re~ion and rank them according
to their initial payoff (step 1).
5. Determine if adding the highest ranked atom on the
contiguity list increases the total weighted
probability of intercepting a crime. If it increases
the payoff include it into the patrolled region. I~
not, test the next highest ranked atom, etc. If no
atom can increase the payoff go on to step 6 other-
wise return to step 40
Once the point is reached that no further single atom expansions
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of the patrol area increase the payoff, we proceed to check
another alternative.
6. Determine if removing an atom can increase the payoff.
Remove the atom which produces the greatest increase
and return to step 4. (Only those atoms which can be
removed without leaving the region split in two are
considered in this step.) If no improvement can be
generated, the algorithm stops.
Consequently, the stopping point of the algorithm is a local
optimum at which adding or removing a single atom does not
increase the weighted probability of intercepting a crime.
There are, of course, numerous approaches that can be followed
in trying to determine if the present local optimum can be
improved upon. One alternative is to see if adding or
removing pairs of atoms from the present patrol region can im-
1
prove on the present solution. In our programmed version of
the above algorithm the alternative we chose was to rerun the
algorithm a second time. However, this time we forced the
construction of the patrol region to begin with the inclu-
sion of an atom that was not in the original solution. In
all our trials the region constructed in the second pass
through the algorithm was the same as the first;
Before proceeding with a discussion of how the weighted
probability of intercept~acrlma is calculated, we would like
to comment briefly on steps 4 and 5 in the algorithm. In
step 5 it is not sufficient to test only the highest ranked
atom for inclusion. The rankings used here were not generated
by calculating how much the addition of each contiguous atOtil
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would increase the payoff. Instead we used the initial
rankings, which compared each atom's potential payoff from
a single patrol unit patrolling only that atom. The reason
for taking the second approach (which in general is a good
surrogate) is that otherwise it would have been necessary to
recalculate -at each iteration how much every contiguous atom
would change the present payoff. However, even though in
step 4 we use the ordering in the original unchangfuglist to
determine which atom to add (as if to say the marginal and
initial rankings are the same), in step 5, we do not assume
that if the contiguous atom ranked first (in the initial list)
can not increase the payoff that no contiguous atom can.
7.1.1 The Weighted Probability of Interception
The calculation of the weighted probability of intercepting
a crime in this algorithm takes on the same general form as in
Chapter 6 with one modification. An additional parameter is
included to reflect the possibility that during the commission
of the crime the patrol unit may be busy responding to a call
and therefore not on patrolo Using the following parameters:
Let A= set of all atoms contained in the patrol area
B= average fraction of time the patrol unit is busy
F(i,j)= the frequency of crime type i in atom j
F(i)= ~ F(i,j), the total frequency of crime'j,jCA
type i in the patrol area
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M(j)= the street mileage in atom j
M= ~ M(j), the total street mileage in the patrol area
j~
P(i,M)= probability of intercepting a crime of type i in
the patrolled region (M street miles)
The expression for the weighted probability of intercepting a
random crime is
Payoff= (I-B) L
j,j£A
c
L
i=l
F(i,j)-W(i)-P(i,M(i»)
=(l-B)
c
L
i=l
F(i)·W(i)-P(i,M) (7.1)
There are two underlying assumptions that produce a
number of simplifications used in generating the above
expressiono The first one, which was discussed earlier in
Chapter 4 (section 4.1), assumes that because the duration
of a crime is small relative to the average duration of a
call for service, that a patrol unit will either be busy or
free (on patrol) throughout the entire duration of a crime.
The result is that although the average workload affects the
total payoff, its impact is independent of which atoms are
included in the heavily patrolled area. It therefore can be
ignored when deciding which atom to include in the patrol
area_ However, when the two patrol car example is presented,
it will be apparent that the value of the average workload
will affect the construction of the optimal region to patrol_
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In addition the patrol effort is assumed to be distrib-
uted uniformly over the patrolled area and is not distributed
in proportion to the crime rates of the individual included
atoms. As a consequence only the total street mileage and
total frequency of each crime type in the patrolled region is
used. If, however, each atom were allocated a different
proportion of patrol, then each atom would need be treated
separately. For each atom it would be necessary to calculate
the following:
"Conditioned on a crime of duration to minutes occuring
in atom it what is the probability dlstribution for the
total time t, t less than to, during the commission of
the crime, that the patrol unit is searching the same
atom i."
As was discussed in Chapter IV this is an extremely difficult
thing to calculate. This assumption (i.e. patrol uniformly
distributed) is not as unreasonable as it first might seem
because it is unlikely that the crime rates of the atoms in
the region patrolled will be widely disparate. The second
example will focus on this point.
In terms of equation (7el) the process of searching for
atoms to be included into the patrolled area, involves
balancing two opposite effects. Adding more atoms increases
each F(i) thereby increasing the total payoff. At the same
time adding to the size of the region increases the street
mileage, thereby decreasing the probability of intercepting
a crime in the area patrolled.
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7.2 Single Patrol Car
For the first example we constructed a sector of 15 atoms
(approximately 8 square city blocks) each of which contained
.4 street miles (see Figure 7e1). The distribution of crimes
within each atom was generated from the earlier five region
data. Atoms one through five have the same distribution as
the five regions of the earlier examples. For the other ten
atoms the distributions were generated by averaging the
distribution of pairs of the first five atoms. As a result
the range of distributions is limited and the tot.al crime
rate in each atom is the same. The patrol unit was assumed
busy 50% of the time. The crime descriptive data is the same
as in Chapter 6 (See Table 6.2).
The optimal region to patrol included almost the entire
sector (excluding only atom 3) because of the uniformity of
the crime rates. Overall there was a .0064 chance of inter-
cepting a random crime. In the atoms that were patrolled the
probability of intercepting a crime ranged from a low of
.00677 in atom 13 to a high of .00703, only a difference of
4%, reflecting the small variations in the distributions.
Table 7.1 summarizes these results~
The above example represents one extreme in terms of the
size of the optimal patrol region. However, if the crime rate
were less uniform, then the size of the region in which
patrol is to be concentrated would decrease. In the next
example the total crime rate in atom 1 was chan~ed; it was
ATOM NUIV1BER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
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PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPTING A CRIME THERE
.00703
.00686
.00000
.00681
.0068)
.00694-
.00689
.00692
.00693
.00679
.oo68~
.00685
.00677
.00678
.00683
Average (random crime)
CRIME TYPE
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
.00640
PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPTION
.01673
.00845
.00460
.00607
.00623
.00515
Table 7.1: Probability of intercepting a crime in the heavily
patrolled region of the sector
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increased to 1.2 times that of any of the other atoms. The
~
resultant solution limited patrol to just atom 1. To under-
stan~why this happened, we will analyze the changes that oc-
cur when an atom is added to the patrol region.
When the algorithm is applied in this example, the first
atom included in the patrol area is naturally atom 1. As the
algorithm considers expanding the size of the patrol area, the
underlying issue is whether or not half of the patrol time
now presently allocated to atom 1 should be allocated instead
to some other atom. The question then is, what is the payoff
from this half of the patrol time when it is assigned to atom
1 and what is its payoff when it is allocated to some other
atom?
The first point to realize is that for a typical crime
described in Table 6.2, the product, t·CB (observable duration
and average observability), is on the order of magnitude of
.005. In addition we are assuming that the patrol speed is
15 miles per hour, the patrol unit is busy 50% of the time
and that the observable duration of a crime has an exponential
"
distribution. Thus if half the patrol effort is allocated to
atom 1 (.4 street miles), the probability of intercepting a
crime is approximately
(I-B) .( set 2·0B ) =
s·t 2·0B + M
If however all the effort were allocated to the single atom,
the probability of interception increases to .079. Due to
I- -/ rJ./-
.
.
t
I
-/+>-
I
-/I~-
f
,
-tt
I
I
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Figure 7.1: The Optimal Region in Which
to Concentrate Patrol
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diminishing return the yield from the additional search
effort is only about 84% as great as the initial effort. If
instead this additional effort were allocated to another atom,
the interception probabiity there would also be .043; however,
the crime rate there is only 83% (1/1.2) of that in atom 1.
Consequently concentrating all the search in atom 1 has an
overall higher payoff than splitting the search betwen atom 1
and a second atom c Extrapolating from the above, the atoms to
be included in the patrolled area are not likely to have crime
rates that vary, from highest to lowest, by more than about
17% assuming the observability and duration are on the order
of magnitude of the data used in our example.
The algorithm presented in this chapter is intended only
as an outline of one approach to finding an optimal area to
patrol and is not offered as a finished product. For one thing
optimal solutions similar to the last example,~which limit
patrol to a two square block area, will likely prove counter-
productive as criminals move to less well patrolled, more
productive areas. Obviously reactions similar to the above
must be taken into account in developing realistic more
effective patrol strategies. Thus algorithms of the type
described here could for instance be incorporated in a game
theoretic approach that attempts to anticipate possible
criminal reaction to patrols. Alternatively, a proportion
of the pa~rol:effort might be set aside for making relatively
high speed patrols in the lower crime areas. This last alter-
-)11-
native could even be handled within the general framework of
an algorithm similar to the one presented in this chapter.
However, the possible repercussions of concentrating patrol
in only a small section of the sector (several atoms) may not
be as large as one might expect. Larson [2 ] in his review of
the Kansas City experiment pointed out that a high level of
visibility was maintained in beats devoid of regular patrol
as a result of cars responding (often with sirens going)
to calls for service in the unpatrolled areas.
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7.3 Extensions to Two Patrol Units
In attempting to develop more flexible effective patrol
strategies, one alter~ative we discussed earlier (Section 4~2)
involves combining an area normally divided between two
patrol units into a single overlapping sector. Calls for
service would be shared equally (automatically balancing
workloads) with each unit 9 s patrol effort concentrated in
only hfugh crim\e areas within the erllar'ged join.t sectorl~ In
searc11ing 1""or the region or regions il1L which to concerltl"'ate
patrol, an algorithm should consider Emd compare these
alternative8:
1. The two patrol units patrol two disjoined sections
of the larger sector, which ~lre sel ected to
maximize the ovel"all we~ighte(i probability of ir.\-cer-
cepting a crime.
2 0 The two patrol units concentrate their efforts in one
single optimal region4
3. The units patrol partially overlapping regions with
the overlap centered on the highest crime areas.
The constru'crtion of" two separate .patrol areas (al terl1a.tive
1) can_pe accomplished by using iteratively an algorithm
analogous to that described in the previous section. However
to Ibcate the optimal region to be patrolled jointly by the
two patrol units, equation (7.1) for calculating the probability
of interception must be modified. The new equation becomes
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c c
~(l)oF(i)OP(i,M,l) + ~ p(2)oF(i)oP(i,M,2)
i=l i=l
where p(l) and p(2) are the respective probabilities that one
and two patrol units are on patrol. P(i,M,l) and P(i,M,2) are
the probability of intercepting a crime of type i in a region
of size M when one and two patrol units respectively are
searching for crimes. If the duration of a crime is assumed
exponential with mean t then
P(i M 2) = 2·S·OB·t
" 2·S·OB e t + M
If the two patrol units respond to calls for service only
within their sector then
p(l)= 2b e (1-b)/(l+b)
and
p(2)= (l-b)/(l+b)
with b representing the average workload of each of the patrol
units. In general, though, the two units will be part of a
larger precinct and will respond to calls for service outside
of their sector. Under those circumstances, it would be neces-
sary to use the hypercube model to calculate these probabilities
as they 2re intertwined with the operation of the rest of the
precinct. We 'discussed earlier (Section 4.2.3) that as a
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result of overlapping sectors travel time would increase.
Consequently, the hypercube eould be used at the same time to
measure also the magnitude of this increase.
An algorithm which would also consider partially over-
lapping patrol (alternative 3) would need to use both
equations. Equation (7.1) would be used to calculate the
probability of intercepting a crime in the non-overlapping
parts of the patrol area and equation (7.2) would be used
for the overlapping regions.
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1.4 Summary
The above discussion is an introduction to some of the
issues and approaches to developing a methodology for better
utilizing the patrol time of a standard patrol car. To the
insightful reader, though, this discussioil may have raised
more questions than it answered. How does one incorporate
response time, a commonly used surrogate for pol~ce effective-
ness, along with the search theoretic model into a single
model of patrol? How quickly do crime patterns change in
response to concentrated patrol efforts? These are just some
of the unanswered questions that immediately come to mind.
Without answers, though, it will be impossible to develop a
tOtal composite picture of the multidimensional interaction
between police patrol and street crime.
12
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FOOTNOTES 7
This alternative is not likely to help under the following
circumstances: At one end of the sector is an atom i with
the highest crime rate. However, the crime rate drops
sharply in the surrounding atoms. At the other end of the
sector there is a larger high crime area but with no one
atom having a crime rate as high as atom i. Thus the
algorithm would concentrate patrol in i even though it
would be better to patrol the other high crime area a The
second alternative for improving on the local optimum
would avoid this problem.
The fact that the algorithm began with a particular atom
does not necessarily mean that that atom will appear in
the final patrol area. Remember the algorithm allows for
the removal of atoms if their removal will increase the
total payoff.
-317-
REFERENCES 7
1. Larson, R.C., "A Hypercube Queuing Model for Facility
Location and Redistricting in Urban Emergency Services",
Computers and Operations Research, Vol. 1, No.1, March
1974.
2. Larson, R.C., "What Do We Know About Preventive Patrol?
A Review of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment",
published by Public Systems Evaluation, Inc., Cambridge,
MA, July 1975, to appear in Journal of Criminal Justice e
-318-
CHAPTER 8
-SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
8.0 Introduction
The models that were presented earlier focus on two
distinct but related issues in police patrol deployment. The
first set of models address deployment issues through the
perspective of sector design, with the emphasis on problems
of equity. These models ~ake a relatively broad view of
police in that the crime directed activities of police are
not the sole focus (e~g. travel time is an importw1t consid-
eration for all emergent calls whether or not they are crime
related.). The second set of models, however, focus only on
crime with their goal being to generate increased probabili-
ties of intercepting crimes in progress. One of the models
works within the framework of a sector configuration. Its
function is to determine where in each sector the local pat-
rol unit should concentrate its patrol time. The second
model is, however, not constrained by sector boundaries as it
allocates a tactical patrol force to the high crime areas in
a precinct or city. When all of the above models are used
t~gether, it is possible for a police decision maker to ad-
dress a range of deployment questions from several perspec-
tives.
In the succeeding sections we will review in greater
detail each of these models. In addition we will present a
number of general conclusions that have resulted from our
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continuing work in model developmente Finally, this chapter
will close with a discussion of a number of directions for
future research.
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8.1 Summary
8,1.1 Sector Design
The interactive system for designing sectors that was
presented offers a different approach to the problem of
sector design than has, in general, been followed until now.
With the development of the hypercube queuing model, it has
become possible to focus on multiple criteria. This system is
just a logical superstructure that can be applied to the
hypercube. It attempts to guide the user towards his preferred
goal while utilizing, to the fullest extent possible, the rich
array of performance measures the hypercube model estimates.
The system, in general, focuses on various definitions
of equity. Through a series of examples we have attempted
to explore some of the conflicts and tradeoffs between, for
example, balancing workloads and balancing travel times.
Similarly we have analyzed the distinction between balanced
workloads and balanced preventive patrol coverage. If crime
rates do not mirror general calls for service, the two ob-
jectives will almost certainly conflict. One potentially
important aspect of the system is that the very nature of the
system tends to direct the potential user tawards making
'. explicit decisions as to his preferences for tradeoffs
between important performance measures.
Although we have also touched on some of the conflicts
between equity (e.g. balanced travel times) and efficiency
(e.g. minimized precinct-wide travel times), there is much
that requires exploration. One example that comes to mind is
-)21-
a consequence of our work in search theory. A strategy that
maximizes the probability of interception will tend to allo-
cate to the higher crime areas a proportion of the patrol
effort that is greater than the fraction of crimes that they
generate. On the other hand, balanced travel times are
achieved by allocating to the regions with the highest call
rate a proportion of the patrol force that is less than the
fraction of calls they generate. How does one choose bet-
ween the two alternatives? As we have emphasized before, only
the local decision maker can decide.
The system as described in Chapter III is complete
conceptually. However, as in the development of the inter-
active interface with the hypercube queuing model [4 J. much
will be learned from user feedback and incorporated into the
final structure of the system. In addition, although the
system was designed with the police in mind, it has poten-
tially broader applications. For example, the issues of
balancing travel times and workloads are also relevant issues
for the deployment of emergency medical vehicles. Perhaps
the most generalizable aspect of the system, though, is simply
its different approach to redistricting. Instead of focusing
on one performance measure, the system guides th~ decision
maker through a process which involves repeated evaluation of
his relative preferences in order to reach a final acceptable
solution.
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8.1.2 Search Theory Applied to Police Patrol
In this section we will discuss the second set of models
which are based on search theory. In Chapters VI and VIr we
presented two sets of algorithms which can be applied to dif-
ferent facets of police patrol deployment. The algorithms
are conceptually simple and therein lies much of their
strength and f~xibilitYe By being able to use only the basic
~ormula for the probabi.lity of interception, it became pos-
sible to build a great deal of flexibility into the algorithms.
Consequently, they are not limited by the form of the
probability distribution for the observable duration of a
crime. In addition a value structure (either the decision
maker's or the community's) is easily incorporated in the
models in order to reflect the relative seriousness of the
various crimes. Similarly, if the relationship between inter-
ception probabilities and crime levels can be discovered (in
terms of both deterrence and removing criminals from the
street), the algorithms can be modified so as to focus in-
stead on the longer range goals of crime reduction.
However, in reviewing the contributions of this work in
applying search theory to the deployment of police, it is not
really the specifics of the algorithms that are of the most
significance. Instead, in many ways, the real significance
lies in the foundation that was laid in Chapters IV and V.
There we discussed the basic character of the search for
crime through the analysis of diminishing return and the
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introduction of a differential equation model. By analyzing
travel time between regions and the various charcteristics of
crimes (e.g. short duration, limited observability, random
arrival), we were able to justify the restructuring of the
deployment problems discussed in the later chapters. Thus in
deploying a tactical patrol force we could ignore solutions
that would require patrol units to travel between regions.
Similarly in developing an algorithm for deploying a standard
patrol car, we could focus on constructing a single contiguous
region to patrol. And, as was noted before, it is in this
restructuring and simplification of the problem that it be-
comes possible to build into applications of search theory to
police patrol, performance measures other than just the
probability of intercepting a random crime.
It may be necessary, however, to modify the solutions
generated by these algorithms. Their tendency is to concen-
trate patrol forces in some areas to the exclusion of others
and this may violate political and equity constraints. In
addition if the disparities in patrol regions become too
obvious to criminals, the best theoretical strategies may be
self defeating. This last issue can be addressed either by
expanding the model to include game theoretic concepts to
anticipate criminal reactions or perhaps by simply applying
some ad hoc modification of the solution that makes direct use
of police familiarity with the local crime problema
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8.2 Conclusions
A major consequence of the relatively short observable
duration of crimes (i.e. small probability of interception) is
that patrol should be heavily concentrated in the highest
crime areas assuming that there are significant geographic
variations (a range o~ 20% or more) in crime levels. Concen-
trating the patrol efforts of a single patrol unit in the
highest crime area of its sector could itself produce a 5%
increase in the probability of interception. However, some
~ly visible patrol should still be allocated to other parts
of the sector for two reasons~ One is because of political
constraints which might make it infeasible to eliminate
regular patrols of the entire sector. (Later in section 8.).
we discuss some aspects of the Kansas City experiment which
involved leaving entire beats without patrol.) Secondly. by
maintaining visible presence in other parts of the sector, the
rate at which crime patterns shift away from the present
intensely patrolled area to other parts of the sector should
be slowed. This would increase the chances of intercepting
a crime before the present area of focus is no longer the
optimal patrol region. This brings us to a necessary component
of any implementation of concentrated patrols. Crime patterns
must be continuously monitored. Concurrently, there must be
a readiness to shift, if necessa~. a patrol unit's area of
concentrated patrol every week (or even more frequently) in
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order to keep pace with a shifting crime rate.
In Chapter VI we disussed an important aspect of moni-
toring crime patterns that Should be kept in mind. We demon-
strated that in allocating patrol effort it is not sufficient
to look at just the to~crime rates of the varioas regions.
The crime rate of each region should be analyzed in order to
breakdown the crime rate into more and less interceptible
crimes, using duration and observability as the criteria.
On a larger scale, such as a precinct, a better alloca-
tion of patrol would have a higher payoff, increasing the
probability of interception by more than 10%. The major
problem is that often if there are differences in workloads
the patrol unit with the least time to patrol is likely to be
responsible for the highest crime area. This, of course, is
a poor matching of patrol to crime levels. One alternative
is to redesign the sectors to balance workloads or patrol
coverage. However there are two alternatives which have a
higher potential for allowing for concentrated allocations of
patrol in the highest (precinct-wide) crime areas. They are
overlapping sectors and a split patrol force. Their key asset
is that they both have larger blocks of patrol effort that
can be flexibly allocated to where it is most needed. However,
both have the disadvantage of increasing the average travel
time to a call for service. This increased travel time could
be reduced with, for example, flexible dispatching algorithms
(closest car dispatched) feasible with an automatic car locator
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system [)]. (See section 4.2.3.)
One last point we would like to make relates also to the
issue of analyzing crimes with regard to their observability
and observable duration. When considering dif~erent tactics
for attacking a specific category of crimes (e.g. burglary),
one component in the analysis should be an attempt at esti-
mating the observable duration of the crime and the degree
of observability. The quantification of these characteristics
may affect the ultimate choice of tactics and will likely
provide, at least, a good idea of how effective any of the
strategies is likely to be.
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8.3 Evaluating a Police Patrol Experiment
8.3.1 Using Models to Monitor Experimental Conditions
Larson in his review [5J of the Kansas City preventive
patrol experiment discussed the need for models to be used
in the design and in the monitoring of the proposed experimen-
tal conditions. He showed that in the reactive beats of the
experiment (i.e. no routine preventive patrol) a significant
visible presence was still provided by units responding to
calls for service in those beats.
This result has important ramifications for the patrol
strategies described in Chapter VII. The algorithm presented
there tended to concentrate patrol in only a small section of
a sector whenever crime rates were not uniformly distributed
over the sector. One- concern of ours in applying the model
was how removing routine patrol from the rest of the sector
would be perceived. The Kansas City experiment seems to
indicate that even in areas not receiving routine patrol, it
is possible for patrol units just responding to calls for
service in those areas to maintain the earlier levels of
visibility (e.g. by increasing the use of sirens).
Larson also demonstrated (using a simple model) that
under the particular experimental design utlized in Kansas City
one should not expect a marked increase in travel distance in
the reactive beats. Of perhaps greater relevance, though, to
this work, were Larson's findings on the levels of patrol in
the various beats.
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"As shown by a simple mathematical model, even doubling
or tripling of patrol effort--as was done in the
proactive beats--does not adequately reflect routine
levels of patrol experienced in other cities."
Consequently, the changes (or lack of change) in crime levels
that occurred in the proactive areas are not necessarily
representative of what would occur if preventive patrol were
concentrated in the highest crime areas at levels suggested
in Chapter VII.
8.;.2 Crime Statistics
The rest of this section will focus on a different
aspect of evaluating a patrol experiment, the collection of
appropriate crime data. The obvious guiding principle is to
determine the relationship between the patrol force and ~ach
piece (or sample) of data. This principle should be applied
to both crime and arrest statistics. It suggests that one
appropriate question to ask a victim is whether or not the
crime could have been observed by a passing patrol unit.
Classifying the occurrence of crimes as inside or outside a
structure (as was done in the Kansas City experiment) may be
a good surrogate but does not directly answer the question.
A drugstore robbery may be spotted by a passing patrol car
(albeit with only a small probability) especially if the
robber or robbers have to flee from the scene of the crime.
On the other hand, a robbery in the middle of a housing
project may occur in the open and still not be observable by
a patrol car cruising the city streets. The standard,
however, needs to be applied to all crime types and not just
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robbery. Was it a burglary of a fourth floor apartment or of
a one family house? Did the commercial burglary occur on the
50th story of a skyscraper or did the criminals break into
a warehouse, drive a ten ton truck up to the door, load it to
capacity and drive away.
A direct corollary of the above suggestion is that the
categorization of crimes go beyond just a yes-no description
of observability. As our examples in Chapters VI and VII
pointed out, it is important to be able to rate the level of
observability. Would a passing c~r have had a clear or ob-
structed view of the crime? How long did the crime last? Was
it at night or in the daytime? Crime patterns might be
shifting in response to the patrol experiment from~ to
less observable crimes but that fact would not be apparent
from the usual crime data that is collected.
An analogous breakdown of arrest data is also necessary.
Was the arrest made by a passing patrol car which spotted the
crime in progress? Or was it the result of a rapid response
to a triggered burglar alarm? If the arrest were made not
at the scene of the crime, was it still in anyway related to
the speed with which the police responded to the origin~l
report of a crime?
J
Many of the issues we have raised here are not related
solely to the problem of evaluating a patrol experiment. In
essence the data we have described (summarized in Table 8.1)
should be routinely gathered in order to assess accurately
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what the potential impact of patrol is. We do not, however,
underestimate the difficulty in obtaining this data. In
many crimes against property there may be no way of determining
even the exact time of the crime, much less whether or not it
was observable c However, even with all the inherent difficul-
ties (and cost) we feel the potential payoff certainly justi-
fies carrying out the collection and analysis of the above
described datao
There is perhaps an even more significant problem in
obtaining 'good' patrol related data than the difficulty and
cost of gathering the potentially available data o Often the
small sample size (~o not many crimes of a p~rticular type)
makes it extremely difficult to obtain good estimates and
establish whether or not any significant changes have
occurredras a result of the experiment. Our suggestion to
break down further the crime categories will, however, tend
to magnify this problem of small sample size.
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8.4 Future ~irections of Rese~
8.4.1 Introduction
Although in this last section we will be discussing exten-
sions of the present work, mRny of the issues that will be
raised are extremely fundamental and in some ways their
resolution may be a prerequisite for applying our models.
Many of the questions were originally asked by the Crime
Commission in 1967[~ In our restatement of some of their
points, we will focus on specific needs and how the resolu-
tion of a particular issue fits into the entire framework of
developing effective police strategies. Perhaps the ability
to be more specific and structure the problems is in part a
measure of the progress that has been made since 1967.
8.4.2 Data Requirements
There is no doubt that significant work needs to be done
in developing a crime data base that is oriented specifically
toward the patrol question. Many departments havebegun to
analyze their crime data in order to determine the actual level
of street crime that is observable and therefore potentially
affected by patrol strategies. Thus a city like Atlanta, in
analyzing its crime patterns, has found that 55% of its
robberies occur on the street, while in contrast, 60% of its
rapes occur in a dwelling [2]. However, as we have pointed
out, a binary system of labeling crimes as observable or not
is insufficient. Crucial questions that need to be answered
-332-
are "For how long was the crime observable? During that time
period how detectable was it?". These questions are not
specific to a search theoretic model of patrol but ra~her
strike at the heart of the question of what kind of an impact
we reasonably expect a patrol force to have on a particular
class of crimes.
Finding answers to these questions, however, will not be
easy. Typically, no one will be standing by during the
commission of a crime with a stopwatch and light meter to
check on visibility. One source of data to answer these
questions is the police themselves. The accumulated years of
patrol experience are a starting point for obtaining estimates
for these parameters which could be supplemented by interview-
ing victims and criminals. (Remember though there is a bias
since the criminals that will be interviewed are the ones
that were caught.) In addition, despite our opening remark,
police departments sometimes do have motion pictures of
specific types of crimes. Laboratory type experiments also
can be performed to replicate different types of crimes in
order to estimate the above parameters as was done in one
experiment in Syracuse by Elliott [1]. No one method is
necessarily going to yield very accurate estimates; however,
by using all of the above approaches, it should be possible
to obtain estimates that are sufficiently accurate to help
answer deployment questions.
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One interesting issue, besides the probability of inter-
ception by a passing patrol car, that the above data can~be
used to address, involves determining the relationship between
response time and apprehending the criminal in the vicinity of
the crime. A model of this phenomenon would seem to require
the following:
1. What is the probability of an individual spotting
the crime and then summoning the police?
2. How long between the observation and the telephone
call is made?
3. At what point during the crime was it observed?
4. How long after the crime was observed will the crime
last and/or the crilliinal be in the immediate vicinity?
Much of the data that we have suggested gathering can also be
applied to answering these questions. This coup~dwith the
more easily obtainable measures of the police response system
can be used to model a major component of the relationship
between apprehension and rapid response.
~.4.3 Expanded Patrol Model
The search theoretic models of patrol we have discussed
have captured only one aspect of patrol, the patrol initiated
probability of intercepting a crime o However, criminals can
also be apprehended by a patrol force rapidly responding to
information about a crime in progress. Thus, a first step
in developing an expanded model of patrol effectiveness is to
-334-
develop a modi of patrol which incorporates both manners of
intercepting a crime. Earlier in our discussion of overlapping
patrol we had seen the need for such a two faceted model.
Overlapping patrol increases the probability of police initia-
ted interceptions but also increases the travel time. A
model which could relate travel time to interception probabi-
lities (citizen initiated) would make possible a detailed
analysis of tradeoffs that arise in choosing between over-
lapping and non-overlapping patrol.
In the second stage this reactive model should be expan-
ded to include a preemptive model which focuses on deterrence
(assuming that some types of patrol can deter criminals), The
model would, of course, require information about the relation-
ship between both visible and plainclothes patrol and deter-
rence. Two other factors, however, that need to be included
are how the probability o~ interception and police response
time may also deter crimes. Thus the expanded model would
include:
A. Probability of Interception
1. Patrol initiated action
2. Rapid response
B. Deterrence (as a function of)
1. Visibility of the patrol force
2. Probability of interception
3. Rapid response
With this model (by no means easily developed) it then is
possible to evaluate alternative strategies and develop
mathematical techniques for finding strategies which are more
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effective overall.
8.4.4 Saturation and Displacement
One effect of major concern in deploying police is the
displacement of crimes. Even if a strategy is effective in
reducing one class of crimes in one particular region, the
crimes may simply be displaced geographically (as in the New
York City 20th precinct study [7 J) or criminals may switch to
different types of crimes. Consequently, experiments involving
new police tactics sometimes contain controls for assessing as
part of the evaluation whether or not there was a displacement
effect. However, what we are suggesting here is that rather
than attempt to measure this phenomenon by tacking on controls
to other experiments this issue should be addressed directly.
The reason for this different emphasis will become clear as
we describe the goals of a possible experiment.
The experiment would have as its basic goal not just the
determination of when displacement occurs or doesn't occur
but also a detailed mapping out of a number of relationships.
1. How much displacement occurs and of what type i~ a
patrol car passes a random point on the average
every hour, half hour, fifteen minutes, etc.?
2. What is the time lag (and time decay) between imple-
mentation of a specific level of saturation patrol
and displacement?
3. How many criminals are caught before and during the
process of displacement until the system stabilizes?
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In order to answer these questions an experiment would obvi-
ously have to be repeated a number of times for differing
levels of saturation. This variability will, in general, be
difficult to carry out if this is only part of a larger
experiment whose major goal is to determine if a particular
strategy is effective. Our discussion here should be inter-
preted as only an outline of the purpose and direction of the
experiment. There are obviously a number of political con-
siderations that will have to be dealt with in designing the
actual experiments. Successful implementation of an experi-
ment of this type would require that personnel at all levels
(including patrolmen) be cognizant of the goals of the experi~
ment and of their importance. Although this is good advice in
any police experiment, it is especially crucial here. The
experiment would have to involve committing a not insignificant
number of patrol units to an experiment whose ultimate payoff
is by no means immediate (or obvious) as its purpose is to
develop a data base necessary for designing effective patrol
strategies. This data base, for example, would be crucial to
applying game theory to the deployment problem.
8.4.5 Concluding Remarks
In our discussion of some issues that need clarification,
our focus has been on only a limited number of s~fic recom~
mendations and almost exclusively on patrol. Our emphasis on
patrol does not mean to suggest that other police tactics are
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ineffectual. However, before it is possible to make a valid
comparison between patrol and stakeouts, decoys or investiga-
tive services, it is necessary to determine how effective
patrol can be and under what circumstances it is most
effective. Lastly, we have not even touched on the inter-
action between police and other components of the crim~nal
justice system. This emission was made even though we
realize that the nature and magnitude of the interaction bet-
ween patrol and courts (or corrections) will sometimes depend
on the type of patrol strategy. Patrol strategies which
maximize deterrence and those which maximize apprehension will
interact differently with courts and their relative impact on
crime levels may well be a function of what the courts do.
However until more is known about how court actions alone and
in conjunction with police actions impact on crime levels, a
more comprehensive approach to police deployment is not
possible. Thus, for now, we have had to limit the discussion
to an isolated analysis of police patrol. Implementation of
models such as ours should, however, at least involve a
qualitative analysis of the impact of the courts and, where
possible, attempt to coordinate the activities of the courts
with the actions of the police.
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FOOTNOTES 8
The fact that the algorithm began with a particular atom
does not necessarily mean that that atom will appear in
in the final patrol area. Remember the algorithm allows
for the removal of atoms if their removal will increase
the total payoff.
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GLOSSARY
Atom
A region or area within the city that is sufficiently small
so that all spatial distributions over the region canre approxi-
mated to be uniform.
Beat
An area or region in which one patrol unit has preventive
patrol responsibility. Same as sector.
Call for service
A communication to police originating from a citizen, an
alarm system, a police officer, or other detector, reporting
the need fo~ on-scene police assistance.
Car locator system
A mthod or device which provides the dispatcher with
improved estimates of the positions of available patrol unitsG
This is to be distinguished from usual manual position estima-
tion methods which usually entail guessing an available unit's
position, using a center-of-mass criterion.
Center-of-mass
The point in a sector or an atom, respectively, which is
the statstically average positon of the patrolling unit or the
reported incidents, respectively.
Dispatch assignment
A directive by the dispatcher to a patrol unit assigning
the unit to respond to the scene of a reported incident, or
call for service.
Dispatch policy
A set of rules regarding the immediate assignment of"pat-
rol units to reported incidents. It specifies the conditions
under which a reported incident of a particular priority from
a particular location is entered into a queue of waiting ,
incident reports or is handled immediately by an assigned
patrol unit~
Dispatcher
An individual who has responsibility for assigning radio-
dispa~chable patrol units to reported incidents~
Dispatching strategy
Usually the component of the dispatch policy pertaining
to distance estimation techniquese
Home sector
The sector in which a patrol unit is assigned to perform
preventive patrol.
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Intercept probability
The likelihood that a patrolling unit will intercept a
crime while in progress
Intersector assignment
A dispatch assignment to a sector other than the unit's
home sector.
MCM (Modified Cemer of Mass Dispatching Strategy)
· If a call for service arises in atom j and the home
sector car is unavailable~ the dispatcher assigns the available
unit with the minimum estimate travel time to atom j.
Overlapping sectors
Sectors that at lee.st partially share common regions or
areas.
Patrol allocation
The entire process of determining the total required num-
ber of patrol units, their spatial and temporal assignments,
and rules governing their operationo Usually used here to
describe just the spatial assignment.
Patrol deployment strategy
A set of rules specifying the spatial distribution of
available patrol units, including sector and command design,
patrol coverages, and repositioning.
Patrol frequency
The number of times per hour that a patrolling unit passes
a particular point.
Patrol status
The condition of a patrol unit, particularly pertaining
tb dispatch availability. In some police departments the
dispatch status of a patrol unit is restricted to one of two
possibilities: available or unavailable; in others, finer
distinctions are made, including such possibilities as meal
break, auto maintenance, patrol initiated action, station~house,
or type of incident currently being serviced.
Patrol uni t ~
A footpatrolman; or an assigned pair of footpatrolment; or
a patrol car, scooter, or wagon and its assigned police officer(s).
Occasionally the term patrol car is used as a substitute for
this more general term.
Precinct
An area or region comprising several sectors that is
administratively distinct, usually having a station-house used
as a base of operations. A patrol officer is usually assigned
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to one precinct for a period of time. Dispatch assignments
are nearly always intra-precinct assignments.
Preventive patrol
An activity undertaken by a patrol unit, in which the unit
tours an area, with the officer(s) checking for crime hazards
(for example, open doors and windows) and attempting to inter-
cept any crimes while in progress.
Probability density function
A nonnegative function for which the probability that the
corresponding rantm variable lies between x and x+_ x (:.x small)
is approximately equal to the function evaluated at x multiplied
by x.
Queue
A waiting line, as of customers before a checkout counter
or incident reports before a dispatcher.
Random patrol
A preventive and interceptive patrol in which the patrolling
unit selects unpredictable patrol paths.
Right-angle distance
The sum of the total east~t and north-south distances
between two points, given that the directions of travel are
oriented east-west and north-south.
Search effort
The amount of time (m~~-hours) available to search for a
target or targets.
Search theory
A body of literature that analyzes the problem of searching
for targets. It includes models for calculating the probability
of intercepting a target under various patrol strategies and for
a range of target behaviors (e.g. stationary, moving). Part of
the literature discusses the optimal allocation of search effort.
Sector
Same as beat.
Sector identity
A term applied to an officer's personal -commitment to main~
tain public order and provide effective police service within
his home sector.
Simulation
A method of replicating the operations of a system with a
computer model that incorporates the same statistical behaviors
as found in the actual system~
-344-
spatial distribution
The relative allotment of some quantity (for example,
reported incidents) to each region of the city.
S~M (Strict Center of Mass IDispatching Strategy Strategy)
If a call for service arises in sector i and the home
sector car is unavailable, the dispatcher assigns the available
unit with the minimum estimated travel time to the center of
mass of sector i.
Temporal distribution
The relative allotment of some quantity (for example,
patrol unit) to each time of day.
Travel time
The time required for the dispatched patrol unit to travel
to the scene of the reported incident.
Utilization factor
The fraction of time a patrol unit is unavailable to
respond to dispatch requests. Sometimes it is assumed that a
unit can only be unavailable because of call-servicing dut'ies.
Sometimes called utilization rate.
Workload
Some measure of the time spent by a patrol unit on a num-
ber of prescribed duties, particularly calls for service.
Most of this glossary appears in a book by Richard C~-Larson
(Urban Police Patrol Analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1972)
and is reprinted with the author's permission.
•
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An Algorithm To Check If A Sector Is Contiguous
CONTlG: PROCEDURE OPTIONS(MAIN);
DECLARE DIMEN FLOAT BINARY;/* DIMEN: THE NUMBER OF ATOMS */
GET LIST (DIMEN) ;
BEGIN;
DECLARE A· A TIG(DIMEN,DIMEN) FIXED BINARY (1,0),
(LABEL(DIMEN), SCAN(DIMEN) FIXED BINARY(4,0),
LISTI FIXED DECIMAL;
1* A A TIG: ATOM CONTIGUITY MATRIX */
I~~ SCAN(K)=l: NODE K IS SCANNED i~1
I~~ LABEL(J)=l: NODE J IS LABELED {~I
l-i~ LISTl: NUMBER OF SCANNED NODES PLUS ONE i:-/
GET LIST(A A TIG);
SCAN=O; - -
SCAN(l)=l; LABEL(l)=l; LISTl=2;
DO K=l TO DIMEN;
IF SCAN(K)=O THEN
DO;
PUT LIST('SECTOR IS NOT CONTIGUOUS');
GO TO FINISH;
END;
I=SCAN(K) ;
DO J=l TO DIl'v1EN;
IF A A TIG(I,J)=l & LABEL(J)~=l THEN
DO; -
SCAN(LIST1)=J;
LIST1=LISTl+1;
IF LISTI ~ DIMEN+.5 THEN GO TO FINE;
LABEL(J)=l;
END;
END; /J,} LOOP ON J it-/
END; /* LOOP ON K */
FINE:PUT LIST ('SECTOR IS CONTIGUOUS');
END; /* BEGIN BLOCK */
FINISH: END CONTIG;
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A TWO SERVER QUEUING SYSTEM
The problem addressed here is to calculate the probability
of zero, (PO)' or one, (PI), server being busy given that each
server is busy an average of lOO·b percent of the time.
Let a- =:. arrival rate of calls for service
u =
p.=
~
average service time for a call
the probability that there are i calls presently
in the system, either being serviced or in queue
The following equations can then be written that describe
the system in steady state.
u·Pl = a~PO
2u·P =2
Equivalently
PI =( a/u) °PO
Pz = (a/Zu)·P1 = (a/u).(a/2u)·Po
Pi :. (a/u) 0 (a/zu)i-l opo
But .L p. = 11.=0 1.
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l=po+(a!u).Po+(a/u).(a.Zu).Po+ •••+(a/u).(a!zu)i-l. PO+.t.
l=PO + (a/u)·PO/(l-a/Zu)
l=(PO +(a/Zu)ePo)/(l-a/Zu)
However, the average utilization of each server wil be a/2u
so that b= a/Zu e
Consequently Po= (l-b)/(l+b)
and P1=(a/u)ePo = 2b·PO = 2b-(1-b)/(1+b) •
-350-
APPENDIX C
OVERLAPPING SECTORS vs. NON-OVERLAPPING SECTORS
-3.51~
OverlaPRing Sectors VB. Non-overlapping Sectors
Overlapping Sectors
Pio = (I-b) .[I-exp(-2S.T.OB!M)] + 2b{l-b) .[l-exp(S.T.OB/M)](l+b) l+b
Non-overlapping Sectors
Pin = (l-b).[I-exp(-2S.T.OB/M)]
-(1-b)·[1-exp(-2S-T·OB/M)]
In order to prove that the above equation is always greater
than zero (i.e. Pio is greater than Pin)' it is only necessary
to show that
1 + exp(-2S·T-OB/M) - 2exp(-S·P.OB/M) ~ 0
since b and (I-b) are always greater than zero.
By substituting 'X' for 'S.T~OB/M' in the inequality, we
obtain
f(X) = 1 + exp(-2X) - 2exp(-X) ~ 0
To show that f(X) is always greater than or equal to zero, it
is sufficient to prove that when X=O, f(X)=O and that when X
is greater than zero f(X) is monotonically increasing.
For X = 0
l-exp(-2X)-2exp(-X) = 1 + 1 - 2 = 0
In addition the derivative of f(X) is
f'(X) = -2exp(-2X) + 2exp(-X)
However, for X > 0 the following is always true:
exp(-X) > exp(-2X)
which means that the function monotonically increases.
Consequently, the function, f(x), is always greater than or
equal to zero. Q.E.D.
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Average Level of Crime Increases as the Cycle Length In~~eases
s= (-C1,/2F-X)'.(1-exp(-F·X)) + PI./2F
- (CZ/2(F+I)·X)-(1-exp(-(F+I)·X)) + A/2(F+I)
with
C = (-AoILPO(F+Jt)O(l-eXr(-(F+I)oX))1 l-exp -(2F+I)oX
02= (A'I!F'(F+I))O(l-eX}(-FOX))
l-exp(-(2F+I ·X)
Replacing C1 and Cz in the original eqllation yields
s= (A e r/2F(F+I)) \l-exp(-F'X-LL~(l-exp(-~p+I)'X))X · (1-exp(-(2F+I ·X
[ 1 IJ~ + A/2(F+I)) + A/2FF+I - F
Since the expression ~~I -~] is negative, and the expressions
A/ZF·(F+I), A/2(F+I), and A/2~ are constants, then to prove that
S isammotonically increasing function of X~ it is necessary and
sufficient to show that H(X),
H(X)= (l-exp~-F·X))·(l-exp(-(F+I)·X))
• X• (1-exp (- (2F+I ) •X) I
is a monotonically decreasing function of X.
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Let f(X)= exp(-P·X)
g(X)= exp(-(F+I) ·X)
Then H(X) can be written as
}I (X ) = (l-f)· (l-g)XtP(l-fg)
H'(X)= X(l-fg)(-f-f+fg'+gf') - (l-f)(l-g)(-Xfg'-Xgf'+(l-fg))
(X(l-fg))Z
Since the denominator is always positive, the problem reduces
to proving that the numerator is negative
Let N(X) equal the numberator of H'(X)
N(X)= X(-f'g'+fg'+gf'+fgf'+fgg'-f2 gg'-fg2 r;+fg'+gf'-f2 g'-gff'
_gfgt_g2f'+f2gg'+fg2f~) - (l-f)(l-g)(l-fg)
N(X)= X(-f'-g'+2fg'+2gf'-f2 g' Qg2f') - (l-f)(l-g)(l-fg)
But I-fg= (I-f) + (I-g) - (l-f)(l-g)
Hence (l-f)(l-g)(l-fg)= (1-f)2(1-g) + (1-g)2(1-f) - (1_f)2(1_g)2
so
N(X)= (-Xf'-(1-f))(1-g)2 + (-Xg'-(1-g))(1-f)2 + (1_f)2(1_g)2
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If each of the two terms is shown to be negative then the proof
is complete.
Let u(X)= -Xf' -(l-f) + (1-f)2
2
Then u'(X)= -Xf" -f' + f' - rt(l-f) = -Xf'-f'+ff'f
Replacing f with the original exp(-F'X) and combining te~s yields
u'(X)= [Fexp(-F'X)]'[-F'X + 1 - exp(-P-X)]
Now let r(X)= (-F·X + 1 - exp(-F·X))
r'(X)= -F + Fexp(-F·X) < 0
But r(O)= 0 + 1 - 1 = 0
which imples that r(X) < 0
Consequently, u'(X) is a product of a positive, Fexp(-FeX), and
a ne~ative function, r(X), which implies that
u'(X) ~ 0
But u(O)= -OF'(O) - (l-F(O)) + (1-F(O))2
2 = a
As a result u(X), which is also a decreasing function of X, must
be less than or equal to zero.
Similarly v(X)= -X·g' - (I-g) + (1_g)22 < 0
so H'(X)= u(X) (l_g)2 + v(X) (1-F)2 ~ 0
and H(X) is a decreasing function of X. Q.E.D.
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Average Level 9f Crime for Shortest Cycles
The problem is to find the limit of S as 2X approaches zero.
lim S= -[Cl /2P'X]'[1-exp(-F'X)] + A/2F2X"'O
- [Cz/Z(F+I)"xJ"[l-exp(-(F+I)"X)]
+ A/2(F+I)
with C1 and Cz as defined in equations (5.9) and(5.10).
Replacing C1 and Cz into the original equation yields:
s= [A'r/2F'(F+I)]' [(l-eXP{-F"X})"(l-eXP~-(F+I}"X}}l
X"(l-exp(-(ZF+I)"X) J
[l - II + A/2{ F+I) + A/2F• F+I ~ -F J
The limits of the numerator and denominator for the first term
in the previous expression oath approach 0 as '2X' approaches O.
It turns out that in order to calculate the limit of the first
term, L'H8p ital's rule will have to be applied twice in succession.
Let N= [l-exp(-F·X)] • [l-exp(-(F+I)'X)]
D= X'[1-exp(-(2F+I)'X)]
The derivatives of the numerator, N, and denominator, D. are
N'* [l-exp(-F·X)]·[F+I]·[exp(-(F+I).X)]
+ [l-exp(-(F+I)'X)]'[Fexp(-F'X)]
D'= X'[2F+I]'[exp(-(2F+I)'X)] + [1 - exp(-(2F+I)'X)]
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However,_ once again the limits of n' and D' are zero. Taking
the ~econd derivative of each term generates the following
two expressions.
lim N-= -(F+I)2 + (2F+I) - Fa = 2F(F+I)
2X"'O
D"= (2F+ I ) •Eex:p ( - ( 2F+ I ) •X) ] 0 [ -x e ( 2F+ I )+1]
+ (2F+I)eexp(-(2F+I)eX)
lim D"= 2(2F+I)
2X....O
Therefore lim N/D= F(F+I)!(2F+I)
2X....O
It is now possible to calculate the lim S
2~-ttO
lim s= [A·I/(2F·(F+I))J·LF(F+I)/(2F+I)J~[-I/F(F+I)]
2X-'O
+A/2(F+I) + A/ZF
= 2A/( 2F+I)
-)60-
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APPENDIX F
This appendix is intended to show that the expressions
that were left out in going from equation (5.37) to (5.38)
all approach zero faster than 1/(X+L)2 when X approaches
infinity. First we write down the eliminated expressions.
They are
R =1 2(X+L) ·Fz • (I+F)Z
-2Fe (X+L
- r-X)
R =2
- I-X)]
We will prove that Rl approaches zero faster than 1/(X+L)2 and
analogous proof applies to RZ- To prove this it is necessary
to show that
lim Rl/(1/(X+L)2)=O
X-'oo
which equals
lim K·(X+I.J)2
x...oo (X+L)
Fexp(-F(X+2L) )J.
(K is a constant_) The denominator approaches 1 as X goes to
infinity and the expression [exp(-2F.(X+IJ)-I-X)-1] approaches
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minus 1 and thus both components can be ignored. However as X
goes to infinity the expression (X+L) also goes to infinity
and the expression [(I+F)·exp(-(I+F).X)+Fexp(-F(X+2L))] goes
to zero. Thus the proof that RI goes to zero faster than
1/(X+L)2 goes to zero reduces to proving that
lim (X+L)·[(I+F)·exp«-(I+F)·X)+Fexp(-F(X+2L))] = 0
x... 00
However, if it can be shown that in general
lim (X+IJ)·Kl€xp(-K2eX-K3):: 0
X-+ 00
then the above also is true. This can be rewritten as
The application of 1lHopital's Rule yields
lim L Kl
X-X> K2
o exp(K2-,X+K3)
which obviously approaches zero as X goes to infinity.
Q.E.D.
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A Proof that at most One of the Two Solutions
is Positive
In order to show that at most one of the two solutions is
positive,we will sketch a proof that
(NI-l)2R(R+l) - 2i~2R+ltJi
2(R+l)2_2MR2
never generates a positive solution. The denominator will
be negative when
WI > (R+ll2
2R
and equal to zero when M equals that expression. However, what
happens to the numerator at the turning point. Substituting
that expression for M into the numerator yields
[(R;lt- IJ .2R(R+l) - 2(2R+l),/(R;1)~
= [(R+l)2 - R2J.ZR(R+l)
R2
2 ( 2R+1 ) • ( R+1 )
R
= 2 ( R+1 ) • ( 2R+1 )
R
2( 2R+l) • (R+l)
R = 0
Thus at the point the denominator is zero the numerator is
also zero. However as M increases above (R~1)1 (i.e. the
denominator is negative) it is clear the numerator has
become positive. The first term is increasin~ faster (almost
proportional to M) than the second term (which increases
with the square root of M)~ Consequently when the numerator
is positive the denominator is negative and vice versa.
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